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From China to Cuba: 
Guerilla Warfare as a Mechanism for Mobilizing Resources 
 
Jorge L. Barrera  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Guerilla Warfare1 is a weapon of the weak; it is decisive only where the 
actor in power fails to commit adequate resources to the conflict. The Chinese 
and Cuban revolutions are examples of guerilla warfare success, albeit under 
different conditions and employment techniques; while Mao Tse-tung utilized 
decentralized guerilla warfare to indoctrinate and mobilize the masses of 
peasants for revolutionary struggle against a stronger enemy; Fidel Castro 
employed a more centralized approach to create the conditions necessary for 
popular support of the revolution. However, in both cases guerilla warfare was 
simply part of a pragmatic grand strategy to build nationalism across all classes 
of society. It is well known that revolutionary movements do not succeed where 
only one class of society is mobilized. As a result, both Mao and Castro designed 
dual strategies: an internal component focused on the peasant base; and an 
external component focused on a nationalistic appeal to all classes of society.  In 
a revolutionary setting, the strong force of nationalism can cut across all 
 
1 The word guerilla is taken from the Spanish word for “little war” which originated during the 
Napoleonic Wars of the early 19th century. 
 iv
segments of the population and strongly enable popular support for the 
insurgents.  
 Both revolutionary leaders skillfully managed the contradictions 
associated with their respective dual strategies – a difficult task indeed since the 
dual strategy is one of deception. This thesis will prove that through such a plan 
of action, Mao and Castro integrated efforts such as leadership and ideology, 
with the key ingredient of guerilla warfare, to create the conditions for the control 
of resources necessary to achieve ultimate victory.  Following revolutionary 
success, the experience of guerilla warfare and the dual strategy - particularly in 
Cuba - shaped the respective foreign policies within the context of a worldwide 
struggle against imperialism. Cuba has continued to refine the dual strategy in 
order to obtain international support and maintain the Castro regime in power. 
China eventually adopted a dual strategy of a different variety: the separation of 
economics from communist ideology. Although implementation of the dual 
strategy continues to the present day, it was the revolutionary process that not 
only validated the concept, but provided the credibility required to continue its 
execution. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
The Cuban and Chinese revolutions – but particularly the latter - are 
known as peasant1 revolutions.  Thus, the perception is that peasants rebelled in 
response to poverty and traditional exploitation by the upper classes and 
succeeded in changing the social structure of the country. Of course, reality is 
considerably more complex than that. These conditions alone are not enough to 
provide a revolutionary situation, nor can peasants alone succeed in a revolution. 
The inter-relation of a number of social, economic, and political factors that 
converge at a particular point in time can set the conditions for revolutionary 
uprising and subsequent social change. According to Charles Tilly (1978), the 
struggle for power translates into control of resources. The actor (government 
included) that can best mobilize and control resources such as land, labor, 
capital, information, and arms into collective action against the rival actor(s) will 
claim the right to rule and control government. The mechanisms to mobilize 
resources include cross-cutting [class] alliances, ideology, leadership, 
organization, and violence.  
 
1 Peasant is defined as a member of a class compromising small farmers and tenants, 
sharecroppers, and laborers on the land, where they constitute the primary labor force in 
agriculture (Webster’s Dictionary). 
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Both Mao Tse-tung and Fidel Castro successfully employed these 
mechanisms to mobilize the resources required to challenge those in power, and 
thus set the conditions for eventual victory. Through guerilla warfare, Mao was 
able to indoctrinate and mobilize the peasants into a decisive force for success to 
await the development of a revolutionary situation. In contrast, Castro’s band of 
revolutionaries succeeded in creating the conditions for revolution, by 
establishing their primary support amongst the rural peasantry and then 
expanding to urban regions.  However as Barrington Moore (1966) explains, 
even if a revolutionary situation exists and the proper strategy is implemented to 
mobilize resources, it does not necessarily mean that such circumstances will 
automatically result in a revolution; a decisive catalyst or ingredient normally 
ignites these conditions into a revolution.  In the case of China, the consensus is 
that the decisive ingredient for communist revolutionary victory was the Japanese 
conquest and the occupation policies of a foreign foe. In Cuba, Fulgencio 
Batista’s brutal campaign against rural villages that he perceived to be supporting 
Castro proved to be a major asset to the cause of the revolutionaries. I argue that 
in fact it was guerilla warfare that served as the catalyst for eventual 
revolutionary victory in both case studies. By shaping their respective guerilla 
campaigns, both Mao and Castro were able to design strategies that permitted 
them to appeal to the different classes, and allowed them to shape a nationalistic 
platform – as an alternative to a communist or socialist one – that eventually 
succeeded.   
 3
                                                
This research seeks to compare the two revolutions by utilizing guerilla 
warfare as the basis for comparison as it shaped the revolutionary strategies of 
China and Cuba.  I will discuss strategies for mobilizing2 popular support 
resources, focusing on the peasantry; then transition into the key role of guerilla 
warfare in implementing and integrating the overall revolutionary strategy to 
capitalize on the conditions that existed for revolution, and thus set the conditions 
for eventual success in 1949 and 1959 respectively. In the case of China, this 
paper focuses on the period of 1935 to 1945, which coincides with Mao’s 
leadership of the Communist Party, the Japanese occupation, and the 
implementation of the communist strategy for popular support and guerilla 
warfare. For Cuba, although the focus for comparison is the period from 1956 - 
when Castro’s 82 revolutionaries landed in Cuba - to his consolidation of power 
in 1959, I will also discuss the internationalization of Castro’s strategy following 
revolutionary victory. 
Theoretical Framework 
Revolutionary Theory. 
   Revolutionary theories seek to organize revolution “facts” into a 
framework that can predict the revolutionary potential of a society or explain the 
causes of why a revolution failed or succeeded. These facts include leaders, 
followers, ideology, organization, techniques, and external support. The most 
commonly discussed are Marxist Theory - its main argument being that 
revolution occurs when the exploited economic class is sufficiently alienated to 
 
2 Mobilization is the process whereby [in this case]  peasants commit their resources (land, food, 
time, energy, and even their lives) to revolutionary organizations (Wickham-Crowley 1991, 177)  
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gain revolutionary consciousness; the Systems Theory – related to a failure of 
existing social structures to perform their essential functions; and Modernization 
Theory – which suggests that revolutionary conditions occur when the state is 
unable or unwilling to adapt to the demands and interest mobilized by 
modernization (Greene 1999).  
The People’s War is Mao Tse-tung’s version of the Marxist Theory; he 
realized that the urban proletariat focus of Marxist theory did not apply to China. 
Obtaining the support of the peasantry, while appealing to all classes of Chinese 
society, was his pragmatic approach to acquiring broad-based popular support; 
that is, build the Red Army, and await the objective conditions for a popular 
uprising, in order to engage in the last revolutionary step: armed struggle 
(Greene 1999; Shum 1988).      
Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, inspired by Mao’s People’s War, further 
refined Marxist theory into their own blend, which resulted in the foco3 theory. 
While acknowledging that popular forces could defeat a stronger enemy, and that 
the countryside was where the struggle would begin, the foco theory stated that 
popular support would be created during the armed struggle itself; there was no 
need to wait until all the conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection 
could create them (Guevara 1961). Jules Régis Debray4 expanded and 
 
3 The word foco is derived from the Spanish word for focus, and is described both in English and 
Spanish as the “center of activity, or area of greatest energy, of a storm, eruption, etc.” (The 
Oxford Universal Dictionary, 3rd ed.) 
4 Debray is a French intellectual, journalist and professor. Although a well-known leftist activist, 
he did become an associate of Guevara and fought with him in Bolivia during 1967. He also 
interviewed Castro several times. His work, Revolution in the Revolution?, is considered 
supplementary to Guevara’s writings on guerilla warfare and revolutionary theory (Wickham-
Crowley 1991). 
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formalized the foco theory – within a Latin American context – in his Revolution in 
the Revolution? (1967) effort. In essence, a small group of revolutionaries was 
considered enough to jumpstart a revolution, while concurrently developing the 
conditions for popular support.5   
The cornerstone of both revolutionary theories is that popular forces can 
win a war against a superior army. This of course is a testament to the power of 
guerilla warfare when supported by the masses. This form of violence became 
the primary mechanism for mobilizing resources and undermining the moral 
authority of the actor in power.  Mao chose to build his own peasant army and 
developed the tactics of guerilla warfare from base areas in the countryside 
(Drew and Snow 1988; Kennedy 2008). To Mao, the role of guerilla warfare went 
beyond the obvious: it would also serve as a mechanism for obtaining popular 
support (Friedman 1970); for getting close to the peasants and sharing their 
hardships; for indoctrination of peasants; and for obtaining small victories against 
the Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalists, and then the Japanese in order to obtain 
credibility and motivate the masses. Finally, it would provide a springboard for 
the development of conventional armies that would eventually confront the KMT 
for the right to rule China. For Che and Castro the existence of a guerilla foco 
would pose a threat to the government’s legitimacy and exclusive monopoly over 
 
5 In this work, I generally credit Che Guevara with the foco theory of revolution because he 
codified its principal component of guerilla warfare in writing - based on his experiences during 
the Cuban revolution. However, it was Fidel Castro that developed it in practice, mostly by trial 
and error, during the revolutionary campaign. Further, Régis Debray is generally credited with 
formalizing the foco theory. Thus, although I generally credit Guevara throughout this document, 
the reader must realize that all three individuals played an important role in the development of 
the foco theory of revolution. 
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violence. Such a challenge was to force an oppressive state to use increasing 
levels of violence and oppression and thus radicalize all sectors of opposition 
(Johnson 2006; Kling 1962). The end result is the same: classes of society riding 
a wave of nationalism unite against the government and overthrow it.   
Specific Theory 
Charles Tilly’s Resource Mobilization, in his Political Conflict Theory, will 
provide the framework for analysis.  I will discuss the blending of the mobilization 
mechanisms – with guerilla warfare as the main ingredient - into a cohesive 
strategy that appealed not only to the main effort of such strategy ( the peasants)  
but also other classes in pursuit of the broadest possible alliance. Both 
revolutionary leaders understood that a revolution cannot succeed without 
support from the different classes of society. I will examine research that focuses 
on the blend of politics and forms of warfare to achieve the end state of regime 
change through violence. The central idea of the comparative analysis is that 
guerilla warfare is not exclusively a form of violence in the pursuit of power, but 
that to achieve success when revolutionary conditions exist, it must be part of a 
grand strategy that incorporates political, social, economic, and psychological 
variables, with an end state of maximum mobilization of resources.  
However as previously discussed, Barrington Moore (1966) explains in his 
work Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, that a decisive catalyst or 
ingredient normally ignites revolutionary conditions into an actual revolution. In 
both China and Cuba, the situation was ripe for a peasant’s revolt.  The structure 
of China’s peasant society could not adjust to the stresses associated with 
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market forces and modernization; its agrarian bureaucracy inhibited reform and 
weakened the link that bound the peasants to the upper classes, resulting in the 
survival of a peasant mass that eventually became the main force behind the 
revolution (Moore 1966). In Cuba the repressive Batista regime, a disaffected 
peasantry without a history of private ownership, and large numbers of 
unemployed rural workers in a sugar mill dominated economy (Pérez-Stable 
1993), combined with a tradition of rebellion in the east of Cuba - created the 
conditions for a guerilla movement in the Oriente province countryside (Pérez 
1988; Wickham-Crowley 1991). As part of this research, I intend to prove that 
guerilla warfare not only shaped the grand strategy of both case studies, but was 
also the decisive catalyst in facilitating revolutionary victory.  
Concepts and Definitions 
Revolution  
 In his work, The Anatomy of Revolution (1966), Crane Brinton defines 
revolution as a “drastic, sudden substitution of one group in charge of running a 
territorial political entity for another group.” A literature review indicates that 
revolution is also associated with:  
(1) An alteration in the personnel, structure, and function of government that are 
not sanctioned by the prevailing constitution.  
(2) A relatively abrupt and significant change in the distribution of wealth and 
social status.  
Thus, it is clear that not all the conflicts commonly referred to as revolutions meet 
the above criteria. For example, the American Revolution could be classified as a 
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“War of Independence” instead of a revolution, because the social status of 
social groups did not abruptly change. However, it is apparent that both the 
Chinese and Cuban revolutions meet the definition and conditions stated above.  
Strategy  
 Strategy is a plan of action, or complex decision making process that 
connects the ends sought (objectives) with the ways and means of achieving 
those ends (Drew and Snow 1988; O’Neill 1990). Hence, for the Chinese and 
Cuban revolutions, the ends sought were the control of resources. Among the 
means were guerilla warfare, leadership, and ideology. The Grand Strategy then 
sought to coordinate resources to achieve a political objective – that is, social 
and regime change.  Both Mao and Castro utilized dual strategies (internal and 
external) to attain the control of resources. The internal strategy focused on 
obtaining the support of the peasants – for Mao they would provide the great 
force to offset the military strengths of the Nationalists; for Castro sanctuary to 
conduct his guerilla campaign. The external focused on appealing to other 
classes of society and international actors.    
Nationalism  
 Nationalism is the process of integrating the masses into a common 
political form (Kohn 1944). Castro realized that fostering and harnessing 
nationalism would unite the classes and serve to control resources. Mao 
developed his political theory of “New Democracy,” the application of Marxism to 
the specific conditions and needs of China, with the intent to broaden the 
ideological appeal by merging the patriotic sentiment of nationalism with the 
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reforming passion of Marxism (Wylie 1980). Essentially, the New Democracy 
called for state ownership of big banks, industries, and commercial 
establishments. But all other enterprises would be permitted to remain in private 
hands. The ownership of land was to be readjusted, not for the purpose of 
building a socialist agriculture, but to turn the land into peasant property (Mark 
1951). Thus, the upper classes are reassured because socialism was not defined 
as the immediate objective but only as a long term goal; conversely, the lower 
classes are satisfied that their land reform agenda will eventually be met. 
To the Cuban revolutionaries, nationalism meant imparting a common 
revolutionary identity to the population. Through the revolution, Castro developed 
the possibility of a new “imagined community” that incorporated a new sense of 
Cubanidad (Cubaness) based on the political and social ideals of the revolution. 
In forging this “imagined community,” a concept developed by Benedict Anderson 
(1991), Castro combined the ideals of a classless society with a passionate anti-
establishment rhetoric that would become essential parts of being Cuban and 
independent (Pérez 1988). Of course, the Batista government contributed to 
Castro’s nationalism by implementing a brutal campaign of repression against 
perceived supporters of the revolutionaries. Nevertheless, both leaders needed a 
mechanism to integrate all elements of their revolutionary strategies and 
demonstrate to the people not only progress, but their commitment to the 
struggle…Guerilla warfare would be that mechanism. 
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Guerilla Warfare  
 The essence of guerilla warfare is highly mobile hit-and-run attacks by 
lightly to moderately armed groups that seek to harass a normally superior 
enemy and gradually erode his will and capability to fight. Guerillas place a 
premium on flexibility, speed, and deception (O’Neill 1990; Drew and Snow 
1988). Guerilla warfare is one technique (means) of violence that revolutionary 
movements can employ to achieve their ends; others include, terrorism, coup 
d’état6, or a combination of these three techniques. Both Mao and Castro’s 
lieutenant, Che Guevara, shaped the techniques, tactics, and procedures of 
guerilla warfare to fit their particular circumstances and conditions.   
Insurgency, war, and warfare 
 Insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or 
movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. 
Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. When compared to their 
adversaries, insurgents generally have strong will, but limited means. It is the 
relative disparity in assets that normally requires groups to use insurgency, 
although some insurgents may have no interest in working within the existing 
political system (JP 3-24). War is a contest of wills between sociopolitical groups, 
or as the Prussian military theorists Carl von Clausewitz proposed: “War is a 
continuation of politics by other means (Drew and Snow 1988).” There are 
differences in the ways wars are waged and these are referred to as warfare. A 
form of warfare may be viewed as one variety of organized violence emphasizing 
 
6 The sudden overthrow of a government by a small group of persons in a position of authority, 
normally the military.  
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particular armed forces, weapons, tactics, and targets (O’Neill 1990). Three 
forms of warfare are associated with insurgencies: guerilla war, conventional 
warfare, and terrorism. These will be discussed in more detail in the chapters 
ahead. 
Research Objective and Hypotheses.  
    The focus of this work is popular support, particularly of the peasantry, and 
thus the research objective is to determine how mobilization of the masses was 
achieved by Mao and Castro. I seek to prove that guerilla warfare was the key 
ingredient that integrated the separate efforts to mobilize resources 
(organization, ideology, violence, etc.) into a coherent plan of action that 
established the direction of both revolutions. Both revolutionary leaders survived 
a series of strategic failures and almost complete extermination, by designing 
dual strategies to de-emphasize class struggle and instead encourage national 
unity and moderate reform, and thus establish cross-cutting alliances throughout 
all classes of society. As a result, they were able to offset the resource 
mobilization advantages (particularly military) of their rivals  I intend to analyze 
this central theme of both strategies as it applies to a common objective in the 
achievement of revolutionary ends: the buildup of nationalism. Hence, this thesis 
project seeks to answer the following questions:  
? What was Mao Tse-tung’s/ Fidel Castro’s strategy for mobilizing popular 
support resources? 
? What role did guerilla warfare play in building nationalism?  
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As I answer these questions, I will demonstrate that both Mao and Castro utilized 
variations of guerilla warfare to design a grand strategy that built nationalism 
across classes of society.    
Research Design 
At its core, this is a case study of two similar cases that explores the 
cause and effect relationship of guerilla warfare (independent variable) and 
nationalism (dependent variable).  However, this approach ignores other 
important variables such as organization, ideology, and leadership that in these 
two cases, also served to build nationalism. An intermediate step is that of 
designing a grand strategy that can wrap all other variables into one. Thus, rather 
than examining multiple instances of X1 => Y, I will examine a single instance of:  
X1 => X2 => Y. That is, a causal chain in a Process Tracing form of analysis, 
where X1 = Guerilla Warfare; X2 = Grand Strategy; and Y = Nationalism.  
This case study of revolutions relies on analyzing archival information of 
the Chinese and Cuban Revolutions as well as forms of warfare. I intend to 
conduct an in-depth longitudinal examination of revolutionary theory in order to 
provide a theoretical framework for the case study. However, in analyzing the 
causal chain described above – as it applies to the Chinese and Cuban 
Revolutions – it is more of a mix. The variable X1 (guerilla warfare) is best 
analyzed through a longitudinal study because the tactics and techniques of this 
form of warfare had to be refined and adapted to the specific situations over an 
extended period of time. Further, in both cases, guerilla warfare was [initially] 
simply a mechanism for survival of the movement(s), not part of a grand strategy 
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or campaign plan that would ultimately serve to mobilize the resources required 
achieve success. However, the variable X2 (grand strategy) is best analyzed 
through a cross-sectional study of the point in time when the grand strategy was 
designed and applied to the revolutionary phenomenon to achieve the desired 
effect: Y (nationalism).   
The unit of analysis for this study is the revolutionary process. These are 
two similar cases because the Chinese and Cuban Revolutions are peasant 
revolutions that occurred within ten years of each other; both successfully 
employed guerilla warfare as a form of violence; had strong and charismatic 
leaders that sought to build nationalism  as a mechanism for regime change; and 
both resulted in extended communist regimes. I seek to demonstrate that the 
main difference was in the employment of guerilla warfare. Regarding X1, my 
argument is that although the basic tenets of this form of warfare remained 
constant; a principal difference between the two was in the degree of command 
and control. Castro insisted on highly centralized control of guerilla activities, 
through Che’s foco theory; while Mao decentralized activities to a group of 
cadres for local initiative and immediate response. Both variations proved to be 
the key ingredient in shaping – albeit in different ways - the grand strategy.   
As far as X2, I argue that both Mao and Castro utilized dual strategies 
(internal and external) to attain the control of resources. As discussed earlier, the 
internal strategy focused on obtaining the support of the peasants – for Mao they 
would provide the great force to offset the military strengths of the Nationalists; 
for Castro sanctuary to conduct his guerilla campaign. The external focused on 
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appealing to other classes of society as well as the international community. I will 
examine the specific mechanisms that facilitated the conduct of such strategy 
and how instrumental was the role of guerilla warfare in implementing it. Of 
course, implementation carries certain risks; even if the internal and external 
strategies are parallel, overlaps do occur resulting in contradictions. Thus in this 
research, I will prove how both leaders brilliantly found a solution by orchestrating 
the dual strategy contradictory elements through the manipulation of, time, 
space, and participants.  
Next, the explanation of Y is straight-forward. It is well-known that 
regardless of how nationalism is inspired it offers the greatest flexibility for 
revolutionaries, to appeal to all classes of society. Thus, as the main objective of 
the grand strategy, nationalism – would be the principal tool in the mobilization of 
resources. The basic concept of how Mao and Castro built nationalism - through 
their dual strategies - has already been discussed in the “Concepts and 
Definitions” section of this chapter. Finally, I intend to incorporate Barrington 
Moore’s (1966) thesis that a catalyst normally ignites a revolution when a 
revolutionary situation exists. I will do so by arguing that guerilla warfare was in 
fact the catalyst for both revolutions. This in fact is a contradiction to his proposal 
that – in the China scenario – it was the Japanese invasion.   
My rationale for this study is to clarify misconceptions of guerilla warfare in 
revolutions as simply a form of violence; that is, a stand-alone instrument for 
actors that seek power.  In this comparative analysis, I argue that guerilla warfare 
is not exclusively a form of violence in the pursuit of power, but that to achieve 
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success when revolutionary conditions exist, it must be part of a grand strategy 
that incorporates political, social, economic, and psychological variables, that 
maximize the mobilization of resources to achieve the end state of political and 
social change.  
Data Collection Plan and Chapter Overview 
As discussed in the previous section, this case study of revolutions relies 
on analyzing archival information of the Chinese and Cuban Revolutions as well 
as forms of warfare. Extensive works on guerilla warfare have been published; 
more importantly, both Mao and Che Guevara codified their particular variations 
of guerilla warfare by publishing works on the subject - these will form the 
cornerstone of the X1 discussion.  As far as X2, there exists plenty of literature on 
making strategy – from tactical and operational to strategic. The challenge lies in 
analyzing how both revolutionary leaders fused politics and violence into a grand 
strategy that appealed to the masses.  My focus in the Y analysis is to describe 
how Mao and Castro coordinated the mobilization of resources and skillfully 
manipulated the contradictions of their strategies to achieve a radical nationalism 
that led to ultimate revolutionary success.   
Chapter two provides an overview of the dynamic relationship between 
insurgencies and revolutions. I will discuss and select a framework for 
understanding the development of revolutions, examine several revolutionary 
theories to provide context, and discuss factors, settings, and conditions that 
make revolutions favorable – and how they apply to the Chinese and Cuban 
revolutions. I will then examine the revolutionary theories developed by Mao and 
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Guevara, and thus provide the reader with the necessary background information 
to understand why guerilla warfare became the backbone of the revolutionary 
strategy employed by Mao and Castro.  
Chapter three analyzes guerilla warfare not only as a form of warfare 
frequently employed by insurgents, but as a resource. My point is that guerilla 
warfare is not exclusively a form of violence in the pursuit of power, but that to 
achieve success when revolutionary conditions exist, it must be part of a grand 
strategy that incorporates political, social, economic, and psychological variables, 
with an end state of maximum mobilization of resources.  The discussion of such 
a strategy in Chapters four and five presents the core argument of my thesis. The 
focus is on the respective “dual strategies” employed by Mao and Castro to 
mobilize the resources required to challenge the actor in power. This strategy of 
deception requires certain elements or conditions, such as successful 
employment of guerilla warfare, leadership, ideology, and of course a 
revolutionary setting. I will explain how each revolutionary leader molded these 
elements to fit their particular conditions and achieve revolutionary success. 
The focus of chapter six is the continued employment of the dual strategy 
following revolutionary victory in Cuba. The internationalization of the insurgent 
strategy by Fidel Castro, with the United States as the primary enemy, was built 
on the experiences of the revolution and the philosophy of guerilla warfare. I will 
explain how Castro used this strategy to remain in power for over 50 years. The 
conclusion summarizes the main themes and findings, and offers some 
perspectives and speculation about the way ahead for China and Cuba.
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Chapter Two 
 
Revolutionary Theory 
 
 
Introduction 
Building a theory of revolution can be problematic and complex. There are 
no simple or straightforward answers to explain revolutions, the factors that 
cause them, or the likely outcomes. For example, a common held notion is that 
poverty breeds revolution. Although this view contains an element of truth, it does 
not explain why historically revolutions have not occurred in scores of extremely 
poor countries. Another common view is that revolutions occur when a state 
faces increasingly unmanageable difficulties, but once again this view fails to 
explain the occurrence of revolution in several countries that have experienced 
such situations (Goldstone 1994). Cuba faced extreme political and economic 
hardship following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but a second revolution did 
not occur; currently, Zimbabwe faces economic collapse and extreme poverty, 
yet no revolution has taken place. Hence, although not totally inaccurate, 
common observations on revolutions do not provide a full understanding on the 
framework and dynamics of revolutions. In this chapter, I will discuss and select a 
framework for understanding the development of revolutions, examine several 
revolutionary theories to provide context, and discuss factors, settings, and 
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conditions that make revolutions favorable – and how they apply to the Chinese 
and Cuban revolutions. I will then examine the revolutionary theories developed 
by Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara. The purpose of this descriptive approach is 
to provide the reader with the necessary background information to understand 
why guerilla warfare became the backbone of the revolutionary strategy 
employed by Mao and Castro.  
 In general, revolutionary theories seek to organize revolutionary “facts” 
into a framework that can predict the revolutionary potential of a society or 
explain the causes of why a revolution failed or succeeded. These facts include 
leaders, followers, ideology, organization, techniques, and external support 
(Greene 1999). Commonly discussed theories include the Marxist Theory - its 
principal tenets being that revolutions are related to historical transitions, that 
revolution is an agent of change, and that revolutions are progressive and 
beneficial. Following the stage of capitalism, a revolution in the name of workers 
would result in a socialist stage (Goldstone 1994). The Systems Theory – related 
to existing social structures such as the political and economic systems that fail 
to perform their essential functions resulting in violent responses by society. 
Finally, the Modernization Theory – which suggests that revolutionary conditions 
occur when the state is unable or unwilling to adapt to the demands and interest 
mobilized by modernization (Greene 1999). However, theories provide only a 
point of reference and could prove incomplete in the analysis of any particular 
revolution. More importantly, revolutionary leaders will modify a particular theory 
to fit their particular situation, or apply more than one in their quest for success. 
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The People’s War is Mao Tse-tung’s version of the Marxist Theory; he 
realized that the urban proletariat focus of Marxist theory did not apply to China. 
Mao observed the impoverished peasants of China’s Hunan province driven to 
desperation by tax collectors, the oppression of the military, manipulation of grain 
prices by greedy merchants, and the ruthless exactions of gentry7 landlords. Mao 
recognized that, instead of Marx’s factory workers, a disciplined, literate, trained, 
and politically loyal to the revolution peasant armed force was the instrument to 
achieve power (Mao 1937, 1938; Schram 1966). Thus, obtaining the support of 
the peasantry while appealing to all classes of Chinese society was the principal 
objective in a pragmatic strategy to acquire broad-based popular support; that is, 
build a Red Army that was thoroughly indoctrinated with the appropriate political 
consciousness; await the objective conditions for a popular uprising; then engage 
in the last stage of the revolutionary struggle: armed conventional warfare 
focused on surrounding the cities from the countryside.     
Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, inspired by Mao’s success, further refined 
the People’s War doctrine, into their own blend, which resulted in the foco theory. 
While acknowledging that popular forces could defeat a stronger enemy, and that 
the countryside was where the struggle would begin, the foco theory stated that 
popular support would be created during the armed struggle itself; there was no 
need to wait until all the conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection 
could create them. In essence, a small group of revolutionaries was considered 
enough to initiate a revolution, while concurrently developing the conditions for 
 
7 The word gentry generally refers to people of high social standing resulting from birth 
(Webster’s Dictionary) 
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popular support. The basic argument is that the existence of a guerilla foco 
poses a threat to the legitimacy of a government’s right to rule and its exclusive 
monopoly over violence (Johnson 2006; Wickham-Crowley 1991). Such a 
challenge normally generates a violent and oppressive government response, 
which typically targets the rural peasantry resulting in increased support for the 
insurgents, and radicalizing all levels of government opposition. Like Mao’s, 
Castro’s strategy focused on securing the peasant masses, but also was 
designed to align with the middle class. As the revolutionary movement grows in 
both urban and rural regions, the government is overwhelmed allowing a 
successful strike against its forces, bringing the revolutionaries to power.    
In summary, both Mao and Castro refined existing revolutionary theories 
to fit their particular conditions, political situation, and geography to exploit the 
weaknesses of their respective enemies. The principal instrument in their 
strategies was guerilla warfare. Thus, in order to set the stage for the analysis of 
each revolution, explain why guerilla warfare was such an important component, 
and why it was the driver for strategic and operational strategies; it is important to 
understand the framework for revolutions, revolutionary theory, and the 
conditions that can generate a revolution.  
Background: Explaining Revolutions 
Building a theory of revolution is not a simple task – because of the 
diversity of dynamics in different countries; however, three common notions that 
explain the genesis of revolutions emerge (Goldstone 2001): first, the rise against 
oppression; second, the state faces an unmanageable accumulation of 
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difficulties; and finally, the population accepts radical views as a mechanism for 
change. Although these three basic notions are not totally inaccurate – and can 
certainly be applied to China and Cuba, they provide only a partial understanding 
of historical revolutionary patterns.  
Following the Russian revolution, the first generation of revolutionary 
studies – that also included the English, American, and French revolutions - 
sought to examine in more detail why and how revolutions develop, resulting in a 
set of propositions that provide guidelines in understanding patterns of events 
associated with revolutions; these include the role of different actors such as 
intellectuals, moderates, and radicals; as well as the reactions of the state to 
revolutionary forces; which are then placed into a context of struggle between 
these actors to assume leadership of the state. Subsequent generations of 
revolutionary studies further develop issues of why revolutions arise; the sources 
of opposition; and what happens as revolutions develop and unfold.  
The American historian, Crane Brinton, in his work The Anatomy of 
Revolution (1938), compared the dynamics of revolutions to that of a fever that 
rises with popular discontent to the point where it is no longer tolerated, and the 
regime is replaced. Brinton, and other historians of the 1920’s and 1930’s era, 
analyzed the history of revolutions and determined that a certain uniformity, best 
described in stages, existed in the development of revolutions (Goldstone1994):   
1. The majority of intellectuals condemn the government and demand significant 
reform.   
2.  State attempts a measure of reform combined with suppression of 
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revolutionaries. 
3.  The fall of the regime begins with a political crisis resulting from inability of 
government to deal with a crisis, rather than action by the revolutionaries. 
4.  Once in power, internal conflicts between revolutionaries results in a lack of 
unity. 
5.  The moderates gain the leadership but fail to satisfy those who insist on 
radical changes.  
6.  The moderates are opposed by the radicals; power is gained by progressively 
more radical elements. 
7.  Radicals replace the moderates; often manifested by a strong man with 
supreme power. 
8.  The extremists impose coercive rule to implement radical reform. 
9.  A period of terror occurs. 
10. Radicalism eventually leads to pragmatic moderation; the revolution is over. 
This model implies that there is a revolutionary process and that not much 
change really occurs between the pre-revolution situation and that of the post-
revolution; but it cannot explain why, under some circumstances, an improved 
government is the result. Although Brinton does provide a useful sequence of 
events in the analysis of revolutions, one can conclude that there is not a one-
size-fits-all process. Crinton’s model was based on revolutions prior to that of 
China and Cuba.  
Jack Goldstone’s selection An Analytical Framework (2001), attempts to 
provide a model for understanding the development of revolutions. This guide is 
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by no means an all-encompassing checklist of events and circumstances. 
Instead it provides a process framework for analysis that must consider how 
different forces and trends inter-connect and affect a particular society. 
Goldstone suggests three processes that overlap, interrelate, and are common to 
all revolutions – offering forecasting implications and thus possible pre-emption: 
state breakdown, revolutionary contention, and state rebuilding. State breakdown 
results from the conjunction of fiscal distress – which prevents government from 
meeting its obligations to the citizenry; elite alienation – which is united against 
the government, but divided over the degree of reform or change; and 
mobilization of the populace – against the state and counterrevolutionaries. Only 
when these elements rise together, through several sectors of society, can 
conditions be set for state breakdown and revolution. Multiple factors such as 
economic conditions, population growth, and international influence can cause 
these elements to arise; nonetheless, each society is different and must be 
analyzed independently to determine the effects of these forces. 
During the process of revolutionary contention, groups struggle to form a 
“dominant coalition.” Groups that are better organized and have access to 
resources, have a better chance of achieving dominance. An agent that unites 
the population, such as a strong ideology, can also serve as an important 
mechanism for group leadership.  The themes of rectification, redistribution, and 
nationalism emerge as groups jockey for position and attempt to dominate the 
revolutionary struggle. Unfortunately, this often leads to periods of terror and the 
emergence of repressive regimes. The final process – state rebuilding – 
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commences once the new ruling group consolidates its authority through a 
variety of means that could contain repression. A key task is the rebuilding of 
political institutions, which is shaped by class and economic structures prior to 
the revolution, the international context, and the objectives of the new elites 
shaped by experiences under the pre-revolutionary regime. An analysis of this 
last factor can result in a forecast of state reconstruction and allow international 
powers to preempt revolution through economic or diplomatic techniques. 
However, once the revolution is in place, these techniques, or even military 
power, are likely to fail in the attempt to re-direct the agenda of the revolutionary 
government, as it begins to consolidate its authority, usually through re-building 
of the army, internal repression, and assertive nationalism.  
In summary, the preceding framework by Goldstone offers a partial, but 
practical guide for understanding the development of revolutions. Goldstone 
argues that the key factor in igniting a revolution is a conjuncture of several 
conditions that work interactively to undermine the state result in a breakdown of 
the state; he also suggest that during this process, intervention to forestall 
revolution could be successful if it can effectively counter one of the conditions 
previously discussed, even though the others may still be present. Once the 
government loses the initiative, the process of revolutionary contention starts; 
that is the jockeying of coalition groups for the control of resources to compete 
with the government; those that are better organized and have a strong ideology 
that appeals to the largest portion of the population, normally emerge on top.  
Finally, this framework also suggests that a period of terror and the emergence of 
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coercive and aggressive regimes are likely outcomes of revolutions. Goldstone 
framework for analysis of revolutions fits both the Chinese and Cuban 
revolutions. I will continue to refer to it in subsequent chapters. Throughout 
history, several revolutionary theories have been developed each focusing on a 
different aspect of revolution: causes, pre-conditions, process, or even likely 
outcomes. I will briefly discuss a number of theories that not only provide context 
to this case study, but also insight to later on explain particular circumstances in 
Cuba and China.  
Revolutionary Theories  
“Without a revolutionary theory, there is no revolutionary movement8.” 
                                                                                     Vladimir Lenin 
 
Classic approaches in the development of general theories of revolution 
began with the French Revolution of 1789 as a model, for it was the most 
dramatic and well known in European history (Goldstone 1994). Several theories 
of revolution emerged from the model of the French Revolution. The Communist 
Manifesto by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels published in 1848, which outlines 
the requirements to achieve the goal of a classless society through a historical 
progression of feudalism-capitalism-socialism-and communism. The main thesis 
is that the fall of capitalism and the ruling (bourgeoisie) class is inevitable 
because they seek the growth of capital which is conditional on the wage labor of 
the working (proletarian) class. Another influential work is that of Alexis 
Tocqueville, The French Revolution and the Growth of the State, also published 
in 1848, in which he argues for caution, noting that revolutions often strengthen 
 
8 As quoted in www.brainyquotes.com 
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the power of the state rather than weaken it – as opposed to Marx who saw 
revolution as progressive and beneficial (Goldstone 1994). Tocqueville also 
stated that increasing prosperity, can actually promote a spirit of unrest, as the 
general public people become hostile to ancient government institutions. In fact, 
those parts of France in which the improvement in the standard of life was most 
pronounced, were the chiefs centers of the revolutionary movement. Finally, Max 
Weber’s selection Bureaucracy and Revolution (1994) amplified the work of 
Tocqueville on state power arguing that bureaucracy - when state authority is 
derived from legally defined offices rather than from hereditary position or 
privilege – increases when the government abolishes such privileges. Thus, the 
likely outcome of revolution is a permanent and entrenched bureaucracy. Weber 
also argued that often the initial impetus for revolution is provided by a 
charismatic leader who challenges traditional authority.  
In the 20th century, studies of revolution moved through three waves of 
research. The natural histories scholars of the 1920s and 1930s, of which Crane 
Brinton was part, I have already introduced.  The 1960s and early 1970s saw the 
development of general theories of political violence. During this period, political 
changes associated with emerging modern states, combined with fast economic 
growth resulted in a general climate of revolutions, coups, riots and civil wars 
(Goldstone 1994). It was during this wave that Régis Debray (1967) codified the 
foco theory as a model for armed struggle in Latin America, with the rural guerilla 
vanguard as the mechanism for the oppressed masses to assume power. Also 
during this period, Samuel P. Huntington developed the Modernization Theory in 
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his work Political Order in Changing Societies (1968). Huntington states that 
revolution is a characteristic of modernization because educational and economic 
growth increases demand by the people for political participation, faster than 
political institutions can accommodate them. Groups that do not gain access to 
political power may revolt. According to Huntington, revolutions do not normally 
occur in traditional societies – with a low level of socio-economic complexity – or 
in already highly modern societies. However, they are likely to develop in 
societies with limited socio-economic development, or those going through a 
process of political modernization. A complete revolution assimilates new groups 
into politics thus creating a new political order; the crucial factor being the 
concentration or dispersion of power – which follows the collapse of the old 
regime – among three social types: moderates, counter-revolutionaries, and 
radicals. Huntington also describes the trends in Eastern and Western 
revolutions and concludes by stating that revolutions do not occur in democratic 
political systems.  
A counter-argument to Huntington is offered by Charles Tilly in his work: 
Does Modernization Breed Revolution? (1973). Tilly states that Huntington’s 
theory is weak because of ambiguities and contradictions. For example the term 
“modernization” in itself is vague and difficult to pinpoint within a specific regional 
context. Additionally, he [Huntington] does not identify what specific groups within 
a society contend for power or their ability to mobilize resources. Tilly offers a 
theory of Collective Mobilization (1978) that instead emphasizes the ability of 
contending groups to mobilize resources and apply them in conflict with the state. 
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Hence, the major issues for groups to execute collective action are the resources 
already controlled by the group prior to mobilization, the process of obtaining 
additional resources and re-direct them towards social change, and the extent to 
which external support increase the pool of resources. 
In his work Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966), 
Barrington Moore seeks to explain the historical development of three alternative 
paths to the modern world through revolutionary variations: the bourgeois 
revolution – culminates in a combination of capitalism and parliamentary 
democracy; top-down conservative revolutions that result in fascism; and 
peasant revolutions that lead to communism. The author also identifies a number 
of variables that explain why countries have taken a different route; these 
variables center on the structural differences in agrarian societies and the 
response the requirements for modernization. Moore makes three important 
points on agrarian societies in relation to the third path of peasant revolutions 
that lead to communism: The first point is that when the commercial inclination is 
weak among the landed upper class, the result is the survival of a peasant mass 
that can eventually be the main force behind a revolution leading to communism. 
Next, the survival of peasant social structures into the modern era - when they 
are subject to stresses such as market forces, modernization and technology - 
and possibly still subject to an agrarian bureaucracy that inhibits reform. Finally, 
agrarian bureaucracies of royal absolutism tend to weaken the landed upper 
class resulting in a break of the link that binds the peasants to the upper classes, 
setting conditions favoring peasant revolutions. I consider Moore’s second point 
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as the most relevant to Cuba and China and also re-enforces Huntington’s thesis 
regarding the reaction of societies to modernization and its possible implications. 
Additionally, it facilitates the understanding of peasant revolutions and their 
association with Marxism. 
Eric Wolf (1969) further expands on peasant revolutions. He states that 
while peasants are difficult to mobilize due to factors such as a mindset of 
independence and not collective action, as well as a lack of “tactical freedom”   to 
act - meaning at least partial possession of resources that can be used for 
political leverage; they can nevertheless revolt in reaction to social strains on 
traditional lifestyles. Wolf cites three sources of such strains: (1) Demographics – 
principally population growth, (2) Commercialization – that threatens traditional 
access to communal lands, and (3) Authority crisis – which refers the 
convergence of the first two strains, resulting in a dislocation of the traditional 
power structure between the government, elites, and peasants. However, even 
with the presence of one or more of these factors, “tactical freedom” is still 
essential. Such freedom may be available to a landowning middle peasantry; or 
to peasants who live in remote areas away from government authority, 
particularly in defensible mountainous regions, as was the case in Cuba. Still, an 
external force capable of challenging existing power structures is normally 
required for the transition from rebellion to revolution; in my case studies: the 
Chinese Red Army and Castro’s guerilla band. 
The third wave of revolutionary studies in the late1970s and 1980s 
focused on structural theories of revolution. These theories conclude that since 
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states vary in structure, they are vulnerable to different kinds of revolution; they 
further contend that revolutions begin with some combination of state weakness, 
conflicts between states and elites, and popular uprisings (Goldstone 1994). 
Theda Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions (1979) is one of the most widely 
recognized works of the third 3rd wave. Skocpol concept of social revolution 
draws heavily upon Marxist focus on social-structural change and class conflict 
Wicham-Crowley 1991, 1992). Skocpol’s structural approach examines multiple 
relationships among political actors. For Skocpol, the key to revolution is the 
creation of a power vacuum as the state power is undermined by several key 
relationships between states and elite groups, between peasants and landlords, 
and between competing states. These relationships vary according to structure of 
certain states and societies. Skocpol’s theory can be applied to China and to a 
certain extent Cuba as well. In fact, her 1979 work is a comparative analysis of 
the revolutions in France, Russia, and China. I will refer to her work, as well as 
the other theorists discussed, in subsequent chapters. 
In conclusion, revolutionary theories have changed over time. Initial 
studies focused on the French Revolution and the establishment of a logical 
pattern to their development. Other scholars focused on different aspects of 
revolutions, such as causes and pre-conditions, or actual process; yet others 
analyzed the likely outcomes. The violence associated with revolutions led to 
additional theories as to why people would take up arms in revolt. Finally, the 
changes associated with modernization and economic changes, led to yet 
additional theories. Not only can something be learned from every theory, 
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particular circumstances in both the Chinese and Cuban Revolutions can be 
explained with one theory or another. However, the fact of the matter is that the 
Marxist Theory of Revolution provided the basic strategic framework for the 
respective theories of Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara. As a result it deserves a 
more detailed explanation.  
Classic Marxist Theory 
Although both Che and Mao refined the Marxist Theory to fit their own 
purposes and particular situations, undoubtedly the Marxist approach to 
revolution remains the unquestioned core and basic framework of their 
respective theories. Thus, it is essential to describe the basic philosophy and 
concepts of the Marxist Theory of Revolution as formulated in the Karl Marx and 
Frederick Engels Manifesto of the Communist Party, published in 1848. Marxism 
holds that class struggle is the central element to social change in Western 
societies. According to Marx, the principal mechanisms for change are the 
workers, exemplified by his axiom of “Workers of the World Unite.” The goal of a 
classless society is achieved through a historical progression of stages; each 
stage is the result of social relationships developed by a society in the fulfillment 
of their basic needs:  
Primitive => Slavery => Feudalism => Capitalism => Socialism => Communism      
? Primitive – No property thus no class conflict; a cooperative tribal society. 
? Slavery – The tribal society develops classes of slaves and masters.  
? Feudalism – Aristocracy is the ruling class over serfs; merchants develop into 
capitalists.  
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? Capitalism – Capitalists are the ruling class who employ the workers.  
? Socialism – Workers gain class consciousness and overthrow the capitalists. 
? Communism – A classless society; common ownership of the means of 
production.  
Of course, revolution can be the mechanism to transition from one stage to 
the next. Marx understood revolutions not as stand-alone incidents of violence, 
but as class based movements that develop as a result of inherent friction 
between classes, within an economic structure. Forces that create friction include 
the alienation and exploitation of lower classes, politics, social values, religion, 
law, morality, culture, and ideology. The economic structural system cannot 
contain the social forces and contradictions in the desire/needs of society, forcing 
it to rupture into revolution.  The essence of Marx’s theory is the relation of 
means of production (tools, infrastructure, and materials) and modes of 
production (means of production focused on labor) that constitute the economic 
structure that meets society’s needs and expectations.  
The basic source of a revolutionary contradiction in society is the 
emergence of a disjuncture within a mode of production between the social 
forces and social relations of production (property ownership and surplus 
appropriation). The disjuncture manifests itself in intensifying class conflicts. The 
consolidation of an emerging mode of production within the confines of an 
existing one; for example, capitalism within feudalism or socialism within 
capitalism, creates the conditions for the growth of class unity and consciousness 
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of a revolutionary class that results in continuing struggles with the existing 
dominant class (Skocpol 1979).  
Revolution itself is then accomplished through class action led by the self-
conscious rising of a revolutionary class (ex. the proletariat in socialist 
revolutions).  Although the revolution could be supported by other classes – such 
as the peasantry – these are not normally class conscious9 or politically 
organized. Of course Mao and Castro proved different. Once successful, a 
revolution marks the transition from the previous mode of production and form of 
class dominance to a new mode of production, in which new social relations of 
production, new political and ideological forms, and in general, the hegemony of 
the new triumphant revolutionary class, create the appropriate conditions for 
further development of society. In short, Marx sees revolutions as emerging out 
of class-divided modes of production, and transforming one mode of production 
into another through class conflict (Skocpol 1979). In addition to revolutionary 
and social theory, exemplified by the Communist Manifesto, Marx also theorized 
on economics in such works as: A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy (1859), and Capital (Vol I, 1867); additional key points that shape his   
theory of revolution include the following: 
? The fall of capitalism and the ruling (bourgeoisie) is inevitable because they 
seek the growth of capital which is conditional on the wage labor of the 
working (proletarian) class. 
 
9 Class consciousness refers to the social situational awareness that a social class attains, and 
its capacity to act in its own interests based on such awareness. 
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? The alienation and exploitation of workers results in a revolutionary setting. 
Alienation is the separation of laborers from the results of their labor. 
Exploitation results from the use of labor as a commodity with little regard for 
their welfare, and without adequate compensation.  
? Higher level of economic development results in higher probability of 
revolution.  
? The process of production requires a system of state oppression, allowing a 
small minority to force the majority to work for its own profit. 
? An essential element of state oppression is the so called "superstructure" - a 
system of cultural, religious, political and philosophical beliefs, justifying 
status quo and providing explanations for the misery of the oppressed and 
welfare of the oppressors. 
? Means of production are constantly developing, due to invention and 
competition. There always comes the day, when the superstructure no longer 
encourages production: on the contrary, it hampers its further development. 
The modes of production are no longer compatible with modern means of 
production – creating conditions for revolution.  
This theory was drawn mostly from analysis of numerous bourgeois 
revolutions. It explains perfectly the past, but its prediction of the future is 
questionable. According to Marx theory, socialism should appear first in highly 
industrialized capitalist societies. This of course was not the case in Russia, in 
the early 20th century, as Lenin sought to jump-start a revolution. He modified the 
Marxist theory of revolution to fit his own needs and the conditions of Russia at 
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the time. Lenin argued that it was possible to have socialism in the least 
developed capitalist countries; through indoctrination, workers would gain insight 
into their exploitation and would bring about revolution leading to their control of 
the means of production. Additionally, Lenin rejected the Determinism philosophy 
of Marxist Theory that events (such as revolutions) are causally determined by 
prior occurrences – that is, future events are linked to past and present events in 
a cause-effect relationship.  
A key concept of Lenin’s theory is that of the Vanguard Party as the central 
force of mass action and safeguard of the revolution. Given that the workers 
were in a day to day struggle for survival, and thus normally fail to develop class 
consciousness, the Vanguard Party would be the engine of proletarian revolution 
(Wickham-Crowley 1991). Lenin also realized that alliance with other classes 
was essential for success. Although for Lenin, the position of revolutionary 
vanguard was reserved for the workers, he argued that an alliance between the 
peasants and workers would maximize the chances of success in overthrowing 
the czar (Vanden 1982). Lenin brilliantly manifested the cross-cutting alliance 
with the peasant class in the national flag depicting the hammer and sickle. 
Power was for the taking in 1917, Lenin succeeded by blending the Marxist 
theory of revolution with strong organization, leadership, and ideology – often 
referred to as Marxism/Leninism.  
People’s War Theory 
Mao’s thesis on peasant-based revolutionary war – in which people not 
weapons – is the decisive factor – was developed progressively and gradually as 
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Mao studied Chinese history, the Russian revolution, and observed the existing 
conditions in China. In doing so, he created an original theory of war (Schram 
1966). Mao Tse-tung’s principal variation from Marx and Lenin is the reliance on 
the peasantry vice the industrial urban forces as the mechanism for change; he 
argued that this applied to semi-feudal societies of the Third World – the People’s 
War. The two principal observations from Mao’s theory are (Mao 1927):  
? The rural masses contained the potential for organized revolutionary action. 
? Only the peasantry of China, and not the urban proletariat, would provide the 
base for revolution.  
 Mao visualized peasant-based protracted struggle waged to wear down and 
discredit the government while at the same time gaining support from larger 
portions of the population. By basing the insurgency in the countryside and by 
expanding its support, Mao envisioned the government becoming increasingly 
isolated, impotent and surrounded in the cities (Drew and Snow 1988). Mao 
viewed the revolutionary struggle as a flexible three-phased conflict (Mao 1938): 
(1) Insurgents establish secure operating bases in the countryside. 
(2) Conduct escalating guerilla warfare in order to discredit the government and 
demonstrate its inability to control and protect the populace.  
(3) The balance of power shifts to the insurgents, who then shift to conventional 
warfare to destroy government forces and overthrow the government.   
As the government attempts to suppress the insurgents, it gets drawn into 
the countryside where the peasant masses, through guerilla warfare, selectively 
engage government forces and slowly erode their will to fight, while continuing to 
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gain popular support. The key in shifting the balance of power is winning the 
support (or at least neutrality) of the population through a sophisticated package 
of political, psychological, and economic programs designed to take advantage of 
grievances against the existing power structure and build nationalism. Eventually, 
the government forces will be reduced to the cities, where the peasant masses – 
now an army – will destroy them and gain power (Drew and Snow 1988).    
A basic theme of Mao’s theory is the political indoctrination of the 
guerillas, as well as the masses; that is, “unity within the army and unity of the 
army with the people.” Mao recognized that a disciplined, literate, trained, and 
politically loyal to the revolution armed force was the instrument to achieve power 
(Mao 1937). Although Mao insisted that the Party retain its position of 
prominence, the People’s Army was just as important as the vanguard of the 
revolution. The Army was a symbol of loyalty, devotion, and self-sacrifice as an 
instrument of the revolution by fighting, conducting propaganda, and mobilizing 
the masses. But if it was to be a co-equal to the Party, it had to be thoroughly 
indoctrinated with the appropriate political consciousness (Schram 1966).  Thus, 
this is a slight modification of Lenin’s thesis which clearly defines the party, led by 
the revolutionary elites, as the protectors and leaders of the revolution.  
In summary, Mao’s philosophy regarding the People’s War and revolution 
consisted of three pillars or components: First, the guerilla warfare component, 
as the mechanism for mobilizing the masses; second, a communist component, 
for political indoctrination of the masses as well as the army; finally, the Chinese 
nationalism component to establish a common consciousness in the minds of the 
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population. Mao’s theory of revolution worked and served to inspire other 
revolutions as well as revolutionary theories. Among these is the Cuban 
revolution and Che Guevara’s foco theory. 
Foco Theory 
Fidel Castro and Che Guevara adopted and modified Mao’s theory of 
insurgent warfare to fit local conditions and cultural differences. Che, on his 
Guerilla Warfare (1961) essay, revealed three fundamental conclusions about 
armed revolution in the Americas: 
(1) Popular forces can win a war against the army 
(2) One does not necessarily have to wait for a revolutionary situation to arise; 
the guerilla insurgents can create them.  
(3) In the underdeveloped countries of Latin America, rural areas are the best 
battlefields for revolution.  
The first point is congruent with Mao and has been proven throughout 
history; it also re-enforces the power of guerilla warfare when combined with 
popular support. However, the second point does deviate from Mao, who argued 
for the buildup of an Army - that at the right time - would fight a conventional war 
against the government’s army; it also deviates from the traditional Marxist 
Theory of class struggle that culminates in a revolution by the proletariat. 
Guevara concurs that the guerilla band can grow into a regular army in order to 
deliver a “knock-out” blow to the oppressive oligarchy army, but dismisses the 
indecisive and patient attitude of revolutionaries that procrastinate under the 
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pretext that it is difficult to fight a professional army. Guevara advocates instead 
for immediate action by a guerilla band to bring about revolutionary conditions.  
It is Guevara’s contention that the existence of a guerilla foco can 
undermine the legitimacy of the government’s right to rule and its monopoly over 
violence. Such as a challenge would escalate the level of violence of an already 
oppressive state, to a level that radicalizes the government opposition. Within the 
Latin American context, extreme oppression will typically fall disproportionally on 
the rural peasantry, thus validating Guevara’s third point (Johnson 2006).  
Guevara does admit that certain minimum pre-conditions are needed to create a 
revolutionary situation for the foco to capitalize on: 
(1) The masses must be shown that social problems will not be addressed by the 
government. 
(2) The oppressive government must break the peace first. 
The presence of these pre-conditions does not guarantee the success of 
the guerilla foco. They do form the socio-political framework for the foco to 
operate and become the spark for a revolutionary situation. Guevara 
acknowledges that if a government came to power through popular vote and 
maintains at least the appearance of constitutional law, a guerilla uprising can 
only occur once all legal means to effect change have been exhausted. He does 
adjust this tenet later on by arguing that democratic governments can still be 
oppressive and exploitative through drafting of new laws and constitutional 
changes that serve the interest of the ruling class.  
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The third conclusion validates Mao’s People’s War centered in the 
countryside, but de-emphasizes the role of urban masses as per traditional 
Marxism. Guevara does not fully undermine the important role of resistance by 
organized workers, but explains that in the urban areas, armed revolt can be 
easily suppressed through the suspension of civil liberties, forcing the resistance 
to go underground. In contrast, rural areas offer sanctuary from oppressor forces 
and close cooperation with the local peasantry. Again, it must be emphasized 
that it was Fidel Castro who designed the revolutionary campaign, selected its 
operational objectives, and established the political end state. Guevara then 
developed the principles of the foco theory from the lessons learned of the 
revolutionary struggle. 
According to Guevara the guerilla foco is not only the vanguard, but also 
the political and military center of the revolution (Debray 1967). Other political 
forces might come into play in the efforts against the government, but the 
strategic, operational, and tactical decisions will always rest with the leadership 
of the foco (Moreno 1970). This centralization of power reflects the Lenin 
influence on Che and is in direct contrast to Mao who decentralized operations 
and indoctrination to his communist guerilla cadres. Debray (1967) made 
reference to the “meticulous and almost obsessive” attention to detail that Fidel 
Castro paid in planning operational activities, from the selection of objectives to 
the number of bullets issued to each fighter. Che learned from Castro and thus 
insisted on controlling everything believing in a tightly controlled elite organization 
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for decision-making (Friedman 1970). Thus, the foco reigns supreme for 
Guevara. 
In summary, Guevara, places a high degree of primacy on the guerilla 
band creating the conditions for revolution; for him, guerilla warfare is the basis of 
the people’s fight for liberation; a fight of the masses, with the guerilla band as 
the armed nucleus. Unlike Mao, who placed the guerillas and the communist 
party on equal footing, Che, places the guerilla foco as the one and only 
vanguard of the revolution. Debray (1967) argues that in Latin America historic 
circumstances have not permitted Communist Parties to take root and establish 
themselves in order to spearhead revolutionary action. Thus, the guerilla army 
will be the nucleus of the party, not vice versa; the guerilla force then becomes 
the political vanguard from which a real party can develop.  
Revolutionary Setting 
The different revolutionary theories discussed so far have certain 
commonalities that permit making general statements about revolutions. It is 
widely accepted by scholars that certain conditions must exist before people 
undertake the difficult task to rebel and drastically change society, form of 
government, and their previous leaders, sometimes even by utilizing extreme 
forms of violence. Of course, these conditions are simply guidelines and by no 
means a checklist to predict revolutions. Every case is unique and the variables 
involved are weighted differently, or perhaps not at all, based on the particular 
situation. For example, it is unlikely that the Cuban revolution would have 
succeeded without the strong personality and leadership of Fidel Castro, the 
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conditions of the peasantry in the Oriente province, or more importantly, the 
neutralization of the U.S. during the revolutionary period. In China, although the 
agrarian conditions favored revolution, it took Mao’s leadership and the Japanese 
invasion to tilt the balance in his favor.  Thus, there is no specific causal effect 
that can predict revolutions with any certainty; rather a variety of factors 
interrelate to create conditions favorable to revolution. According to Greene 
(1999), the presence of what can be considered obvious preliminary signs or 
preconditions, as well as what can be considered “accelerators,” can increase 
the probability of a revolution occurring.  Pre-conditions include the following:  
? Geography – Geographic conditions can often determine the success or 
failure of a revolutionary movement. For example, variables such as physical 
geography of a country can facilitate the external support of an insurgency or 
perhaps geographic isolation can hinder it. In Cuba, it is unlikely that Castro 
would have succeeded without a base of operations in the remote Sierra 
Maestra Mountains, located in the Oriente province – traditionally a region of 
insurgency since the days of Spanish rule. Mao utilized the northwest region 
of the Shensi Province region to build his Red Army and test his communist 
policies for eventual expansion. Economic geography, that is differential rates 
of regional economic development, can heighten hostility between 
socioeconomic classes. Finally, political geography can also determine 
revolutionary potential; for example, a highly centralized state with universities 
and industry located near a capital, can result in the blending of students and 
workers into a revolutionary movement.  
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? Demography – Factors such as population growth, migration of citizens – 
either internally or to a foreign country, can contribute to a revolutionary 
condition. For example, in Cuba, the large migration of anti-Castro middle and 
upper class Cubans to the United States, explains the relative socially 
homogenous population that lacked political activism; this of course worked to 
the advantage of the Castro regime during its consolidation period. Pre-
revolutionary China’s population growth significantly strained limited 
agricultural resources, resulting in a peasant radicalism that was eventually 
exploited by Mao (Greene 1999).    
? Cultural Cleavage – A culturally and/or racially diverse society, particularly 
with non-assimilated immigrants, can create or raise the level of friction with 
the indigenous majority.  Such conditions can lead to social conflict and 
political instability. Cuba’s history of slavery resulted in a large black 
population subject to discrimination, low social status, and a lack of access to 
government services. Castro found extensive support among this segment of 
the population. The Japanese occupation of China served to unite the nation 
in a wave of nationalism against the foreign invaders; as I will describe later, 
Mao harnessed this nationalism as part of his grand strategy. Religion falls in 
this category as a special case because it can facilitate or prevent revolution. 
The relative weakness of the Catholic Church in Cuba made it a non-factor in 
opposing Castro. Although more of a philosophy or ethical system than a 
religion, Confucianism was not viewed as a threat by Mao because its 
teachings subordinated it to the state. Mao actually found a role for 
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Confucianism in his grand revolution strategy. Once in power, however, he 
eventually sought to eliminate it.  
? Land Tenure – Land ownership in agricultural societies is the primary 
measurement of wealth and social status. Hence, socio-economic differences 
are most visible in this type of society. Historically, extremely unequal 
distribution of land has resulted in almost all revolutionary movements of 
modern times. Prior to the Chinese Communist revolution, the vast majority of 
Chinese, at least 80%, were peasants, but only 20% of the total population 
were landowners (Greene 1999; Skocpol 1979). In the first half of the 20th 
century, Cuba was to a large extent, owned by foreigners – both land and 
industry. This would lead to the slow development of a Cuban national identity 
comprised of the people – that is, the workers, the mill-workers, the Negroes, 
and the peasants. Foreigners controlled the means of production but the 
Cubans on the whole worked for it (Thomas 1971). Both Mao and Castro 
capitalized on the socio-economic conditions of their respective nations for 
popular support.  
Three additional pre-conditions can increase revolutionary potential. First, 
economic change which can threaten the status quo; the spread of western 
capitalism has been cited as an important pre-condition in both Cuba and China. 
Next, social status discrepancies associated with inconsistencies in the division 
of political, economic, and social status. In both Cuba and China, a weak middle 
class within the context of an economically developing, but largely agrarian 
society, was a major pre-condition for revolution. Finally, the lack of political 
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adaptation to accommodate the interests of newly mobilized social classes can 
increase political tension. Castro attempted to effect reform through constitutional 
channels before turning revolutionary. Of course, the presence of several pre-
conditions does not guarantee the development of a revolution; however, the 
presence of one or more of the following accelerators can fuse a number of pre-
conditions and expedite a revolutionary situation (Greene 1999):  
? Military Defeat – Whether against insurgents, against an invading foreign 
power, or through an external military intervention; a military defeat 
undermines the legitimacy of the government and facilitates cross-cutting 
alliances against it. The government’s military defeat suggests that its efforts 
to inspire citizen loyalty and sacrifice lack credibility. 
? Economic Crises – People are more likely to take direct action against the 
government when their own economic circumstances become critical. This is 
a stronger incentive than ideology or social justice. However, once mobilized 
in protest of food shortages, unemployment, or inflation, the masses are more 
susceptible to revolutionary ideology and organization. Normally, economic 
crisis alone is unlikely to provoke collective revolutionary action; however, it 
could highlight other social or economic problems, and serve to focus 
revolutionaries. 
? Government Violence – Arbitrary and indiscriminate, beyond the maintenance 
of law and order, serves to lower the government’s legitimacy and raises the 
potential for revolt.  
 46
? Elite fragmentation – A common pattern observed in revolutions is that of 
divisions among members of the political elite. These divisions are frequently 
brought about by military defeat or economic crises. Such fragmentation is an 
indicator of declining government competence, which serves to lower its 
legitimacy in the minds of its citizens, and can lead to political instability.  
? Reform and Political Change – Abrupt departure from past policies without 
accompanied changes in political institutions and representation; bad 
government reforming itself – usually half-hearted, not enforced, repudiate 
past inequalities and lower regime’s legitimacy. 
One final point regarding revolutionary settings; Barrington Moore (1966) 
explains that a decisive catalyst or ingredient normally ignites revolutionary 
conditions into an actual revolution. In both China and Cuba, the situation was 
ripe for a peasant’s revolt: The structure of China’s peasant society could not 
adjust to the stresses associated with market forces and modernization; its 
agrarian bureaucracy inhibited reform and weakened the link that bound the 
peasants to the upper classes, resulting in the survival of a peasant mass that 
eventually became the main force behind the revolution (Moore 1966). In Cuba 
the repressive Batista regime, combined with a disaffected peasantry without a 
history of private ownership, and large numbers of unemployed rural workers in a 
sugar mill dominated economy, created the conditions for a guerilla movement in 
the countryside. As part of this research, I will examine the pre-conditions, 
accelerators, and decisive catalyst of each revolution, and the important role that 
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guerilla warfare played in facilitating the catalyst, or maximizing its benefits for 
eventual revolutionary victory.  
Conclusion 
There is no set formula, checklist, or pre-conditions for revolutions to 
occur. Several forces come together, at a certain point in a society’s history, 
which set the conditions for regime change or revolution. However, it is important 
to note that each country and region is geographically, culturally, socially, and 
economically different. In this chapter, I have attempted to provide a progression 
of theories and studies to set the stage for the comparative analysis of the 
Chinese and Cuban revolutions. Jack Goldstone’s thesis in the development of 
revolutions will provide context for the revolutionary process. The Marxist theory 
of revolution will frame the strategic framework for analysis and general 
guidelines, because both revolutionary leaders in the China and Cuban 
revolutions derived their own theories from Marx. Charles Tilly’s Mobilization of 
Resources theory will operationalize the strategic objectives and explain the role 
of guerilla warfare revolutionary theories, by Mao and Che, in meeting those 
objectives, as well as shaping the strategies for success. I consider Tilly’s theory 
more operational than strategic and thus applicable to my case study; while the 
Marxist Theory of revolution offers a general framework – such as conditions, 
accelerators, and timing – these conditions must be operationalized and Tilly’s 
theory offers a pragmatic guide to doing just that: the control of resources by any 
means necessary. In subsequent chapters, I will discuss the blending of the 
mobilization mechanisms – with guerilla warfare as the main ingredient - into a 
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cohesive strategy that appealed not only to the main effort of such strategy – the 
peasants – but also other classes in pursuit of the broadest possible alliance. 
Both revolutionary leaders understood that a revolution cannot succeed without 
support from the different classes of society. By blending politics and forms of 
warfare they both achieved the end state of regime change through violence.  
The cornerstone of both revolutionary theories is that popular guerilla 
forces can win a war against a superior army. This form of violence became the 
primary mechanism for mobilizing resources and undermining the moral authority 
of the actor in power.  Mao chose to build his own peasant army and developed 
the tactics of guerilla warfare from base areas in the countryside. To Mao, the 
role of guerilla warfare went beyond the obvious: it would also serve as a 
mechanism for obtaining popular support; for getting close to the peasants and 
sharing their hardships; for indoctrination of peasants; and for obtaining small 
victories to motivate the masses. Finally, it would provide a springboard for the 
development of conventional armies that would eventually confront the KMT for 
the right to rule China. For Che and Castro the existence of a guerilla foco would 
pose a threat to the government’s legitimacy and force a violent response from 
the government. The resulting campaign of oppression would naturally fall on the 
peasants creating a backlash against the government across all sectors of 
opposition. The end result is the same: classes of society, riding a wave of 
nationalism, unite against the government and overthrow it.  
The central idea of the comparative analysis is that guerilla warfare is not 
exclusively a form of violence in the pursuit of power, but that to achieve success 
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when revolutionary conditions exist, it must be part of a grand strategy that 
incorporates political, social, economic, and psychological variables, with an end 
state of maximum mobilization of resources. Thus, a comprehensive analysis of 
guerilla warfare, as not only a technique but an overall philosophy for the 
attainment of strategic objectives is in order.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Guerilla Warfare 
 
Introduction 
Violence is a resource - and as such - it can be harnessed, mobilized, and 
employed. But violence for the sake of violence is not a successful technique for 
winning the popular support required to achieve political objectives. First and 
foremost, it must be integrated into a grand strategy that clearly defines the 
parameters for the use of violence in support of political objectives. This is 
certainly easier than done – the use of violence requires political vision, assets, 
command and control, and discipline in its employment. Further, it could possibly 
require the political leadership to publicly separate itself from violence; this 
concept is part of the “Dual Strategy” that will be discussed in latter chapters. 
Ultimate success in mobilizing and utilizing any resource depends on effective 
organization, which seeks the active support of large segments of the population, 
on behalf of an actor’s cause. In this case study, the government and the 
insurgents are the two principal actors that compete for resources. Both Mao and 
Castro recognized the importance of organization to obtain popular support. 
Realizing that they were at a resource disadvantage against an entrenched 
government, they sought to slowly bleed the government of support, as they 
concurrently spread their message and broadened their support across all 
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segments of society, through organization in the countryside, urban areas, and 
even within the government. Essentially, organization would be the mechanism 
to connect the leadership of the insurgency with the population. But an ingredient 
was needed in the formulation of a grand strategy to inspire and unite the 
masses in support of the insurgent’s cause. That key ingredient would be guerilla 
warfare.  
Guerilla warfare is a weapon of the weak. Both Mao and Castro were in 
extreme positions of weakness against their respective rivals, as they formulated 
their revolutionary theories with guerilla warfare as the principal component. They 
really had no other choice. Mao’s communists were almost exterminated once by 
the KMT. Castro had been arrested and thrown in jail by Batista. Further, political 
participation was not an option in either environment. The use of violence would 
lead the road to change. Of course, what differentiates an insurgency from a 
political protest movement- such as Gandhi’s in India or Khomeini in Iran – is the 
use of violence. The violent component of an insurgency is manifested in 
different forms of warfare – that is, a variety of organized violence which 
emphasizes particular armed forces, weapons, tactics, and targets. Three forms 
of warfare have been associated with insurgencies: guerilla war, conventional 
warfare, and terrorism, (O’Neill 1990). 
Terrorism is a form of warfare in which violence is directed primarily 
against non-combatants rather than government police/military forces or 
economic assets. While the targets of such violence – through assassinations, 
bombings, arson, torture, etc. – may appear random, they are carefully planned 
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to maximize the political impact in support of the insurgency (Greene 1999; 
O’Neill 1990). Terror ultimately attacks people’s minds by instilling fear in 
government officials and their supporters and convincing people that the 
insurgency is powerful, while the power of the state is weak; another function of 
terror is to provoke the state into a response of indiscriminate violence and 
oppression against the population; finally, on a sufficient scale, it can also disrupt 
the functioning of government (Joint Publication 3-24).  However, an exclusive 
reliance on terror as a revolutionary or insurgent technique is a certain sign of the 
movement’s weakness (Greene 1999). Although both Mao and Che 
Guevara/Fidel Castro used terrorism selectively and on a relatively small scale; 
their respective theories were clear in the negative impact of terrorism on popular 
support (Mao 1937; Guevara 1961). Conventional warfare – defined as the direct 
confrontation large units in the battlefield – was seen by Mao and Che as 
possible necessity in the last phase of revolution to defeat government forces. 
Initially, however, insurgencies are not strong enough to measure up with the 
government in conventional warfare; whether the transition is made, depends on 
the insurgent strategy, and vulnerabilities of the government’s armed forces.  
Thus, the most common form of violence utilized by insurgents has been 
guerilla warfare. Guerilla warfare differs from terrorism in that it targets the 
government’s armed forces, police, or their support units – and in some cases – 
key economic infrastructure, rather than unarmed civilians.  The essence of 
guerilla warfare is highly-mobile hit-and-run attacks conducted by lightly armed 
bands that seek to harass the enemy and gradually erode his capability and will 
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to fight. Guerillas place a premium on flexibility, speed and deception (Mao 1937; 
Guevara 1961). In this chapter, I will introduce the characteristics of insurgent 
warfare and the use of guerilla tactics in waging a successful insurgency; such 
analysis will provide the reader with an understanding of how successful 
employment of violence by a weak actor can eventually lead to success. I will 
also explain the basic guerilla tactics of Mao and Che in order to demonstrate, in 
latter chapters, how these actions - at the lowest tactical level - were well 
planned and integrated into a grand strategy that eventually resulted in a buildup 
of nationalism in support of the insurgents. Although guerilla warfare is a tactical 
tool, to Mao and Fidel Castro, it went far beyond a mechanism for violence: 
Guerilla warfare was a philosophy that guided operational and strategic 
decisions. 
Fundamentals of Insurgency and Guerilla Warfare 
Insurgents wage revolutionary warfare, and for the most part, insurgencies 
are revolutions, as they seek to control resources and instruments of violence 
against the government to achieve their goals.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
basis and inspiration for most third world revolutions since in the latter half of the 
20th century, was Mao Tse-tung, who through trial and error, refined and tested 
his ideas and techniques in the long civil war in China, as he attempted to 
overthrow the government of Chiang Kai-shek. The principal political and military 
tool in an insurgency is guerilla warfare, waged in a fashion where the ultimate 
end state is to disaffect the population from the government.  Mao’s basic theory 
was adapted by Fidel Castro and other insurgents theorists, such as Vo Nguyen 
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Giap in Vietnam, to fit local conditions. Hence, every insurgency has its unique 
characteristics. Nonetheless, successful insurgencies have four characteristics in 
common that constitute the basis of insurgent warfare doctrine (Drew and Snow 
1988).    
The first is that they are normally protracted struggles. Rebels are at a 
disadvantage as they go against an entrenched government that commands a 
military, controls the economy, and has direct access to means of 
communication. Although a quick victory is unlikely, time is normally on the side 
of the insurgents and it is used as a weapon to weaken the government. Every 
day that the insurgency continues to exist, serves to discredit those in power, 
adds a degree of legitimacy to their cause, and creates a sense of inevitability 
that the insurgents might just prevail. Those that are not ardent supporters might 
start to hedge their bets and either indirectly support the insurgency, or remain 
neutral –both wins for the rebels. The classic example is the Vietnam War. The 
U.S. possessed an unquestionable advantage in weapons, technology, and 
training but the insurgency slowly - and over time - bled the U.S. forces turning 
public opinion in the U.S. against the war; no conflict in a democracy can 
continue without popular support. As a result, although U.S. forces never lost a 
battle, the war was eventually lost.    
Second, and probably most important, is the central role played by their 
infrastructures – the underground organization that can be a primary source of 
strength for the insurgency. This political infrastructure performs several 
functions that are vital to the initial survival, subsequent growth, and eventual 
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victory of the insurgency: intelligence gathering, provision of supplies and 
financial resources; recruitment and political expansion; sabotage, terrorism, and 
intimidation; and the establishment of a shadow government. Agents placed 
within government agencies are important facilitators, but also sympathizers 
embedded in the general population can help the insurgent’s cause by reporting 
troop movements or conducting small acts of sabotage. If the insurgent 
underground succeeds, the government appears weak and ineffective.  
The third characteristic of successful insurgencies is the subsidiary 
importance of insurgent military actions. Although important, success in the 
battlefield is not crucial to the success of the insurgent movement. This explains 
why insurgent forces can lose virtually every battle and still win the war. The key 
is blending insurgent military actions with the political component. 
The fourth and final characteristic that successful insurgencies have in 
common is the use of guerilla tactics – the classic insurgent strategy used by the 
weak against the strong. As opposed to conventional operations designed to win 
a quick victory, guerilla tactics are designed to avoid that decisive defeat against 
a stronger enemy. Basic concepts of guerilla warfare are as follows: 
? Operations are based on the mobility of the individual soldier. 
? Operate in small units to avoid presenting high-value large targets to 
government forces with superior firepower. 
? Fight only when it is advantageous to fight – often by concentrating forces 
against isolated government units or posts.  
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? Holding terrain is not normally advantageous; to do so invites destruction by 
superior enemy forces. 
  The immediate objective of these concepts is to negate the major 
advantage of government forces – superior firepower and numbers. By doing so, 
the insurgency remains relevant and active in the pursuit of its operational 
objectives: first, shift government attention away from activities of the insurgent 
political infrastructure, so that the movement can continue to grow; second, 
harass, demoralize, and embarrass the government, its military, and its allies; 
and lastly, elicit a violent response from a frustrated government, which as we 
know, are often counterproductive and further alienate the population from the 
government. If successful guerilla tactics result in increased popular support for 
the insurgents, a frustrated government slowly loses command and control of the 
nation, resulting in an expansion of the insurgent infrastructure. Eventually, the 
forces combine to favor the insurgents, who by now can assemble and mass 
large units using conventional tactics, to deliver the final blow to the government.  
Two additional points regarding insurgent warfare (as opposed to 
conventional warfare) - are worth mentioning. First the center of gravity – that is, 
the resource from which a military force draws its strength, and if neutralized 
would result in defeat - is twofold: its covert political infrastructure embedded in 
the general population and popular support itself. Without an infrastructure or 
popular support, the insurgency has no political arm, is devoid of its intelligence 
apparatus, and unable to access its principal source of manpower and logistical 
support. Of course, no government can survive without the acceptance of the 
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people – particularly one opposed by an attractive insurgency; thus, in this case, 
the center of gravity for the government’s power is also located within the general 
population. This is why popular support is the key strategic objective of most 
insurgencies. A second unique feature of insurgent warfare is that insurgent 
military forces win when they do not lose. Although guerillas often lose small 
tactical engagements, the fact that they normally do not concentrate their forces, 
allows them to avoid total defeat and continue the fight. Their survival in the face 
of vastly superior government strength adds to their credibility. Conversely, 
conventional military forces lose when they do not win. The failure to do 
decisively defeat an inferior insurgency discredits the government’s military and 
the government as a whole.  
In summary, the military warfare conducted by insurgents – often 
manifested in the form of guerilla warfare – is the direct opposite of conventional 
warfare. Conventional military forces seek to concentrate forces at the decisive 
time and space to achieve quick and decisive victories. Insurgent military forces 
take the opposite approach, by dispersing in time and space to avoid decisive 
defeat. While conventional forces attempt to achieve a decision by acting faster 
than the enemy can react, insurgent guerilla forces seek to extend the conflict to 
prevent an effective reaction. For the guerillas, time becomes a weapon (Joint 
Publication 3-24; O’Neill 1990). Both Mao and Castro took this basic framework, 
the lessons of history, and their particular situations, to build their respective 
blends of guerilla tactics. The basic tactics are very similar; the principal 
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differences are in their execution. As I will explain on the following sections, while 
Mao decentralized operations, Castro preferred absolute control.   
Basic Guerilla Tactics – Mao Tse-tung 
“The guerilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea10.”                      
                                                                                           Mao Tse-tung  
Mao’s thesis on peasant-based revolutionary war – in which people not 
weapons – is the decisive factor – was developed progressively and gradually as 
Mao studied Chinese history, the Russian revolution, and observed the existing 
conditions in China. In doing so, he created the original theory of war discussed 
in Chapter 2. Mao also drew heavily from the ancient Chinese Strategist, Sun 
Tzu, whose book The Art of War is still in use today at military colleges. Mao’s 
Basic Tactics (1938, 53) book defines the overall philosophy of guerilla tactics:  
When it is not advantageous for our main land army to meet the 
enemy in large scale engagements and we therefore, send our 
[guerilla] units which employ the tactics of avoiding strengths and 
striking at weaknesses, of flitting about and having no fixed 
position, and of subduing the enemy according to circumstances, 
and when we do not oppose the enemy according to the ordinary 
rules of tactics, this is called employing guerilla tactics. 
 
According to Mao, the essential feature of all guerilla strategy/tactics is to 
concentrate forces in order to destroy the enemy units one by one. The aim is not 
to hold territory or cities, but to destroy the enemy and stir up the courage of the 
popular masses. To achieve this result, Mao stresses the importance of accurate 
information on the enemy’s movement and secrecy regarding the guerilla’s 
movement, as indispensable. Both of course depend on the support of the 
population, which takes us back to the fundamentals discussed earlier and the 
 
10 As quoted in www.military.quotes.com 
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prominence of organization in a successful insurgency. Among other basic tenets 
extracted from Basic Tactics and On Guerilla Warfare (1937), Mao recognizes 
the importance of political organization down to the guerilla unit level: 
? Do not attack strong positions or fight hard battles. 
? Organize the masses and fight with them. 
? When the enemy advances we retreat; when the enemy retreats we pursue; 
the enemy halts, we harass.  
? Importance of organization – to include political in guerilla units. 
? Deal strongest possible blows to the enemy’s morale and in creating disorder 
and agitation so he can neither advance nor retreat.  
? Peculiar quality of operations lies entirely in taking the enemy by surprise. 
? The sole habitual tactic of a guerilla unit is the ambush. 
? Political and literacy training – to raise and strengthen the fighting capacity of 
members; to stimulate the soldier’s national consciousness, their patriotism, 
and their love for the people and masses. 
Although Mao emphasized discipline and loyalty of subordinates in the 
execution of orders by superiors, he also recognized the importance of 
increasing the “spirit of initiative,” in order to adapt to rapidly changing situations.  
Mao emphasizes initiative and de-centralization in the following passage from 
Guerilla Warfare (1937, 52): 
“In guerilla warfare, small units acting independently play the 
principal role, and there must no be excessive interference with 
their activities. In orthodox warfare [in principle] command is 
centralized. This is done because all units and supporting arms in 
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all districts must coordinate to the highest degree. In the case of 
guerilla warfare, this is not only undesirable but impossible.” 
 
Mao defined the relationship of guerilla unit commanders and their 
subordinates in the same manner as that of the Communist Party and the 
masses: the former establish the objectives, and the latter carries them in a 
combination of obedience to orders and initiative (Mao [May] 1938). This 
decentralization of operations served Mao well; not only did it allow him to gain 
speed relative to his opponents, it was also well-suited to the vast distances and 
geography of the Chinese countryside that made command, control, and 
communications difficult. There are three elements that facilitate decentralization 
(Warfighting 1989). The first are mission-type tactics; that is, the assignment of a 
mission to a subordinate without specifying how the mission is to be 
accomplished. The higher commander describes the mission and explains its 
purpose; the subordinate commander determines the tactics needed to 
accomplish the task based on the mission and the higher commander’s intent. As 
a result, each leader can act quickly as the situation changes without having to 
pass information and wait for orders. The second element I have already 
mentioned: commander’s intent. As the situation changes, subordinate 
commanders who clearly understand the purpose, can take action in the absence 
of orders and thus exploit situations as long as it complies with the overall intent 
or vision of the commander for the operation. Finally, the experience factor 
cannot be underestimated in gaining speed through decentralization. Veteran 
units are normally familiar with different situations, or at least know generally 
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what to expect, and thus can think, move, and act faster than untried units. It is 
clear from analyzing Basic Tactics and Guerilla Warfare, that Mao emphasized 
decentralization and the speed it generates in relation to the enemy’s decision-
making and action cycle. Acting faster is a great advantage in combat as the 
enemy falls in a reactive mode and loses the initiative. 
At this tactical level11, Mao also took the opportunity to inject political work 
and nationalism into his guerilla commanders, cadres12, and fighters. On Guerilla 
Warfare (1937, 89), Mao States:  
“The political goal must be clearly and precisely indicated to 
inhabitants of guerilla zones and their national consciousness 
awakened.”  
 
Mao also dedicates an entire chapter of Basic Tactics (1938) to political 
work.  In this chapter he explains that through political indoctrination, the goal is 
to raise the fighting capacity of guerilla fighters to a higher level. He measures 
the fighting capacity of a guerilla unit not so much by its conduct of military 
operations, but by its ability to utilize political consciousness and political 
influence to obtain the support of the masses and inducing them to accept the 
insurgency leadership. The main content of political work is dedicated to 
stimulating the fighter’s national consciousness, patriotism, and love for the 
people and the masses. All fighters must be of a single mind and endowed with 
the resolve and will to save the nation together. To this end, orders of superiors 
 
11 There are three levels of war: the tactical level of war refers to the art and science of winning 
engagements and battles; the operational level coordinates tactical results to attain strategic 
objectives; the strategic level focuses directly on national policy objectives (U.S. Marine Corps 
Warfighting Field   Manual 1).   
12 The fundamental role of the cadre is enforcement of political and ideological discipline, 
subversion of opponents, and co-optation of social power to support the insurgent strategy (Joint 
Publication 3-24). 
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must be carried out while maintaining strict military discipline. Mao also makes it 
a point that guerilla units must also carry out propaganda among the masses 
regarding the intent of the enemy. The chapter goes on to explain mechanisms 
for political work, such as small group discussions; methods such as topics, 
timing, and number of personnel; and types of political work during ordinary 
times, during battle, and after battle. 
In summary, the main takeaways from Mao’s Basic Tactics and Guerilla 
Warfare are that guerilla units avoid enemy strong positions and concentrate 
forces against weak ones. Next, operations should be decentralized to generate 
speed in decision-making and avoid the command and control limitations 
imposed by China’s geography. And finally, that political work be integrated into 
guerilla units to build national consciousness and support of the masses. 
Success in these three areas would set the conditions for the implementation of 
Mao’s Dual Strategy in the pursuit of revolutionary victory.  In Cuba, Fidel Castro 
and Che Guevara developed the guerilla tactics that would succeed in a different 
environment and political situation.  
Basic Guerilla Tactics – Che Guevara 
“The revolution is not an apple that falls when it is ripe; you must make it drop13.” 
                                                                                         Ernesto “Che” Guevara 
 
Historically, the coup d’état is the most frequently used form of violence in 
Latin America. Professional militaries in Latin America see themselves as 
defenders of the constitution and defenders against subversive movements and 
corrupt politicians. Under the coup scenario, the armed forces occupy 
 
13 As quoted in Che Guevara Speaks: Selected Speeches and Writings (1967). 
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government buildings, deploy to key areas of the capital in a display of force, 
secure the means of communication, and thus force the president and his 
associates to seek asylum in a foreign embassy. A military junta14 assumes 
power and proclaims control of the government’s administration until a civilian 
government can be restored, typically through elections. However, such revolts 
do not change the established social or economic structure; it simply changes 
those in power and the composition of government workers by non-constitutional 
means (Kling 1962).  By the time Castro and his band invaded in 1956, he was 
seeking power along with social change, the coup d’état option died with his 
initial failed attempts prior to his 1952 arrest. Castro’s pursuit of power by 
unconventional means assumed the form of guerilla warfare. This resulted in two 
major variations of the Latin American norm (Kling 1962): 
1. A protracted campaign of guerilla warfare rather than a quick hit. 
2. A complete change in the existing social and economic institutions. 
While Mao had learned through trial and error, Castro and the cadres of 
leaders around him were familiar with the principles and requirements of guerilla 
warfare. Before their invasion of Cuba in 1956, this group was instructed and 
trained in the tactics of guerilla warfare in the mountains of Mexico by veterans of 
guerilla warfare in the Spanish Civil War; one of them, Alberto Bayo, had been a 
General in the Republican army (Guevara 1963). It is here that the foundation for 
the foco theory of revolution was laid, by observation of guerilla movements in 
Asia, and by constant practice.  They learned that a small determined nucleus 
 
14 A junta is essentially a committee of senior military officers. 
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could initiate guerilla warfare and that the growing band must be divided into 
relatively small detachments (Kling 1962). The actions of these small groups 
were to be controlled by the inner circle of revolutionaries. Guevara builds on 
Mao’s concepts of guerilla warfare. The essence of foco tactics are captured on 
Guevara’s On Guerilla Warfare (1961,6):  
Guerilla warfare is a fight of the masses, with the guerilla band as 
the armed nucleus. One resorts to guerilla warfare when oppressed 
by superior numbers and arms. The guerilla must possess a highly 
developed knowledge of the terrain on which he operates avenues 
of access and escape, possibilities for rapid maneuver, popular 
support, and hiding places. All this favors rural areas. [Here] the 
guerilla can represent the great mass of poor farmers. [Hence], the 
guerilla is – above all else – an agrarian revolutionary.  
 
The foco is essentially a means to create a revolutionary situation. Once 
the group obtains the support of peasants in the area, and thus ensure its 
survival, then the foco can move on to its primary task of creating instability and 
opposition to the government. Other foco functions include attacking the enemy, 
protecting the peasants, and implementing agrarian reform – but survival of the 
foco is paramount. According to Guevara (1961), the foco is composed of 25-35 
men under the politico-military leadership of a commander. The individual 
fighters must be first and foremost a social reformer of high moral standards and 
self-control, who seeks to introduce social reform to the peasants through 
personal example. To Guevara, popular support is indispensable. Once again, 
this takes us back to the fundamentals discussed earlier and the importance of 
organization in a successful insurgency. In fact, Guevara dedicates an entire 
chapter, a section of a separate chapter, and an appendix to organization. In 
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these sections, he explains the optimum organization of the guerilla bands for 
combat, the supporting logistics, as well as the organization for the entire 
movement, to include civil administration, propaganda, and the role of women. 
The following include some of Guevara’s basic tenets of guerilla warfare and 
organization: 
? The guerilla relies on mobility to flee from action when necessary, to shift his 
front, to evade encirclement, and even to envelop the enemy.   
? Nothing helps the combat forces more than accurate intelligence. 
? The guerilla numerical inferiority makes the element of surprise extremely 
important in facilitating disproportionate loses upon the enemy.  
? Sabotage is an important revolutionary means, but it should be differentiated 
from terrorism.  
? Indiscriminate terrorism against ordinary people is inefficient and can provoke 
retaliation.  
? Shock, not sustained attack is the key to fighting in the open country. 
? Guerilla organization is not fixed, rather is task-organized to specific needs. 
? A good number for a guerilla band in the countryside is 10-15 men; this 
number provides good mutual support, adequate firepower when massed, 
can rapidly scatter, not easily detected, and maximizes mobility.  
? For a major attack, guerillas can be massed in greater numbers, but 
immediately thereafter, must withdraw back into small groups.   
Like Mao, Guevara emphasizes loyalty and discipline in the execution of 
orders, but decision-making is centralized in the leadership of the guerilla foco – 
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the center of the revolution (Moreno 1970). Centralization worked in Cuba 
because the individual members and subordinate leaders of Castro’s forces did 
not posses the experience and military knowledge to carry-out mission-type 
tactics. Castro’s resources were limited and centralization minimized risk as 
operations were methodically planned against limited objectives that ensured 
success; and the scope of Castro’s operations were limited mostly to the Oriente 
Province. The fight in the cities was left to other segments of the opposition to 
Batista. Unification with these elements would come later through the 
mobilization of resources. 
At this tactical level, Guevara introduces the individual guerilla as the 
mechanism for political change; a crusader for the people’s freedom, who after 
exhausting peaceful means, resorts to armed rebellion; he aims directly at 
destroying the existing social order and replacing it with something new. Since 
the economic and political conditions in the Americas favor initiating the fight in 
rural areas, the guerilla makes “agrarian reform” his banner for revolution. Thus, 
to obtain the status of true crusader, the guerilla must adhere to a strong moral 
conduct and strict self-control. At first, he will not stress social reform, acting 
more as an advisor to the peasants in matters of the technology, economics, and 
culture. He does not steal and bothers the rich as little as possible. These are 
basic principles of the “Dual Strategy” that I will explain in detail in latter chapters. 
As I have discussed previously, revolutions cannot succeed without appealing to 
all classes. By preaching agrarian reform to obtain the support of their base, yet 
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downgrading its importance to other classes, the guerillas seek broad popular 
support. 
Whether by design, inspiration from Mao, or simply by default in the 
application of guerilla tactics, Guevara lays the foundation for the Dual Strategy, 
as one studies On Guerilla Warfare (1961). Guevara explains that the individual 
guerilla should be recruited from the area in which he will fight in order to develop 
contacts, make use of his local terrain knowledge, and provide him with a sense 
of fighting for his own area. Men so dedicated must have an ideal – one that is 
simple yet worth dying for. For peasants, the right to own land and fair social 
treatment; for industrial workers, a decent job and wages combined with social 
justice; and for students and professional workers, the ideal is more abstract, 
such as freedom. As I will discuss later, the underlying framework that fuses the 
different ideals is nationalism 
In summary, apart from the essence of the foco theory introduced in 
Chapter 2, the main takeaways from Che’s On Guerilla Warfare are that his basic 
tactics of mobility, surprise, and concentration of forces only when necessary, are 
right out of Mao’s concept for guerillas. Guevara sanctions sabotage, but in a 
controlled manner that does not appear as terrorism. But Guevara also provides 
tactical guidance that supports the Dual Strategy, by focusing on agrarian reform, 
but not dictating to the peasants; and by not alienating other classes, even 
though Guevara’s contempt for the upper classes is evident. Above all, it is the 
individual guerilla that sets the example for social reform and armed rebellion; the 
people then carry it forward as it snowballs into a nationwide rebellion.  
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 Conclusion 
Guerilla warfare is a form of violence that is governed by the laws of 
warfare (Wickham-Crowley 1991); in other words, unlike terrorism there is 
nothing illegal about it, as long as it complies with the accepted norms of armed 
conflict.  Both Mao and Guevara/Castro applied the fundamentals of guerilla 
warfare, but shaped them to fit their particular situations, while being cautious to 
maintain the legitimacy of the insurgency in the eyes of the population and the 
rest of the world. This is essential for domestic popular support and possible 
international aid. Both revolutionaries recognized that a sanctuary is an essential 
element of guerilla warfare. Mao operated in the vast territory of the Chinese 
countryside to maneuver and attack the enemy at his weakest points. He evaded 
extermination by disappearing into the populace. Mao developed incredible skill 
in changing the profile and character of his forces – from guerilla bands, to 
organized army units, back to guerilla bands, and to civilians. Castro never 
developed such a changing character; his band of guerillas relied more on fixed 
bases from where to launch attacks, then would simply disappear into the 
remote, heavily vegetated, and inaccessible mountains of the Sierra Maestra. As 
for war material, neither Mao nor Castro received any substantial aid from 
outside sources. Instead, they mostly supplied themselves by capturing war 
materiel from their enemy – a basic tenet of guerilla warfare. Mao did not 
consider urban sabotage an important element of the insurgency, but Fidel 
Castro and Guevara saw it as complementary, often coordinated from their own 
headquarters in the mountains (Peterson 1970).  
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Both doctrines of guerilla tactics relied on the example set by the 
individual fighters; but Mao took it a step further by placing a much larger degree 
of faith in his guerillas. And here lies the greatest difference between Mao and 
Che: command and control; centralization versus decentralization. Che and 
Castro insisted in running the show; they distrusted the abilities of those around 
them except for the inner circle (Moreno 1970). This was partly due to the 
geography and the specific conditions of Cuba, but also ideology. Although Che 
was a rather unorthodox Leninist, he still believed in elite and tightly controlled 
organization (Friedman 1970). Mao, on the other hand, relied on decentralization 
and the local initiative of his cadres and the people. Mao focused on attracting 
maximum support from all classes - to include the capitalist bourgeoisie; 
Guevara, on the other hand, stressed socialism instead of alliance with 
nationalistic capitalists. However, Che – at the direction of Fidel Castro - was 
careful not to take his antagonism too far with the upper classes; otherwise he 
risked isolating the guerillas from a potential source of financial and manpower 
support, as well as running the risk of that segment of society aligning itself with 
reactionary military nationalists (Friedman 1970). As it was, elements of the 
middle and upper classes never fully trusted Castro and his followers. But as I 
will discuss later, in the end, Castro was able to mobilize enough resources to 
partially offset the antagonism of these elements.  
Leadership was defined and exercised differently by Mao and Castro. 
Both stressed leadership by example, but Mao’s teachings and actions appear 
more genuine and pragmatic than Castro’s. Mao could accept – as he did – his 
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rival Chiang Kai-shek as national leader in the fight against Japan, but at the 
same time work to displace him. As such, he appears to be truly fighting for the 
interest of the people instead of himself (Friedman 1970). On the other hand, 
Castro and Che could never accept subordination to anybody or any group. 
Castro has eliminated potential opponents for 50 years. Guevara’s insistence on 
subordination of Bolivian guerillas contributed to failure (Johnson 2006; Moreno 
1970). These two different approaches to leadership reflected on the execution of 
the Dual Strategy that I will discuss in the following chapters. Castro was direct 
and thus more transparent in dealing with the inconsistencies of such strategy; 
Mao, while pragmatic in order to appeal to different groups without utilizing 
violence, had to design a number of mechanisms to deal with such 
inconsistencies. 
The principal takeaway from this chapter is that in China and Cuba, the 
form of warfare resorted to by the insurgents was guerilla warfare; but in both 
cases, guerilla warfare went beyond simply military tactics techniques, and 
procedures. It was the catalyst for mobilizing the peasant masses, for political 
indoctrination, and the main ingredient in a grand strategy to mobilize the 
resources required for revolutionary victory (Mao 1937, 1938; Guevara 1961, 
1963). Guerilla warfare was the mechanism for political work from the bottom-up, 
which combined with top-down strategic organization, would result in the buildup 
of nationalism – the objective of the grand strategy. Guerillas must appear as 
nationalists, otherwise they will not win the mass support, the elites, and the 
patriotic youth needed to educate, organize, lead and die for the revolution 
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(Friedman 1970). Mao would have never come to power if he had not been able 
to mobilize the Chinese peasantry by exploiting their nationalist sentiments. 
Nationalism was the decisive factor in China. In Cuba, and the rest of Latin 
America for that matter, nationalism is a strong issue. The nationalist banner can 
be up for grabs and not necessarily fall in the hands of the guerillas. In fact, Latin 
American history is full of examples of militaries – acting for the bourgeois – 
taking the nationalist mantle and expropriating the properties of outside powers.  
Castro realized full well the requirement to design a strategy that would promote 
and harness nationalism in favor of the guerillas, or possibly risk losing the 
nationalism banner to other groups in search of resources and power. In the next 
two chapters, I will discuss how Chinese and Cuban revolutionary leaders 
incorporated a number of mechanisms - within a revolutionary setting - to 
develop a cohesive strategy focused on nationalism…What I refer to as a Dual 
Strategy.  
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Chapter Four 
 
China Revisited 
 
Introduction 
The Chinese revolution is the best known peasant revolution. This is 
because peasants comprised the preponderance of the masses behind Mao Tse-
tung’s rise to power. Although Chinese peasants rebelled in response to poverty, 
traditional exploitation by the upper classes, and did succeed in changing the 
social structure of the country, reality is significantly more complex than rebellion 
in response to social conditions. As previously discussed, these conditions alone 
are not enough to provide a revolutionary situation, nor can peasants alone 
succeed in a revolution. The inter-relation of a number of social, economic, and 
political factors that converge at a particular point in time can set the conditions 
for revolutionary uprising and subsequent social change. Mao’s focus in his 
struggle for power was the control of resources. He successfully mobilized and 
controlled resources such as peasant masses, land, information, and cross-
cutting popular support to effectively neutralize and eventually defeat the superior 
military of the Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalists. Mao went as far as forging an 
alliance with the KMT against the Japanese occupation, under the leadership of 
the KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek, in order to not only rebuild his forces – but also 
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appeal to elites, intellectuals, and students, while continuing to harness 
resources for the eventual showdown with the KMT. Mao effectively utilized a 
number of mechanisms, such as ideology, leadership, organization, and violence 
to build his nationalistic appeal as he sought broad popular support across all 
classes.  
 During the period from 1935 to 1949, the Chinese Communists, led by 
Mao Tse-tung, successfully employed these mechanisms to mobilize the 
resources required to initially challenge the Japanese occupiers, and then the 
nominal rule of the Kuomintang (KMT) Party to set the conditions for eventual 
victory in 1949. Most important was Mao’s ability to turn the peasants into the 
decisive force for success. The communist party had previously failed to achieve 
mobilization objectives by focusing instead on the Bolshevik model of urban 
proletariat uprising and thus excluding either the bourgeois or peasant support 
(Green 1999). It took Mao’s leadership and vision to survive strategic failure and 
almost complete extermination, by designing a new approach for popular support 
that would offset the resource mobilization advantages (particularly military) of its 
rivals – essentially a rural strategy based on the peasantry (Mao 1927). Thus, 
this chapter seeks to answer the question: What was Mao Tse-tung’s strategy for 
mobilizing peasants in support of the revolutionary struggle? I will discuss the 
blending of the mobilization mechanisms into a cohesive strategy that appealed 
not only to the main effort of such strategy – the peasants – but also other 
classes in pursuit of the broadest possible alliance. 
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However, as Barrington Moore (1966) explains, even if a revolutionary 
situation exists and the proper strategy is implemented to mobilize resources, it 
does not necessarily mean that such circumstances will automatically result in a 
revolution; a decisive catalyst or ingredient normally ignites these conditions into 
a revolution. In the case of China, the situation was ripe for a peasant’s revolt: 
The traditional structure of China’s peasant society could not adjust to the 
stresses associated with global market forces, industrialization, and 
modernization; there was simply a lack of incentive for landowners and gentry to 
modernize and perhaps lose their prominent status. The KMT, in power since 
1911 - and reminiscent of the Manchu Dynasty and warlords before them – did 
not undertake any serious land reform, stopped short of altering the elites’ control 
of local life, and instead sought to maintain the status quo. Additionally, through 
the 19th and early 20th century, the agrarian bureaucracy had not only inhibited 
reform, but weakened the link that bound the peasants to the upper classes, by 
essentially not performing any functions that the peasants regarded as essential 
to their way of life; hence the link between rulers and ruled was weak and largely 
artificial, and thus liable to break under strain (Moore 1966; Skocpol 1979). 
Additionally, landlords had a historical interest in peasant overpopulation. An 
excess of peasants bid up the rents for the landlord as they competed to work 
the land. The result was the survival of a peasant mass that eventually became 
the main force behind the revolution (Moore 1966). Finally, by 1934, the 
Communists had designed the proper strategy for mobilization by abandoning 
the Bolshevik model.  Moore argues that the decisive ingredient for communist 
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revolutionary victory was the Japanese conquest and the occupation policies of a 
foreign foe. The next logical question is why did the KMT fail and the communists 
succeed in their responses to the Japanese? As important as the Japanese 
contribution was, I would argue that in fact it was guerilla warfare – as conducted 
by the communists – that served as the catalyst for eventual revolutionary 
victory.  
In this chapter, I will discuss Mao’s strategy for mobilizing popular support 
resources, focusing on the peasantry; then transition into the key role of guerilla 
warfare in implementing and integrating the overall communist strategy to 
capitalize on the conditions that existed for revolution, and thus set the conditions 
for eventual success in 1949. The chapter focuses on the period of 1935 to 1945, 
which coincides with Mao’s leadership of the Communist Party, the Japanese 
occupation, and the implementation of the communist strategy for popular 
support and guerilla warfare. Nonetheless, I will also discuss the Communists’ 
strategy for the continuation of the Civil War, following the defeat of the Japanese 
in World War II, through their eventual victory. However, it is important to set the 
stage by discussing the factors and history that led to Mao’s change of strategy. 
Background 
The young intellectuals that founded the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
in 1921 believed that their main task was to organize the Chinese proletariat for a 
socialist revolution that would be part of the international transformation that 
Marx had envisioned, and which the Russian revolution seemed to herald. Within 
a few years, the CCP had indeed built a national labor base representing a half-
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million workers (Meisner 1986). Heavily influenced by the Soviet Union and the 
Moscow-based Communist International dual policy of supporting both the KMT 
and CCP, but also because of political conditions in China, in 1924 the CCP was 
pressured to ally itself with the KMT in order to achieve the twin goals of national 
unification and national independence; that is, the elimination of warlord 
separatism and foreign imperialism. The CCP was the junior partner of the 
alliance since the KMT did control a territorial base of operations in southern 
China.  As a result, Soviet arms, money, and military and political advisers – for 
the purpose of building a modern army –were directed to the KMT. To the CCP, 
Moscow offered moral encouragement and political advice. A “United Front” was 
formed (Meisner 1986). 
     By 1926, the new National Revolutionary Army under the command of new 
KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek, began a successful campaign against the warlords 
that controlled most of northern China, and achieved at least nominal control 
over most of China (Lazzerini 1999). Concurrently, mass movements were 
organized in both the cities and the countryside.  However, the combined 
success of the military and mass movement campaigns exposed the tensions 
within the alliance. The popular social revolution agenda promoted by the CCP 
was simply incompatible with the terms of the KMT-CCP alliance, as it 
threatened classes and groups that formed the social basis of the Kuomintang 
and the bourgeoisie revolution advocated by Moscow. Once Chiang had 
acquired enough military power and the financial support of the upper classes, he 
turned to a campaign of destruction against the CCP and the mass movements. 
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The political strength of the CCP was virtually extinguished in the purge of 1927-
1928. CCP cadres, trade unions, and student organizations were annihilated in 
the cities, but the suppression of peasant associations was particularly brutal 
(Meissner 1986; Skocpol 1979). The communists learned some important 
lessons out of this defeat (Shum 1988): 
? Military power was decisive in determining the outcome of political class 
struggles 
? Urban proletariat focus of revolutionary movement did not apply to China 
? Support of peasantry had been insufficient 
? The social revolution was not appealing to all classes 
  Those who survived, led by Mao Tse-tung, fled to remote areas of the 
countryside to design a new strategy and attempt a new revolution. Mao had 
identified the peasants as the force for success in his Hunan Report (1927) and 
thus built a tiny military base by recruiting peasants and uniting with local bandits. 
Eventually, he achieved military predominance in the southern Kiangsi province 
and established the Chinese Soviet Republic in 1931.  The communists 
established a functioning and sizable civilian government that controlled a 
territory of about 15,000 square miles and 3 million people (Meisner 1986). The 
KMT did not ignore this growing threat. Following four unsuccessful campaigns 
against the Communists, the KMT employed new tactics in the fifth and forced 
Mao and his followers into the famous “Long March” to another remote region of 
China; this time in the sparsely populated northwest region of the Shensi 
Province. The 1934 defeat had also resulted in important lessons learned about 
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the preconditions for the political and social mobilization of rural resources 
(Meisner 1986; Skocpol 1979; Shum 1988):   
? The predominance of the Red Army15 and the security it guaranteed 
? Radical land policies which threatened middle peasants were 
counterproductive 
? Meaningful and lasting land reform could not be imposed from above 
   Additionally, the communists acquired valuable experience in running a 
government; experimented with land re-distribution; and the principles of guerilla 
warfare were developed and tested. Once again, the communists would regroup 
and design the final strategy for the mobilization of the masses. However, an 
important new variable was introduced shortly thereafter – the Japanese invasion 
of 1937.  By this time Mao had achieved effective control of the CCP and it would 
be his revolutionary theory and vision for ultimate success that would guide the 
new strategy against the Japanese and the KMT. 
Development of Dual Strategy 
Strategy is defined as a plan of action that organizes efforts to achieve 
objectives. As discussed previously, and based on Tilly’s (1973, 1978) theory, 
control of resources is the overall objective. The focus of the communist guerillas 
was popular support, particularly of the peasantry, and thus the objective was 
mobilization of the masses. To achieve the objective, separate efforts 
 
15 Although “Red Army” and “People’s Liberation Army (PLA)” are terms used interchangeably 
when referring to Mao’s military forces, I utilize Red Army throughout this document because that 
is what Mao’s band of guerillas, peasants, and bandits  - as the military arm of the CCP - were 
called following the 1927 purge. The PLA originated when elements of the KMT rebelled following 
the breakup of the first “United Front” in 1927, but then went on to join Mao’s Red Army. In the 
civil war following Japan’s defeat in WW II, the Red Army was formally renamed the People’ 
Liberation Army (britannica.com; globalsecurity.com).  
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(organization, ideology, violence, etc.) were integrated into a coherent plan of 
action that established the direction of the revolution. The CCP would de-
emphasize class struggle and instead encourage national unity and moderate 
reform, while at the same time continue the indoctrination, protection, and 
organization of peasants in the countryside without pressure from the KMT 
(Skocpol 1979; Shum 1988). In essence, Mao saw the Japanese invasion as an 
opportunity to improve the CCP’s position in its continuing struggle with the KMT. 
    Thus, during the resistance to Japan, the CCP pursued a dual strategy – 
external and internal. The external strategy focused on securing the sympathy 
and support of the majority of the upper classes and to isolate the KMT 
domestically and internationally. By stressing a liberal patriotic image, defending 
elite (human, property, political) rights, and calling for unity and moderate 
reforms, the Communists hoped to build cross-cutting alliances and broaden their 
appeal (Chen 1986). Additionally, they hoped to recruit elites into the 
administration for indoctrination and organization of the masses (Shum 1988). 
The principal mechanism for implementing the external strategy was a second 
“United Front” with the KMT against the Japanese invaders. Faced with Japan’s 
increasing assertiveness, the CCP and the KMT concluded that a second united 
front, in August 1937, was necessary. The terms were kept vague in order to 
increase appeal and reduce alienation (Chen 1986). Although Chiang Kai-shek’s 
hand was forced by his own generals to join the united front, the alliance was 
mostly in name only and cooperation was minimal. In view of the failure of the 
first united front of 1927, neither Chiang nor Mao had any illusions about the 
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long-term success of this second effort. Nonetheless, for a short time most of the 
nation rallied behind Chiang in defense of the nation (Lazzerini 1999). The 
Communists were cautious, tentative, and patient; they hardly engaged the 
Japanese in major battles, but instead utilized and refined their guerilla tactics, 
while the KMT expended significant resources in fighting the Japanese, as well 
as attempting to contain Communist growth. Although Mao’s guerilla tactics 
emphasized “the flexible dispersal or concentration of forces according to 
circumstances” (Mao, May 1938, 123), he instructed the CCP leaders to carry out 
“dispersed guerilla warfare” against the Japanese invaders and not “concentrate 
our forces for a campaign” (Kennedy 200816), in order to avoid depletion of 
resources. The Communists rebuilt while holding on to their countryside enclaves 
as the KMT was forced to retreat from their city strongholds. The end result was 
that the Communists gained the control of resources and thus increased their 
power, specifically (Skocpol 1979; Shum 1988):   
? Transformation into a national party fighting for national defense and unity 
? Provided CCP with a legitimate banner to organize peasants for resistance 
? Neutralized the former opposition of landlord elites   
? Acquired the service of progressive elites to contribute resources and skills 
? Fostered nationalism by subordinating class warfare to national interest 
? Adopted mutually beneficial policies for both the elites and masses 
? KMT support was reduced to a minority of the upper class 
 
16 Kennedy references this quote to Guanyu hongjun zuozhan de yuanze (“On the Operational 
Principles of the Red Army”), 1 August 1937, in Mao Zedong’s Collected Writings, Vol 2, p.20 
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   As a result, the Communist based areas became the most democratic, 
popular, and economically viable in China; and the legitimacy of the KMT, in spite 
of its nominal leadership in the resistance war, was undermined domestically and 
internationally (Shum 1988). Nonetheless, both Mao and Chiang knew that an 
eventual showdown between the KMT and CCP for control of China was 
inevitable. Mao had long ago realized that the peasants were the greatest source 
of strength for the CCP to achieve a decision against the KMT (Mao 1927). The 
internal strategy – that stressed class struggle to mobilize the entire peasantry – 
became his main effort. 
Dual Strategy 
 
“[Peasants represent] a force so swift and violent that no power, 
however great, will be able to suppress it17.” Mao Tse-tung  
 
The challenge for communist leader Mao Tse-tung was to mobilize this 
great force of peasants to offset the anticipated military strengths of the KMT 
Nationalists – a difficult task indeed. Peasants are not easily mobilized since their 
goals are normally local and they lack access to resources. In addition, Chinese 
peasants were not accustomed to cooperating with each other beyond the limits 
of the family or clan, making the acceptance of solidarity and a new kind of 
society extremely difficult (Moore 1966). Although a degree of the “tactical 
freedom” and associated “leverage” described by Wolf (1969) and explained in 
Chapter 2, existed in the middle peasantry, they were constrained by the existing 
power structure (Wolf 1969). Further, even poor peasants could not just be 
forcibly drafted into the Red Army or forced to provide supplies and guerilla 
 
17 The Hunan Report, Mao (1927, 54) 
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bases; they had to be persuaded. Peasants would not willingly and reliably 
provide such support unless the Communists seemed to be fighting in their 
interests. Mao had built an important base in the Communist held areas of the 
Shensi province; it was time to consolidate gains and expand in the countryside. 
Rectification Campaign 
Following some political and military reversals in 1941, the CCP chose to 
consolidate their gains in the base areas of the countryside by launching a series 
of mass campaigns aimed at solidifying the ties between the Party and the 
masses and achieving a high level of mass mobilization. Among these programs 
were the Rent and Interest Reduction Campaign (1942), the “To the Village” 
Movement (1941-2), the Campaign for Strengthening the Militia (1941-4), and the 
Production Movement (1943) (Lazzerini 1999; Shum 1988). I will not describe 
these and other campaigns in this chapter; the point is that these campaigns 
sought to mobilize the Communists principal resource – the peasant masses – 
within the spirit of the Dual Strategy, so as not to alienate the support of other 
classes. For example, the Rent and Interest Reduction Campaign was based on 
compromise between classes in the interest of a united resistance: the landlord’s 
reduction in rent was tolerable so long as they could retain their property and 
collect rent. Thus the CCP gave equal emphasis to the necessity of improving 
the living conditions of the peasants and workers and protecting the economic 
and political interests of the landlords and capitalists. The policy of class 
reconciliation was preserved.  Nonetheless, policy is just that, policy; the success 
of the campaigns depended on the effectiveness of mobilization. To encourage 
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and increase popular involvement, the party developed an operational technique 
known as “mass line,” a set of principles and rules by which Communist cadres 
became intimately involved and identified with the peasant masses (Lazzerini 
1999; Meisner 1986).  
Mass-Line Politics 
Mass-Line techniques were formulated and implemented during the period 
of resistance against Japan (Schram 1967), as the basic leadership tool that the 
CCP cadres employed to mobilize the masses. The central concept of mass line 
dictates the establishment of a direct relationship between the general population 
and CCP cadres, by means of a conscious and continuous operational process 
that maximizes contact through democratic participation, group discussion, and 
criticism (Skocpol 1979). The philosophy of mass-line is exemplified by the 
following quote from Mao (1942, 219): 
Revolutionary statesmen, the political specialists who know the 
science or art of revolutionary politics, are simply the leaders of 
millions upon millions of statesmen – the masses. Their task is to 
collect the opinions of these mass statesmen, sift and refine them, 
and return them to the masses, who then take them and put them 
into practice.  
 
 The goal was for cadres to form new mass line or “comradely” 
relationships with the masses, while preserving the national direction of the CCP 
(Wilson 1963). The technique comprised a three-stage process (Lazzerini 1999):  
1. Cadres would go directly to the people to determine what kind of program 
appealed to them 
2. Popular desires were then integrated with party ideology and goals 
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3. Convince the masses that to support the particular program(s) was in their 
best interest    
   Mass-line reflected Mao’s conviction that party policy and its operational 
aspect must originate with the masses and be based on popular support. The 
key to success of the mass line was in the cadres themselves, and the ability to 
arouse the people into believing in the program and to act upon it with genuine 
commitment. The technique’s application was essential in implementing the Rent 
and Interest Reduction campaign discussed previously (Lazzerini 1999).   
  The rectification campaigns and use of mass-line techniques achieved major 
results by the end of the Japanese occupation in 1945. Communist propaganda 
reached millions of people, party membership rose to 1.2 million (compared with 
40,000 in 1937), and the Red Army numbered about 1 million men (Lazzerini 
1999). What had been a movement on the verge of extinction twice before (1927 
and 1934), was now capable of challenging the KMT for the leadership of China. 
It not only had successfully mobilized the personnel, organizational material, and 
military resources to succeed, but had the support of millions believing in the 
Communist ideals.      
  However, the success of mass-line politics did not mean that the United 
Front policy was brushed aside or submerged in the interests of promoting class 
struggle. Rather at times, mass-line politics were actually subordinated to the 
politics of class collaboration: the Party would refrain from fully satisfying the 
peasants’ demands in order not to antagonize the majority of the elites (Shum 
1988). This of course carried certain risks; even if the internal and external 
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strategies were parallel, overlaps do occur resulting in contradictions. In Mao’s 
case, the call for unity with landlords against the Japanese contradicted the Party 
struggle for redistribution of wealth and a much more radical redistribution of rural 
power (Chen 1986). Earlier, I explained how compromise between the classes 
was emphasized in the Rectification Campaign, but that was after the peasants 
had been already mobilized by mass-line. The cadres had the difficult task of 
dealing with the occasional contradictions of the dual strategy. The solution was 
to orchestrate its contradictory elements through the manipulation of time, space, 
and participants (Chen 1986). In other words, one strategy (internal or external) 
would be subordinated to the other during periods when it was strategically 
feasible (time); or depending on the local circumstances of a particular area as 
opposed to another (space); or the specific audience (participants). Of course, 
the strategic direction in the orchestration of contradictions originated with the 
party. Leadership and ideology were the central elements in the fusion of 
operational techniques (rectification campaign, mass-line) with strategic objective 
of the dual strategy (mobilization of resources) and thus deserve a short 
discussion.   
Leadership 
The leadership capabilities, charismatic attraction, and credibility of Mao 
Tse-tung cannot be underestimated in mobilizing resources and obtaining 
popular support. By the end of the Long March, he had achieved almost cult 
status – some of it, of course, self-promoted. The brilliance of Mao cut across the 
entire spectrum of conflict: political and military. His design of the dual strategy, 
 86
development of Chinese Communism, and of course his concept of guerilla 
warfare were all validated with the eventual victory of the Communists. The 
importance of Mao’s leadership surfaces when compared to Chiang Kai-shek. 
Following the Japanese invasion, Chiang held all the cards: he was head of the 
established government, controlled the National Liberation Army, and the country 
(CCP included) had united behind him. But Chiang was a military leader not a 
political leader; his failure to build cross-cutting alliances and a political strategy 
eventually cost him broader appeal to the masses.  
Mao’s genius was in adapting the long-range objectives of the communist 
revolution to the social demands of the peasants while building and sustaining 
cross-cutting class alliances (Greene 1999).  In the absence of survey data, it is 
impossible to specify exactly how many people joined the CCP’s cause because 
of Mao’s leadership, as opposed to other factors, but many observers of the 
Chinese Revolution have indicated that the force of Mao’s personality was 
important (O’Neill 1990). 
Ideology 
The principal functions of revolutionary ideology are to facilitate the 
development of cross-cutting alliances between classes as well as revolutionary 
mobilization; additionally, it serves to legitimatize the revolutionary movement 
(Greene 1999). Thus, following the CCP defeat of 1927, Mao had a pressing 
need to find theories that were useful to the survival and growth of the political 
and military movement that he was leading (Wylie 1980). Guerilla warfare would 
be the initial military theory; his political theory was exemplified by his concept of 
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“New Democracy.” A full explanation of Mao’s ideology is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. However, a brief explanation is necessary to understand how 
ideology ties in with mobilization of the masses. Essentially, Mao’s “New 
Democracy” was the application of Marxism to the specific conditions and needs 
of China – or what the CCP referred to as the “Sinification of Marxism.” The 
intent was to broaden the ideological appeal by merging the patriotic sentiment of 
nationalism with the reforming passion of Marxism (Wylie 1980).  
Mao expressed the belief that the Chinese revolution would consist of two 
stages: first the stage of the New Democracy – a bourgeois democratic 
revolution suited to the particular needs of China; then the stage of socialism 
(Mao 1940). However, the New Democracy stage does not result in a 
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or the proletariat, but in a dictatorship of the united 
front of all the revolutionary classes – workers, peasants, intelligentsia, and 
national bourgeois (Mao 1940; Mark 1951; Meisner 1986).  Mao stated that while 
the eventual goal was socialism, the New Democracy stage could last a long 
time and that the transition would occur when the necessary conditions were 
“ripe” (Mao 1940). Economically, Mao’s New Democracy called for state 
ownership of big banks, big industries, and big commercial establishments. But 
all other enterprises would be permitted to remain in private hands. The 
ownership of land was to be readjusted, not for the purpose of building a socialist 
agriculture, but to turn the land into peasant property (Mao 1940; Mark 1951).    
The brilliance of the New Democracy is threefold. First, it appealed to all 
classes with a blend of nationalism and pragmatism. The upper classes are 
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reassured because socialism was not defined as the immediate objective but 
only as a long term goal. The lower classes are satisfied that their land reform 
agenda will eventually be met. Second, the vagueness in parts of the ideology 
(i.e. transition when conditions are “ripe”) allowed flexibility and political space. 
Finally, it achieved the purpose of facilitating cross-cutting alliances and 
mobilizing the masses. Nevertheless, the best strategy, ideology, and leadership 
would not necessarily result in victory over the superior KMT. The Communists 
needed a mechanism to integrate all these elements and demonstrate to the 
people not only progress, but their commitment in the struggle against the 
Japanese and eventually the KMT... Guerilla warfare would provide such a 
mechanism. 
Guerilla Warfare 
“Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun18.” Mao Tse-tung  
This famous Mao quote has been interpreted in a number of different 
ways. I agree with the version that in political and social class struggles military 
power often proves to be the decisive force. To succeed, revolutionaries normally 
either win over the allegiance of the armed forces, or otherwise neutralize it. Mao 
chose to build his own peasant army in order to offset the advantage provided by 
the established army of Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT. Following the defeat of 
1927, Mao started developing the tactics of guerilla warfare from base areas in 
the countryside (Skocpol, Lazzerini 1999). The design was by necessity because 
guerilla warfare is a technique of the weak, and Mao understood that at the time 
 
18 As quoted in Mao (November 1938,  146)  
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it was his best chance to stay relevant and prevent extermination by the KMT. To 
Mao, the role of guerilla warfare went beyond the obvious: it would also serve as 
a mechanism for obtaining popular support; for getting close to the peasants and 
sharing their hardships; for indoctrination of peasants; and for obtaining small 
victories against the KMT and Japanese in order to motivate the masses. Finally, 
it would provide a springboard for the development of conventional armies that 
would eventually confront the KMT for the right to rule China.   
To achieve these objectives, Mao insisted on political control over military 
operations combined with a strong program of ideological indoctrination both for 
party members and for the troops, with the party maintaining at all times its 
leadership over the army (Greene 1999; Wylie 1980). Such control somewhat 
contradicts his own essence of guerilla warfare of decentralized small units that 
conduct highly mobile hit-and-run attacks against weak targets. The risk is, that 
theoretically, nothing prevents guerilla-type military forces from developing into 
scattered, disunited bands of armed thugs that abuse the populace. Mao 
resolved this dilemma by establishing control of the Red Army Guerillas; placing 
well-trained and indoctrinated political commissars, committees, and cadres 
throughout the ranks to educate all military members and ensure compliance with 
Party goals – thus combining decentralized guerilla tactics with political-
ideological unification through party control (Skocpol 1979).  
   Further, the Chinese Red Army was trained to “unite” with the civilian 
peasantry (Skocpol 1979). Essentially, this meant treating peasants’ lives, 
property, and customs with respect. In fact, Mao recognized the importance of 
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bonding with the peasants by demanding adherence to a code of conduct to deal 
with the people. In what he referred to as “Eight Points of Attention,” he warned 
his military forces to (Mao 1966, 134; O’Neill 1990):  
? Speak politely 
? Pay fairly for what you buy 
? Return everything that you borrow 
? Pay for anything you damage 
? Do not hit or swear at people 
? Do not damage crops 
? Do not take liberties with women 
? Do not ill-treat captives     
        Unification of the CCP guerilla units with the people also meant becoming 
involved in their lives by assisting peasants in production activities, sharing 
peasants’ living conditions, and by promoting political education, Party activities, 
and militia organization in the villages with which they came in contact with. In 
sum, the Red Army had to undertake economic, political, as well as combat 
activities (Skocpol 1979).  
            In pursuing a guerilla campaign, the Red Army was instrumental in the 
implementation of Mao’s dual strategy. As the Communists expanded their 
influence into areas owned by the landlords, the policies of the Rectification 
Campaign, such as tax or rent reduction, provision of local social services, and 
protection depended – as previously discussed – on mass-line techniques, which 
in turn required cadre direct access to the communities under the security of at 
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least a minimal military-administrative shield (Sckocpol 1979). Politically, the 
Communists applied the “three thirds” system, under which local government in 
the guerilla areas was composed of one-third Communists, one-third from other 
organizations, and one-third non-party people. The result was not democracy in 
the sense of majority rule, which would have been difficult under the 
circumstances, but it was honest government which earned the respect of a large 
part of the population (Schram 1967) and reinforced the New Democracy 
doctrine.    
 Thus, it is clear that Red Army guerillas played a decisive role in the 
emergence of the CCP as the manifestation of the country’s resistance to Japan 
and with the control of significant resources to challenge the KMT for the right to 
rule China. That is why I argue that the catalyst for revolution was guerilla 
warfare under the leadership of Mao and not as Moore (1966) has suggested 
that it was the Japanese invasion. If Barrington Moore were correct, the KMT 
should have benefited most from the invasion and thus emerged victorious. The 
war of resistance was conducted under the leadership of the KMT government, 
which in spite of severe military setbacks, did achieve some early victories, never 
succumbed to Japan, and thus could claim military leadership against the 
invaders. But the KMT employed the wrong political strategy by not mobilizing 
the masses in its support or building cross-cutting alliances, as well as the wrong 
military strategy by attempting to defend cities against the superior Japanese. On 
the other hand, the CCP’s military strategy of guerilla warfare re-enforced all 
political policies to build peasant support, cross-cutting alliances, and mass 
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indoctrination, while at the same time achieving small victories and successfully 
securing Communist held areas in the countryside. As a result, the CCP 
assumed political leadership of the resistance along with some military success, 
while the KMT assumed military leadership with limited success and no political 
leadership.  
In support of Moore, the argument could be made that the invasion was an 
event while guerilla warfare is a technique and that without the invasion it is likely 
that Mao would have eventually failed. But what actually united the population in 
a wave of nationalism were the brutal occupation techniques of the Japanese 
that terrorized the population and prevented even the support of some of the 
upper class that might have been sympathetic to the Japanese. Thus, I see it as 
an argument of techniques where guerilla warfare proved to be superior. 
Nonetheless, the invasion was a major variable, and in the final analysis, very 
difficult to separate its impact from that of guerilla warfare. What is clear is that 
the Communists had built a significant base of support prior to the intensified 
attacks of the Japanese in 1940. The CCP had mobilized enough resources to 
challenge the KMT; nobody can predict what could have happened without the 
invasion.   
Guerilla warfare was only a stage in Mao’s version of protracted popular-
war military strategy. To defeat the KMT, a transition into conventional warfare 
(the direct confrontation of large units in combat) would be required. Only this 
kind of warfare would finally settle the issue of supreme power in the struggle 
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between the Communists and the Nationalists. The civil war of 1945-1949 would 
resolve the issue in favor of the Communists.  
Civil War and Revolutionary Victory 
Through the Dual Strategy, the CCP enjoyed spectacular growth and 
expansion of its power during the war of resistance against Japan (1937-45). The 
shift in emphasis from agrarian revolution and class warfare to national 
resistance paid dividends, as it enabled the Communists to identify themselves 
with the spontaneous outburst of peasant nationalism in response to Japanese 
aggression and atrocities, and thus won them the popular support they required 
to go against the KMT (Shum 1988). The communists were successful in 
fostering an image of conducting guerilla warfare in defense of the people.  
Although they did not hold any major cities after World War II, they enjoyed 
strong grass roots support, superior organization and morale, and large stocks of 
weapons seized from the Japanese. On the other hand, the war left the 
Nationalists severely weakened and their policies left them unpopular. Although 
Chiang was personally incorruptible, his government was corrupt and 
mismanaged the economy into hyperinflation.  
The Japanese surrender set the stage for the continuation of civil war in 
China. In 1945, Mao and Chiang met for a series of talks regarding the formation 
of a post-war government. Both agreed on the importance of democracy, a 
unified military, and equality for all Chinese political parties. But the truce was 
tenuous; decades of animosity and mistrust could not be overcome and efforts to 
form a coalition government failed. By 1946, the two sides were fighting an all-out 
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civil war. Nevertheless, Mao did not want war in early 1946; rather than seeking 
Chiang’s overthrow, he merely sought to fend off the Nationalists offensive which 
would allow the CCP to negotiate peace in more favorable terms. Thus, Mao’s 
goal throughout the first few months of the war remained a negotiated peace 
(Kennedy 2008). Both sides set in motion strategies to expand their territorial 
control. Chiang enjoyed the support of the U.S. and used it to move his forces to 
principal cities around China. Communist strategy called for building on their 
strength by surrounding and taking over cities of North China.  
Chiang attempted to eliminate the CCP in the North by using troops 
belonging to northern warlords, who had sided with Chiang during the previous 
phase of the civil war and then switched to join the Japanese during the invasion. 
This strategy of course backfired, as the peasants associated the warlords with 
the hated Japanese invaders, and thus further eroded any popular support for 
Chiang. Mao’s confidence grew. In November 1946, he raised his sights 
considerably by referring to the conflict as “the people’s war of liberation.” For the 
first time, Mao proposed the actual overthrow of the regime (Kennedy 2008). As 
per his revolutionary theory, Mao then transitioned to conventional warfare in the 
prosecution of total war to destroy the KMT army. The technique that he used 
was “positional warfare.” As Mao explained: mobile warfare resembled guerilla 
warfare in its emphasis on mobility and surprise, but involved greater 
concentration of troops and firepower over a large range of territories. As such, 
mobile warfare had the potential to inflict greater punishment on enemy forces in 
a given period of time, but required greater organization and coordination from 
 95
above (Kennedy 2008). The center of gravity, discussed in Chapter 3, now 
shifted from popular support in the guerilla warfare phase, to the moral and 
physical cohesion of the Nationalist Army.  
In the summer and fall of 1947, the Red Army of Mao began to win 
important victories in North China. The subsequent capture of KMT tanks, heavy 
artillery, and other combined-arms assets allowed execution of larger offensive 
campaigns. Although the KMT had an advantage in numbers and weapons, and 
benefited from international support, their low morale hindered their ability to 
fight. Economic collapse and government corruption compounded the battlefield 
disasters of the KMT. The communists expanded south, and by late 1949, the 
Red Army was pursuing remnants of KMT forces into southern China. On 
October 1, 1949, Mao Tse-tung declared the creation of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC). Chiang Kai-shek and his remaining Nationalists retreated from 
mainland China to the island of Taiwan. Mao had achieved total victory. His 
guerilla tactics and revolutionary theory had been validated…The dual strategy 
was a success.    
Conclusion    
“Learn from the masses, and then teach them.” Mao Tse-tung 
The winning communist strategy of mobilizing the peasants in support of 
the revolutionary struggle, was born out of the defeats of 1927 and 1934; 
learning from those mistakes the communists realized that to defeat the KMT, 
they must have their own territorial base, their own army, and rely primarily on 
the support of the worker-peasants masses. Additionally, Mao’s ascendancy to 
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the CCP meant the implementation of his rural strategy without significant 
opposition within the CCP. However, the Communist’s defeat in 1934 showed 
them that they could not afford to alienate the intermediate classes because as 
history shows, revolutionary movements do not succeed where only one class of 
society is mobilized. The Communists would have faced enormous difficulties if 
the majority of landlords and capitalists had gone over to the KMT or even the 
Japanese. Mao Tse-tung’s dual strategy – characterized by moderation, 
reformism, and pragmatism rather than radicalism –   eventually proved to be the 
winning formula in mobilizing and controlling the resources required to challenge 
the Kuomintang.  
As a result, the Communists experienced an expansion of their power 
during the Japanese occupation. The Chinese Communists mixed simple living, 
self-reliance, and guerilla warfare into an aggressive nationalistic strategy that 
won widespread admiration from all classes of society. They increased their 
territorial control across North China, refined their tactics, and grew in confidence 
for the eventual showdown with the KMT. Although the Nationalist also held back 
from major offenses against the Japanese, gained in international stature, and 
even acquired a powerful ally in the United States, they suffered from a variety of 
internal weaknesses. A wrecked economy, runaway inflation, loss of popular 
support, and the loss of economically advanced territories to the Japanese, 
created the conditions for the eventual communist victory. As described in 
Chapter 2, it is clear that several pre-conditions regarding a revolutionary setting 
applied to the Chinese situation: conditions of peasantry, geography, 
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demography, and land tenure; as well as accelerators such as military defeat, 
and economic crises.  
However, it was guerilla warfare that ultimately facilitated the Communists 
ability to reach directly into the villages and organize the peasants for resistance, 
production, and class struggle; and afforded the Communists access to its 
greatest source of strength and the extraordinary resources they needed to 
control, in order to hold the line against the Japanese and achieve the goal of 
mobilizing resources to eventually challenge the Kuomintang. As a result, I 
consider guerilla warfare as the catalyst that ignited the existing revolutionary 
conditions and enabled the Chinese Communists to lead a revolution to victory. 
The Cuban revolution offers striking similarities and differences, which allows us 
to better understand the role of guerilla warfare in the mobilization of resources.  
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Chapter Five 
 
Cuba Revisited 
 
 
Introduction 
The consensus classifying the Cuban revolution as a peasant revolution is 
not as strong as the Chinese case study. In fact, some scholars have gone as far 
as describing the Cuban revolution as a middle-class revolution, mostly by 
arguing that the radicalized sectors of the middle class spearheaded the 
mobilization of the peasantry to bring the revolution to power (Pérez-Stable 
1993). In addition, the guerilla leaders could trace their backgrounds to the 
middle class; the urban underground that supported Castro, and cooperated with 
recruitment and sabotage, was composed of mostly middle class; even middle-
class political figures helped finance Castro’s original expedition from Mexico 
(Kling 1962).  Nonetheless, Castro’s band of guerillas would have never survived 
without the support of the peasants, who not only provided the bulk of recruits to 
the rebels, but also the sanctuary and resources that allowed the band to grow 
and become the spearhead of the rebellion against the Batista regime. Wolf’s 
(1969) thesis of “tactical mobility” (or autonomy), discussed in Chapter 2, was 
particularly applicable to the Oriente region of Cuba: a peasantry in a peripheral 
area beyond government control, with defensible mountainous redoubts, and 
 99
                                                
ethnically different from the surrounding population.19  Further, agrarian reform 
was the basic political objective of the revolutionaries – as stated by Guevara 
(1961, 7): “Above all else, the guerilla is an agrarian revolutionary.” Hence, in the 
final analysis, the Cuban revolution can be classified as a peasant’s revolution. 
Like Mao, Castro realized that the control of resources was the key to 
power – a difficult task indeed. How can a band of only twelve men, in complete 
disarray following a disastrous landing in the southern coast of Cuba, possibly 
take on an entrenched government with a standing army, and supported by a 
superpower? One possible mechanism could have been the traditional coup 
d’état, so prevalent in Latin American history. But as discussed in Chapter 3, 
Castro rejected this option. Besides, a coup with military elements – even in favor 
of the 26th of July Movement – would have represented a counter-force to his 
revolutionary objectives (Debray 1967). Castro wanted sweeping social and 
economic change; guerilla warfare would be the vehicle to mobilize resources 
and accelerate the rate of socio-economic change. But guerilla warfare is not a 
stand-alone mechanism; it must be integrated into a strategy that mobilizes 
resources, particularly popular support - the key to any insurgent movement. 
Castro’s challenge was to mold a number of instruments such as organization, 
charismatic leadership, information, and violence into a strategy that would build 
his nationalistic appeal across all segments of society. As in the previous 
chapter, I will conduct an analysis to answer the questions: What was the 
insurgent strategy for mobilizing peasants in support of the revolutionary 
 
19 Oriente province contained a significant Afro-Cuban element (Wolf 1969). 
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struggle? How did this strategy appeal to not only the peasants, but other classes 
as well? Although his focus was slightly different than Mao, Castro also designed 
a dual strategy of deception that would allow him to maintain his base of peasant 
support, appeal to the middle class, and neutralize his greatest threat – the 
United States.  
During his guerilla campaign, Castro did not deliberately antagonize the 
middle class elements of Cuban society; instead, he sought their sympathy by 
exploiting their resentment of Batista (Kling 1962). The promise of free elections 
and civil liberties appealed to the middle class. But Castro was careful to avoid 
specific statements and policies regarding social, economic, and foreign policy 
which could threaten the support of his leftist base. Of course, two years after 
assuming power he declared himself a Marxist-Leninist, thus abandoning the 
businessmen and middle class who had originally supported him. These groups 
then formed the bulk of the exile community in the United States. Hence, Castro 
initially concealed his hostility to the interests and values of the middle and upper 
class, in order to obtain a broad coalition of support across all classes of Cuban 
society (Kling 1962). This is the underlying basic framework of the Dual Strategy. 
Additionally, as part of the strategy, Castro skillfully manipulated the North 
American press. By portraying himself as a freedom fighter against a corrupt 
regime, he effectively neutralized the possible involvement of the U.S. – the most 
important actor in Cuban affairs and one that could stop the revolution dead on 
its tracks. 
 101
Castro also benefited from the existing revolutionary pre-conditions that 
existed in the Cuban society and economy: land tenure inequalities, economic 
crisis, cultural cleavages, and government violence all existed in Cuba during the 
1950’s.  As the principal economic engine, the sugar industry in Cuba absorbed 
rural labor and brought factories to the countryside; but it did not create an 
agrarian population with any significant land ownership and could not provide 
year-round employment for rural workers and blacks (Kling 1962; Pérez-Stable 
1993), who received low wages, few social services, and were poorly housed 
and educated. On the other hand, urban workers were better off with higher 
wages and job security and better access to health care and education. Mounting 
inflation, combined with unemployment and underemployment took its toll on the 
morale and material condition of the Cuban working class, resulting in resistance 
to maximizing production through technology and instead opting to preserve jobs 
(Pérez 1988) – perhaps a classic validation of Huntington’s Modernization 
Theory discussed in Chapter 2. These problems were all exacerbated by 
significant population growth. This revolutionary setting was expertly exploited by 
Castro. Undoubtedly, it was Castro’s guerilla warfare campaign that ignited the 
existing pre-conditions into a revolution, and served as the catalyst referred to by 
Barrington Moore (1966).   
In this chapter, I will discuss Castro’s strategy for mobilizing popular 
support. Although the focus is the peasantry, I will also explain the important role 
of leadership and ideology as a link between Castro’s 26th of July Movement and 
important sectors of society such as the elites and middle class. I will then 
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transition into an explanation of the important role of guerilla warfare in uniting 
the variety of groups in opposition to the Batista government, and creating the 
synergy in the strategy that exploited the revolutionary conditions that existed in 
Cuba at the time, and thus ride a wave of nationalism to the eventual victory of 
the rebel army. This chapter focuses on the period of 1953 to 1959, which 
includes the failed attack led by Castro at the Moncada Barracks; his arrest and 
two years of imprisonment, and subsequent release; exile to Mexico and return 
to Cuba to conduct the 1956-1958 guerilla campaign; and revolutionary victory 
marked by the departure of Batista to the Dominican Republic on January 1, 
1959. However, it is essential to provide context to the discussion of such an 
unlikely triumph, after what amounts to only 25 months of insurrection, by 
discussing the factors and history that set the conditions for the success of 
Castro’s strategy.  
Background 
The roots of the Cuban revolution can be traced back to the struggle 
against Spain in the late nineteenth century, which forged a commitment to 
national independence and social justice among many Cubans. The legacy of the 
Ten Year War (1868-1878), in which separatists in the east rebelled against the 
Spanish government with an agenda built on the reformist tenets of free trade, 
representative government, and abolition of slavery - set the stage for a growing 
independence movement. The war stalled in the eastern provinces, but 
negotiations to end hostilities resulted in a wide range of administrative and 
political reforms and the eventual abolition of slavery in 1886.  Nevertheless, 
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uprisings continued – one labeled “La Guerra Chiquita” in 1879 lasted months - 
but all eventually failed. Consequently, irreconcilable veterans of the Ten Year 
War as well as a significant pro-independence expatiate community, began to 
organize around a vision of Cuba Libre (Free Cuba) and a commitment to armed 
struggle. José Martí, a young writer in exile, emerged as a leader in the 
independence movement and defined Cuba Libre as: independence from Spain 
and the United States – untrammeled, unconditional, uncompromising national 
sovereignty; a Cuba free from racism and oppression, a republic responsive to 
the needs of all Cubans (Pérez 1988). In 1892, Martí established the Cuban 
Revolutionary Party (PRC) with the goal of liberating Cuba. The basis for the 
radical nationalism that would eventually serve Castro had been established 
(Pérez-Stable 1993).     
A new grand strategy was also developed by the insurgent independence 
movement: overthrow the colonial administration by undermining the socio-
economic system it protected. Thus, the war was now against the dominant 
social class, the local collaborators of colonialism. The operational strategy was 
to destroy all active sugar plantations and supporting infrastructure. Planters 
faced a dilemma: comply with the production ban dictated by the insurgents and 
face economic hardship, or risk destruction of property. As the destruction 
continued, it became evident that the insurgents would ultimately prevail. By the 
end of 1897, the elites then turned to the U.S. in an attempt to encourage 
intervention in order to maintain their properties, security, and status. The U.S. 
had historically pursued hegemony even at times the outright annexation of 
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Cuba20. A victory by the Cuban insurgency threatened this goal. Citing the need 
to establish order and security by terminating the war, President McKinley sought 
congressional approval for “neutral intervention21.” Instead, Congress approved 
intervention with the disclaimer that once pacified, government and control of the 
island would go to the Cubans. The Spanish-American War resulted in the 
freedom of Cubans from Spain, but in essence they transitioned to another 
master: the United States – who sought to maintain legal hegemony by granting 
independence under a number of provisions that became known as the Platt 
Amendment – principally, the right of the U.S. to intervene in Cuba to preserve 
independence and stability. The U.S. effectively occupied Cuba until 1902, but as 
stated by Pérez (1988, 192): “Cubans had achieved self-government without self-
determination and independence without sovereignty.”  
After granting independence to Cuba, the U.S. continued to control the 
government and policy formulation during occupation and thus facilitated U.S. 
(and some European) business interests in the island, and their control over 
sugar production, land purchases, railroad construction, tobacco, and mining. By 
1925, the U.S. owned 41 percent of all the sugar mills and 60 percent of the 
harvest (Pérez-Stable 1993). In summary, foreign capital dominated the Cuban 
 
20 North American interest in Cuba had its origins early in the 19th century as a component of 
“Manifest Destiny” and the notion of physical and political gravitation to a North American Union. 
Subsequently the principle of  “no transfer,” a proposition by which the U.S. refused to sanction 
the cession of sovereignty [of Spain] over Cuba to a third party, was seen as the most efficient 
means of acquiring eventual possession of Cuba. President James K. Polk attempted to 
purchase Cuba from Spain; and prior to the U.S. Civil War, the Southern States contemplated the 
annexation of Cuba to the Union as a slave state, in order to balance the power in Congress 
(Pérez 1988).   
21 McKinley argued that an intervention as a neutral to stop the war, offered a means by which to 
establish, by virtue of arms, U.S. sovereignty over Cuba (Pérez 1988).   
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economy and labor immigration displaced Cuban workers with very little left for 
the Cubans. Black Cubans and women fared worse. As a result, the old 
separatist coalition began to re-organize – not around the pursuit of property or 
economic power – but around the pursuit for political power (Pérez 1988; 
Thomas 1971).  A series of corrupt and at times repressive governments 
followed, and in 1933 a protest regarding army conditions by a group of 
disgruntled non-commissioned officers (sergeants and corporals), developed into 
a limited mutiny at an Army camp, to which anti-government groups rapidly 
rallied around. As a result, civilians transformed an act of insubordination into a 
full-fledged military coup and used it as an instrument for political change. In 
September 1933, a new government emerged under Ramón Grau San Martín 
formed by a coalition of convenience between rebellious soldiers who sought 
amnesty and dissident civilians in search of political power. The provisional 
government ruled for 100 days allowing the rebellious soldiers to purge and 
arrest their formers officers and consolidate themselves under the leadership of 
Sergeant Fulgencio Batista. This was the first government in Cuba without 
sanction and support of the U.S. and as such caused uneasiness in the U.S. 
government and economic interests. The U.S. pursued a subversive strategy 
thorough non-recognition and destabilization of the government coalition. In 
1934, with the implicit support of the U.S., Batista withdrew his support of Grau, 
eventually leaving Batista and the Armed Forces in control of the government 
(Pérez 1988; Thomas 1971). 
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  Batista’s authority increased throughout the 1930’s. He restored order and 
tranquility, established social programs, and won the support of foreign capital. A 
number of puppet presidents were installed, but Batista remained as the single 
most dominant political force on the island. The Platt amendment was abrogated, 
economic conditions improved, and terms of trade with the U.S. were re-
negotiated. Although the agreement contributed to the economic revival, it also 
re-focused Cuba on sugar production, returning the island to the patterns of pre-
depression dependency. A new constitution was adopted in 1940, which set the 
stage for elections won by Batista – now a populist and out of uniform - against 
Grau. The 1940 Cuban Constitution embodied a social compromise protecting 
private property, sanctioning an interventionist state, endorsing agrarian reform, 
and promoting a host of social rights (Pérez-Stable 1993). A fair and well-written 
document, it would later come back to haunt Batista. 
The Batista presidency coincided with the Second World War and the 
economy mostly benefited. Batista did not run in 1944; the next few years were 
marked by a series of boom-bust economic cycles - as Cuba continued to 
depend on sugar as an export – and two separate governments that took 
corruption to unprecedented levels. These conditions set the stage for Batista’s 
return in a 1952 well-planned military coup. Batista’s overthrow of Carlos Prío 
ended 12 years of constitutional government; but few were upset with the 
passing of the Prío government. The coup pre-empted the elections of 1952 in 
which Batista was running a distant third. A young activist lawyer and member of 
the Ortodoxo Party named Fidel Castro, would have likely won the Congressional 
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election of the Havana district (Pérez 1988; Pérez-Stable 1993; Thomas 1971). 
The coup served to radicalize him as he became a proponent of armed 
insurrection. The opposition to Batista was disorganized and incapable of a 
response to the takeover. A leader capable of galvanizing the masses against 
Batista was needed. Fidel Castro seized the opportunity. 
 Development of Dual Strategy 
In response to the coup, on the 26th of July 1953, Castro led 165 young 
Cubans in an attempt to seize the Moncada Military Barracks in Santiago de 
Cuba, to then distribute arms to the population, and spark a national insurrection. 
It was a resounding fiasco. Dozens of youths were captured, tortured, and killed; 
the rest were imprisoned. The nation was appalled by the government 
repression, but also moved by the daring attack. When brought to trial, Castro 
convincingly defended himself and gained many admirers and followers after his 
performance. Although sent to jail, Castro’s statement (Castro 1953, 76): 
“Condemn me, it does not matter. History will absolve me!,” captured the 
imagination of the nation – and combined with the failed, but daring attack - 
served to propel Castro into contention for the leadership of anti-Batista forces, 
and reaffirm armed struggle as the mechanism for change. Although he probably 
did not know it at the time, the attack on the barracks marked the beginning of his 
dual strategy to seek wide popular support: 
? The year 1953 was the centenary of José Martí’s birth and the symbolism was 
not lost on Castro; he knew Martí’s appeal to Cubans would serve him well. 
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? The date of the attack gave birth to his 26th of July Movement – an attempt to 
organize the opposition into a single group. 
? More importantly, the 26th of July Movement had acquired high-profile martyrs. 
? In his trial, he defended himself with dignity and compassion as he outlined his 
political program of nationalistic reform (Pérez-Stable 1993). 
Thus, Castro planted the seed for his eventual revolutionary leadership, 
ideology, and dual strategy. He had risked his life by standing up to Batista; he 
identified himself with Cuba’s greatest patriot; his nationalistic rhetoric combined 
with his charismatic persona appealed to a broad segment of society. In his trial, 
he described the program he would have implemented had insurrection been 
successful: restoration of the Constitution of 1940, agrarian reform, profit-sharing 
in industry, greater share of sugar industry profits for the Cuban people, and 
confiscation of misappropriated wealth. He defined the Cuban people as the 
unemployed, rural workers, industrial laborers, small farmers, teachers and 
professors, small merchants, and young professionals (Castro 1953). Absent of 
course, where the large landowners and industrial interests (Pérez-Stable 1993). 
But they could be ignored, as they represented a small segment of the population 
and his aim was broad popular support. Castro’s agenda had appeal, he would 
return.  
Castro was freed from jail in 1954 as part of a set of concessions by 
Batista who had a new sense of stability following rigged elections. Castro 
immediately resumed his opposition activities, but then went into exile in Mexico, 
as he reaffirmed his belief in armed insurrection. Of course, that meant that 
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Castro had to breakaway from the Ortodoxo political party. However, he realized 
that he needed financial and political resources that at the time only the middle 
and upper classes could offer. The effort to mobilize the peasants was not yet a 
priority – that would come later almost by necessity. In August 1955, the 26th of 
July Movement issued a manifesto to the people of Cuba: 
The Cuban Revolution does not compromise with groups or persons 
of any sort…[It] will never regard the state as the booty of a 
triumphant group…[We] assume before history responsibility for our 
actions. And in making our declaration of faith in a happier world for 
the Cuban people, we think like Martí that a sincere man does not 
seek where his advantage lies but where his duty is, and that the 
only practical man is the one whose present dream will be the law of 
tomorrow (Pérez-Stable 1993, 54). 
 
The Manifesto made the 26th of July Movement separate and distinct from 
the Ortodoxo Party and Fidel Castro was its central figure (Pérez-Stable 1993). 
Additionally, it contained a nationalistic, patriotic, and unifying appeal to the 
classes whose support Castro sought; and it also justified armed struggle against 
the corrupt regime. It is likely that Castro’s intent was to remain relevant as he 
sought to control resources belonging to established opposition groups, such as 
organization and information; and to establish credibility not only with the Cuban 
people, but internationally. The latter was important, because as already 
discussed, external support can play a defining role for either the insurgents or 
the government. Castro returned to compete for power during December 1956, 
with 82 revolutionaries that included his brother Raúl and Che Guevara, aboard 
the yacht Granma. It is unclear exactly how Castro intended to achieve his 
objective; did he mean to spark a rebellion by conducting a high-profile attack - 
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possibly, a coup d’état? Or was he focused in obtaining the leadership of the 
already established opposition? Perhaps his intent all along was to wage a 
protracted guerilla campaign. In any case, the decision was made for him, as 
Batista’s troops routed the rebels’ botched landing, and the surviving 
revolutionaries fled to the mountains in desperation. Castro’s band now consisted 
of a dozen demoralized men in a remote area of Cuba.  
A dozen men, even if their numbers included Fidel Castro, Raúl Castro, 
and Che Guevara, had no hope of overthrowing a government in command of an 
army. If this group of leaders was to have a chance in their pursuit of power, they 
had to recruit additional fighters. It is likely that Castro’s original objective was to 
assume the leadership of the urban underground movements. However, these 
movements had proved incapable of overcoming the forces of Batista, thus 
validating Guevara’s thesis that urban underground movements were ineffective 
against an oppressive government (Guevara 1961). Further, Castro was 
geographically isolated from this source anyway. As a result, he was forced to 
recruit his guerilla troops mostly from among the inhabitants of rural areas. Thus, 
whatever may have been the original motives of Castro and his followers, the 
situation in 1957 dictated that he attract the peasantry and the unemployed rural 
inhabitants, in order to obtain a mass base of support from which to draw the 
required resources to mount a challenge for power  Castro now shifted his main 
effort to mobilizing the peasantry. The Dual Strategy was now reality.  
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Dual Strategy 
 “The guerilla makes agrarian reform his banner.22” Che Guevara 
The challenge in attracting the peasants was less of a challenge for 
Castro than Mao. As discussed previously, peasants are normally difficult to 
mobilize. But the situation and history of eastern Cuba was different. Castro and 
his followers stepped into a tradition of rebellion in the Sierra Maestra. Further, 
the historical social conditions of the area, home to an estimated 50,000 
peasants living in varying degrees of poverty, facilitated recruitment and support 
(Wickham-Crowley 1991). They occupied the worst of worlds: low paid laborers 
in large estates, or low producing farmers on marginal land. These conditions set 
the stage for persistent conflict between peasants on one side and landowners 
and the armed forces on the other. Hence Castro’s band fell into armed struggle, 
they did not create it23. These communities of outcasts, peasants barely 
surviving, fugitives, outlaws, and bandits became the first recruits in the emerging 
rebel army (Pérez 1988). 
Thus, to appeal to the peasantry and increase the size of his guerilla 
army, Castro had to become identified with policies holding out promise of 
landownership reform. Not surprisingly, Castro’s movement became one of 
radical agrarian change. The sugar industry provided labor for farmers and 
 
22 Guevara (1961, 30) 
23 The east versus west conflict had been a part of Cuba since early in the colonial period when 
the east did not share in the prosperity of Havana and the west. Isolated and neglected, eastern 
Cuba was the historical source of rebellions to include the “Ten-Year War” (1868-1878). A spirit of 
insurgency continued during the Batista regime, as local army commanders consistently 
terrorized rural communities and peasant squatters of untended tracts of land, setting the stage 
for permanent conflict between peasants on one side and landowners and the armed forces on 
the other (Pérez 188; Thomas 1971).   
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brought factories to rural areas. But it did not create an agrarian population with a 
direct interest in the maintenance of private ownership, and it could not provide 
year-round employment. As a result, the recruiting of fighters for Castro’s guerilla 
band was facilitated by a peasantry that did not possess the land it cultivated and 
a rural population that lacked adequate employment (Kling 1962). Castro 
capitalized on the rural conditions with his message of land reform, allowing him 
to develop a mass base and a sanctuary in which to train, grow, and then expand 
operations. As per the Guevara doctrine outlined in Chapter 3, the peasantry was 
to provide intelligence, supplies, and protection as well.  As a result, the guerilla 
movement became identified with radical agrarian change – the internal 
component of the dual strategy. 
Once Castro felt secure in his countryside base, he needed to get his 
message out to the rest of Cuba and the world. But this message had to be 
different from the one for the peasants. Agrarian reform did not have a strong 
appeal to the middle class and urban workers of the cities, and he knew that the 
United States would be suspicious of his intentions, so soon after the Chinese 
communist revolution. Plus he was also competing against other opposition 
groups. During July 1957, he issued a communiqué from the Sierra advocating 
for a civilian provisional government, restoration of civil liberties, social and 
economic reforms, and abstention by other nations from intervention in Cuba 
(Guevara 1963), definitely a more moderate message that appealed to middle-
class interests and values. More importantly, through his guerilla and 
propaganda campaign (Débray 1967), Castro was successful in undermining the 
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moral authority of the Batista regime. The guerilla developed a communications 
and information apparatus that included a radio transmitter and a small 
newspaper, El Cubano Libre (The Free Cuban) (Guevara 1963; Castro 1998). 
Castro utilized these mediums to continuously challenge the legitimacy of Batista 
by pointing out and demonstrating (Kling 1962): 
?    Batista’s assumption of power by a coup d’état 
? The repressive techniques, to include torture, of the government 
? Government corruption 
? Lack of wealth distribution 
? Sanctioning of gambling and prostitution by the government 
Hence, Castro was successful in portraying Batista’s government as brutal, 
dictatorial, illegal, and immoral. This campaign was effective in two important 
counts: it accelerated the general discontent of all classes of society with Batista, 
and placed the U.S. government in a defensive position with Batista. But most 
importantly, it exploited Cuban nationalistic sentiment, by portraying Batista as a 
puppet of foreign interests. 
Additionally, Castro was well aware of the important part played by the 
North American press in the war of independence. He instructed his Havana 
contacts to bring to his camp in the mountains the most gullible foreign 
correspondent they could find. This was an easy task, for the Havana contacts 
had the perfect man already spotted. His name was Herbert Matthews of the 
New York Times (Lynch 1998). In fact, Castro told Guevara24 that: “[Matthews] 
 
24 Guevara (1963, 130) 
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appeared to sympathize with the revolution.” The significance of the interview 
was enormous. First, it created for North Americans the legend of Castro – the 
freedom fighter – fighting oppression25. Second, it grossly exaggerated the 
number of guerillas and war equipment under the leadership of Castro26. 
Matthews brought Castro back to life in a big way; he was now an international 
figure (Lynch 1998; Thomas 1971). The external component of the dual strategy 
was now taking form: a moderate message of restoring democracy and 
implementing the Constitution of 1940. The target:  the middle and upper 
classes, but also the United States.   
As mentioned earlier, minimizing the role and interference of the U.S. in 
the conflict was one of the objectives of Castro’s dual strategy. U.S. Policy was 
essentially caught in a dilemma between a “freedom-fighter” they did not really 
trust, and an oppressive dictator in Batista. The hesitation of the U.S. resulted in 
it being neutralized – that is, irrelevant to the political process. Three major 
factors contributed to the U.S. indecisiveness (Kling 1962). First, the negative 
image of Batista; he was portrayed as a dictator who profited from gambling and 
corruption and kept himself in power through oppression. Second, the confused 
image of Castro; rejection of Batista did not equate to embracing Castro. Was he 
 
25 Matthews wrote: “The personality of the man [Castro] is overpowering. It was easy to see that 
his men adored him…Here was an educated, dedicated fanatic, a man of ideals, of courage, and 
of remarkable qualities of leadership; one got the feeling that he is now invincible…a great talker 
who dealt fairly with the peasants, paying for everything they ate…The 26th of July Movement 
talks of nationalism, anti-colonialism, and anti-imperialism.” To Matthews, Castro said: “You can 
be sure that we have no animosity towards the United States and the American people…we are 
fighting for a democratic Cuba and an end to the dictatorship.” (Thomas 1971). 
26 At the time, Castro had only eighteen men, but Matthews wrote of the forty men Castro had in 
his camp, and of bands of similar size that he “knew were close by.”  In fact, Raúl Castro kept 
passing in front of Matthews with the same men (Lynch 1998; Thomas 1971). 
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a communist or a nationalist? Conflicting behavior and reports – as part of the 
dual strategy - blurred the image of Castro to the point that the U.S. could not 
classify him as friend or foe. And finally, the two previous points resulted in a 
vague U.S. policy. On the one hand the U.S. halted shipment of arms to Batista 
in early 1958, but on the other, the U.S. did not attempt to stop shipments of 
arms to Castro by friendly nations. Nonetheless, the U.S. did not completely 
abandon Batista. As a result, the U.S. hesitation and procrastination allowed 
Castro’s guerilla forces to conduct their campaign, achieve eventual victory, and 
consolidate power, without any obligation to the U.S – a major achievement for 
Castro and one that portrayed him as a true nationalist.  
Of course, the dual strategy carries certain risks. Even if the end state of 
the two components is the same – that is, wide popular support – overlaps do 
occur resulting in contradictions. In Castro’s case, his message of radical social 
reform for the lower classes, peasants, and rural laborers contradicted his public 
announcements that he simply wanted to restore the democratic regime that 
existed before Batista’s coup in 1952 (Weitz 1982). Castro orchestrated the 
contradictory elements by borrowing a page out of Mao’s book; he would 
subordinate one strategy to the other at specific times when it was strategically 
feasible. For example, as he was building his guerilla band in the mountains, the 
internal strategy was dominant; later, as he attempted to consolidate the 
government opposition groups, the external prevailed. But Castro’s technique 
was not as refined as Mao’s. The latter spent years fine-tuning his techniques in 
liberated zones of the vast Chinese countryside; could count on the organization 
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of the communist party; and had a vast guerilla army with experienced political 
cadres to indoctrinate the masses. Castro’s time and resources were limited. The 
equalizers to resolve the contradictions were leadership and ideology 
Leadership 
Individual leaders can become the principal reason why some people 
support insurgent movements. The phenomenon of charismatic attraction has 
been exemplified by both Mao and Fidel Castro. When such men are either 
perceived to have supernatural qualities (Mao), or manifest impressive speaking 
skills and a dynamic, forceful personality (Castro), they frequently are able to 
motivate others to join their cause through their example and persuasiveness 
(O’Neill 1990). Of course, Castro benefited from key lieutenants such as his 
brother Raúl, Guevara, and Camilo Cienfuegos27, but Fidel’s forceful personality 
almost single-handedly drove the insurgency, and the population identified the 
insurgency with Castro. In fact, Che Guevara states in his work On Guerilla 
Warfare (1961): “In Cuba, a nucleus of twelve dedicated men – plus a Fidel 
Castro – were able to succeed.” 
Like Mao, Castro’s leadership abilities, charismatic attraction, and 
eloquence were instrumental in mobilizing resources and obtaining popular 
support. Débray (1967) refers to the quality of “tenacity,” which Fidel Castro 
possessed, as a requirement to Latin America’s revolutionary wars. His daring 
attack on the Moncada Barracks, brilliant self-defense at his subsequent trial, 
 
27 Camilo Cienfuegos was one of the surviving revolutionaries of the Granma landing. Cienfuegos 
was later put in command of a guerilla column that achieved considerable success against 
Batista forces in late 1958. He is considered one of the heroes of the revolution (Guevara 1963). 
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imprisonment, and now leadership of a guerilla band, who portrayed an overall 
confidence of eventual victory against the hated Batista, conferred in him a 
special reputation for courage, leadership, and enormous credibility with the 
Cuban people. As previously discussed with Mao, it is impossible to measure 
how many people joined the rebel’s cause because of Castro’s charismatic 
attraction; but undoubtedly the force of his personality was important. The 
traditional Latin American political culture has defined political conflict as 
struggles between strong individuals – or caudillos – and their followers, and 
Cuba is no exception. Fidel Castro can easily be classified as a strong and 
charismatic leader capable of arousing the masses with nationalistic fervor in the 
caudillo tradition (Kling 1962).  
These qualities are indeed essential for obtaining popular support, but 
also in inspiring fighters to continue the fight under difficult conditions. The 
morale of a guerilla fighter is especially dependent upon the inspiring view of his 
leader; circumstances in the life of a guerilla fighter can demoralize him. His life 
is in danger; daily life is uncomfortable; his food supply is uncertain; his family life 
shattered; and victory can seem remote. But faith in the capabilities of his leader 
can sustain him indefinitely (Kling 1962). In summary, a successful insurgent 
leader is able to break the ties between the people and their government, and 
secure credibility for the insurgent efforts. Castro was successful on all counts.  
Ideology 
During the revolutionary period, Castro did not attach himself to any 
dogmatic formula such as Marxism. In fact, it was not until April 1961, over two 
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years after the initial victory, that Castro declared the socialist character of the 
revolution. Whether Castro planned all along to convert the revolution to a 
Marxist model has been the subject of much speculation. He certainly had 
Marxist sympathizers in his inner circle, such as his brother Raúl and Che 
Guevara, but he realized that adherence to a communist or Marxist doctrine 
would not appeal to the majority of Cubans; it would definitely antagonize the 
U.S., and also threaten the covert international aid that he was receiving from 
Costa Rica and Venezuela. Thus, Castro kept his distance from the Cuban 
Communist Party – which he distrusted anyway - and made the ideology of the 
revolution one of popular empowerment, collective liberation, and distrust of 
political parties (Moreno 1970). 
 In essence, Castro favored an ideology focused on nationalism, which 
offered the greatest flexibility in attracting majorities in all classes of society – the 
principal objective of the dual strategy. Of course, it is a fact that an ideology that 
appeals to national identity is probably the most powerful means of mobilizing 
resources (Greene 1990), but Castro did add a twist to this formula. He made the 
guerilla force the center of the revolution and thus the nucleus of nationalism. As 
the vanguard of the revolution, it would not be subordinated to a political party, 
ideology, or international actor (Débray 1967). In sum, Castro had enough 
confidence in himself and his leadership that he rejected the revolutionary 
ideologies of Mao and Lenin and instead developed a radical nationalism with 
two principal components: national sovereignty and social justice (Pérez-Stable 
1993).  
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Nonetheless, despite his charismatic leadership, ability to build cross-
cutting alliances, and nationalistic ideology, Castro’s quest for power may very 
well have been in vain, without the special position that resulted from leading a 
guerilla campaign against an oppressive government. By taking on Batista’s 
army – albeit in small engagements – it showed the world that the rebels could 
beat the army and challenge Batista’s claim to legitimacy and monopoly on 
resources of violence. There were other - more established – opposition leaders, 
but they did not control a guerilla band of motivated and well-led fighters. Guerilla 
warfare proved to be the mechanism that fused leadership, ideology, and the 
dual strategy into a cohesive mass movement for mobilization and control of 
resources.    
Guerilla Warfare 
      “Guerilla warfare is a fight for the masses, with the guerilla band as the 
       armed nucleus28.” Ernesto Che Guevara 
 
The message of the quote above is clear: the guerilla band was the center 
of the revolution and armed struggle would be the mechanism for obtaining 
popular support; for getting close to the masses with their message of radical 
nationalism; and for obtaining the small victories that would eventually make 
them the only alternative against Batista. Unlike Mao, Fidel Castro did not have 
the option of building an army that would rival Batista’s. His only hope was to use 
his guerilla band to neutralize it, by creating the conditions that would stop U.S. 
military aid and eventually make the army crumble from within. The rebels would 
obtain small, yet symbolic, military victories against remote government outposts; 
 
28 Guevara (1961, 6) 
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gradually increase the scope of military activities; then, as popular support grew, 
the government would become increasingly isolated from the people and the 
army would lose its cohesion and will to fight.  
The guerilla band gave Castro a tool that none of the other opposition 
leaders had: a controlled means of violence against the government and the 
ability to capitalize on its propaganda effects. Publicity about the guerilla leaders 
exploits encouraged sympathy, attracted fresh recruits, and created doubts about 
the authority of the established government (Kling 1962). Sure, other opposition 
groups could employ violence through sabotage, but they had no visible symbol 
that represented their cause. Further, they had to remain underground in the 
cities, with no chance of using a Herbert Matthews to capture the imagination of 
all Cubans and gain international support. The romance associated with the 
guerillas was hard to resist: the weak against the strong, nationalists against 
oppressors, and a charismatic leader against a corrupt and illegitimate one. Most 
Cubans could not help but sympathize with Castro and his guerilla band. The 
dual strategy, as shaped by guerilla warfare was beginning to bear fruit.  
As already discussed, Fidel Castro and his followers also benefited from 
the fact that they established (not by choice) their main base in the Sierra 
Maestra, a region distant from the army’s base of operations and whose 
inhabitants were dissatisfied with the Batista regime; from there the band could 
expand. On the other hand, the urban underground had limited opportunities to 
do the same. The government had an intelligence network in the cities, as well as 
informants. Besides, if there was one aspect that his army was experienced at 
 121
                                                
was urban insurrection, having gained expertise during the 1930s. Batista 
effectively marshaled that experience against the urban underground (Pérez-
Stable 1993). But rural Cuba – particularly in Oriente - was another matter; with a 
limited presence in the countryside, as well as a lack of experience and training 
in fighting guerillas in a jungle environment, the government’s army indeed had a 
challenge in their hands. The rebel army first achieved success simply by 
surviving and later by resisting the regular army. However, the rebel leadership 
knew quite well that the eastern mountains were not representative of Cuban 
society (Pérez-Stable 1993). In order to defeat Batista, they had to incorporate 
the urban groups…Guerilla warfare would be the mechanism.  
Castro was not completely isolated in the mountains. His 26th of July 
Movement was also active in the cities, but even within the movement there was 
dissension between the urban (llano) and countryside (sierra) factions.29 A united 
front – similar to Mao’s with the KMT – was required. Castro utilized the dual 
strategy, as shaped by guerilla warfare, to move in that direction. Gradually, the 
opposition to Batista centered on Castro through a mixture of competence, 
shrewdness, and plain luck (Childs 1995). Castro’s luck in the form of accidental 
elimination of alternative leaders was remarkable. Several attacks launched 
against important government targets failed, and ended the aspirations of these 
rivals through loss of influence or even killed in the attempt. Most important was 
the death of Frank País – his most serious rival within the 26th of July movement. 
 
29 Guevara: “The division between the Sierra and the Llano was a real one.” (Guevara 1963, 318) 
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País was killed in July 1957 by the City of Santiago police30. A general strike, 
called by all opposition groups, in April 1958 failed; as other attacks and 
expeditions by other groups against Batista failed, they contributed to a general 
belief of dissatisfaction with the government; but more importantly, they 
channeled popular support towards the guerillas as the only credible challenge to 
the forces of the government. The end result was a subordination of the urban 
and labor underground to the guerilla leadership in the Sierra Maestra (Childs 
1995). Castro’s leadership was consolidated in a meeting of the 26th of July 
Movement’s National Directorate that took place in the Sierra on May 3, 1958. As 
stated by Guevara (1963, 317): 
The guerilla conception would emerge triumphant from that 
meeting. Fidel’s standing and authority were consolidated, and he 
was named commander in chief of all forces, including the militias – 
which until then had been under Llano leadership. Fidel was also 
named secretary general of the July 26 Movement.   
 
The argument is often made that Batista was his own worst enemy and 
that a revolution would have occurred in Cuba with or without Castro. This 
misses the point on the importance of guerilla warfare. Batista had to respond to 
the open challenge of the rebels; the problem was that he took the bait offered by 
Castro by employing the incorrect counter-insurgency technique. Instead of 
winning the “hearts and minds” of the people by persuading them that their best 
interests would be served by the government’s success, Batista embarked on a 
campaign of terror against peasants, and police brutality against the urban 
underground and civilian leaders. On the other hand, the rebels also took care to 
 
30 Another serious rival, Havana student leader José Antonio Echevarría, was killed in a university 
student attack on the Presidential Palace in March 1957. 
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avoid operations that produced large numbers of casualties, thus alienating as 
few people as possible. It is evident then that guerilla warfare played the decisive 
role in shaping the dual strategy. Without the credibility of having a guerilla band 
that could achieve success against the government, Castro would have never 
been able to attract popular support, neutralize the U.S., and mobilize resources 
for revolution. Indeed, the leadership of the opposition to Batista gradually 
centered on the guerilla band that constituted the only credible threat to the 
dictator. Thus, a system of “dual power,” which is part of Tilly’s mobilization 
theory, developed in Cuba: claims by the government as the only central 
authority no longer went unchallenged (Wickham-Crowley 1991).  After a full year 
in the mountains fighting the government in the sierras, and standing up to 
Batista, they had earned the right to lead others in the struggle.  
Revolutionary Victory 
By the middle of 1958, Cuba approached a revolutionary situation. Batista 
was now perceived as the greatest single obstacle to the return of political 
stability and economic prosperity. The insurgency had its effect: tourism declined 
and the flow of foodstuffs from the countryside to the cities was halted. Sabotage 
and destruction of property further contributed to the economic crises (Pérez 
1988). Castro’s dual strategy had secured the peasant masses, an alignment 
with the middle class, absorption of the urban underground, and the leadership of 
the revolutionary struggle – all bound together with a spirit of radical nationalism 
and Cuba Libre. This is apparent in Castro’s signing of the Caracas Declaration 
in July, 1958, a document that called for the unity of anti-Batista forces in an 
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effort to restore civil democracy in Cuba. The Pact of Caracas established Fidel 
Castro as the principal leader of the Anti-Batista movement and the rebel army 
as the main arm of the revolution (Pérez 1988). Although in retrospect, Castro 
was likely less than genuine in his support for the Caracas Declaration, it was a 
move that permitted him to appeal to middle classes and allowed him to benefit 
from riding a nationalistic platform as opposed to a socialist one (Johnson 2006),  
the essence of the dual strategy. Castro had been successful in mobilizing the 
resources required to openly challenge Batista. It was time to enter the final 
stage of revolutionary conflict.  
Insurgent victories forced the government to concede rebel-occupied 
zones to the guerillas, creating enclaves of liberalized territories. The expanding 
struggle in the countryside was accompanied by growing resistance in the cities. 
The insurgents opened a new front against the regime – a war against property 
and production as a means to isolate Batista from the support of the economic 
elites. The strength of the Batista regime had been to maintain political order and 
social peace, but it was now failing to do even that (Pérez 1988). The regime was 
now expendable. Batista had to go, but he wouldn’t do so without a fight. In mid-
1958, Batista launched his most formidable offensive against the guerillas with 
an estimated 12,000 troops deployed to the Sierra Maestra.  
By the end of the summer the offensive had failed. Batista’s army was 
battered but not yet defeated. The final rebel strategy to achieve a decision was 
to attack along three points: Pinar del Río province in the west of the island; Las 
Villas in the center; and the City of Santiago in the eastern province of Oriente 
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(Guevara 1963). The Battle of Santa Clara in Las Villas proved to be the decisive 
victory. The rebel column was led by Che Guevara, and although Fidel Castro 
had been recognized as the leader of the anti-Batista forces, full revolutionary 
unity on the tactical front had yet to be achieved. A number of groups were 
operating in the Escambray Mountains outside of Santa Clara; these included 
groups from the Popular Socialist Party, the Revolutionary Directorate, and the 
Authentic Organization; in fact, a total of five different organizations were 
operating in the area under different commands (Guevara 1963). An intense 
campaign for revolutionary unity was carried out, and after a series of 
agreements, a fragile common front was formed, with Guevara as commander in 
chief of the armed forces in Las Villas (Guevara 1963).  
The Battle of Santa Clara began on December 27, 1958, and by January 
1, the city had fallen. Batista’s armed forces collapsed through desertion and 
defection and simply ceased to fight as the guerillas routed them in a 
counteroffensive. Additionally, the U.S. government withdrew their support for the 
Batista government. The rebels had successfully mobilized manpower and 
materiel resources, organized popular support of the guerilla band while 
minimizing those available to the government, and brought the urban movement 
under the leadership of Fidel Castro. A short-lived military coup was rejected by 
Castro (Guevara 1963); nothing could stop the rebels now. They refused any sort 
of compromise with a military junta or the government, as everybody accepted 
their leadership. Castro controlled the resource of violence; at this point, nobody 
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would dare to dispute their right to conduct the revolution the way they wanted 
(Moreno 1970). Batista, increasingly isolated, fled the country in January 1, 1959.  
 Conclusion    
                “This time the revolution is for real.” Fidel Castro 
Fidel Castro made the above declaration upon entering Santiago de Cuba 
on January 1, 1959 (Pérez-Stable 1993). Few Cubans paused to consider what 
the revolution really meant and what lay ahead. They were simply elated with the 
end of the Batista regime; things could not possibly get any worse. But Castro’s 
revolution was in fact real and has survived time and time again for over 50  
years. Unlike Mao who designed, tested, and refined his strategy over decades 
of struggle, Castro’s strategy was essentially ad hoc over a period of only 25 
months following the landing in Cuba. Nonetheless, his objective was fixed: he 
had to secure his mass base of peasants, appeal to the middle class, and also 
neutralize the United States. To accomplish these objectives, he designed a 
strategy of deception – a dual strategy – to first survive and grow a guerilla force 
with peasant support as he appealed to the peasantry through a program of 
drastic agrarian reform – implemented through guerilla warfare. But then expand 
into the rest of Cuba with a more moderate and appealing message of 
democratic reform.  
The guerillas gained widespread support by declaring that their objective 
was to restore equality and justice to the nation. On several occasions Castro 
stated that he simply wanted to restore the democratic regime that existed before 
Batista’s coup in 1952, and restore the 1940 Constitution. In 1958, he even 
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signed the Declaration of Caracas, which called for unity among all the anti-
Batista groups. The guerillas benefited greatly from these public announcements 
of moderation as well as the inability of moderates to display any progress in 
overthrowing Batista. As time went on, and Castro achieved small victories 
against the government forces, more Cubans threw their support behind the 
guerillas, as it appeared that Castro was the only one capable of deposing the 
dictator. Additionally, the population started buying into the moderate Castro 
rhetoric and figured that a guerilla victory could not be any worse than the Batista 
government (Weitz 1986). U.S. involvement was essentially neutralized, as 
Castro’s dual strategy resulted in an ambivalent U.S. foreign policy with Cuba.  
The level of popular support had an important impact on the insurgent’s 
performance, but to maximize popular support, they had to fuse the rural support 
with the urban underground (Childs 1995). These forces were linked to the 
guerillas through various organizations such as the underground cells of the 26th 
of July Movement and of the Civic Resistance Movement31. International support 
also had an impact: sanctuary (unintentional) provided by Mexico; favorable 
coverage in the American press – particularly in the New York Times by 
correspondent Herbert Matthews; and shipments of arms to the rebels from Latin 
American countries. Thus, the rebel’s operational strategy consisted of two 
parallel tracks: public professions of moderation designed to win popular support, 
combined with selective use of force against their opponents (Weitz 1986).  
 
31 The Civic Resistance Movement was an urban resistance group organized to attract groups 
and individuals who did not openly support armed struggle (Sweig 2002) 
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There are some who still argue that it was not Castro and his guerilla band 
who brought about the downfall of Batista. They point out that the middle class 
was alienated, the rich did not feel secure, some generals betrayed Batista, 
bishops wrote pastoral letters, U.S. embargoes were enforced, the army 
disintegrated, and the whole political structure collapsed (Moreno 1970). But this 
situation simply validates Goldstone’s thesis of a revolutionary setting, as well as 
Barrington Moore’s (1966) point that such settings are normally ignited into a full 
revolution by a catalyst. There is no question that in the Cuba case study, guerilla 
warfare was such a catalyst. Without Castro’s guerilla band the wave of 
nationalism that swept the nation might have never been generated. Further, the 
opposition was disorganized and lacked the proper strategy to take on the 
government. Batista could have otherwise stayed in power as the U.S. paved the 
way for a democratically elected replacement that could have possibly diffused 
the revolutionary setting.  
It was principally guerilla warfare, however, that tilted all the revolutionary 
conditions to the insurgent’s favor. Guerilla warfare molded Castro’s dual 
strategy by providing a credible opposition to Batista – one that could actually 
obtain victories against the government’s army. Guerilla warfare brought an 
ideology of radical nationalism to the setting, and the charismatic leadership to 
unite Cubans in opposition to the regime. This revolution was different; it was 
succeeding in its own terms without the interference of international actors such 
as the United States. The Cuban people believed Castro’s nationalistic ideology 
and rhetoric. They either chose to ignore the contradictions in his dual strategy, 
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or blindly follow him. Those that still mistrusted Castro stayed on the sidelines, 
reasoning that things couldn’t get any worse, and if they did, the United States 
would always be there to set things right…They were all wrong. The next chapter 
describes how Castro took the foco theory of revolution, to an international level. 
The dual strategy would live on. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Dual Strategy Aftermath 
 
 
Introduction 
Following their revolutionary victories, Mao Tse-tung and Fidel Castro took 
different paths with their respective revolutionary theories and dual strategies. 
Mao elected not to aggressively pursue an insurgent strategy at the international 
level, choosing instead to pursue a mostly isolationist policy as he consolidated 
his power. Sure, the argument could be made that communist revolutionary 
warfare became a weapon for China to export revolution and communism. 
Learning from the Korean experience of 1950-53 that overt aggression would be 
opposed by the international community, China did support insurrection in Laos, 
as well as North and South Vietnam during the 1950s and 60s. But these 
countries bordered China and were located within its area of influence. China’s 
interests were at stake as they felt threatened by what they perceived was U.S. 
expansion. Mao’s philosophy was that revolution could not be exported. 
Struggles for liberation had to take national form; that is, only locals can lead and 
make revolutionary war, as they innovate to fit their particular conditions 
(Friedman 1970).  Further, as a nuclear power32 and later-on a member of the 
 
32 The PRC began developing nuclear weapons in the late 1950s and conducted its first nuclear 
test in 1964. 
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United Nations Security Council,33 China could not convincingly pursue an 
insurgent strategy in world affairs. That is not to say that China has not supported 
rogue states such as North Korea with their U.N. vote, but again, that is mostly to 
protect their own interests as they try to avoid criticism against their own policies 
such as human rights. 
Domestically, Mao’s highly flexible and pragmatic dual strategy turned into 
a rigid and ideological strategy exemplified by the Great Leap Forward economic 
and social plan, and the Cultural Revolution, which was an attempt re-capture the 
spirit of the revolution – both were resounding failures. The objective of the Great 
Leap Forward (1958-63) was to modernize China’s economy. Abandoning the 
dual strategy that had served him so well, Mao sought to redistribute land and 
collectivize agriculture in order to generate the capital for industrialization. 
However, the rapid change and unrealistic goals led to failure and famine. Mao 
lost political capital to the moderates within the CCP and the program was 
eliminated. Later, seeking to re-establish his authority, Mao launched the Cultural 
Revolution during his last decade in power (1966-76). His targets were the 
moderates; the mechanism: mobilized urban youths designated as Red Guards 
tasked with enforcing Mao’s ideology and security. The result was a period of 
social and political chaos combined with economic disarray. Mao had enough 
internal problems to consider exporting revolution. Following Mao’s death in 
1976, and with the rise to power of Deng Xiaoping, China adopted a dual 
 
33 China was designated a permanent member of the UN Security Council under Article 23 of the 
UN Charter. However, the Republic of China (Taiwan) also claimed to represent China. In 1971, 
the PRC was awarded China’s seat by General Assembly Resolution 2758 and the Republic of 
China lost membership in all UN organizations. 
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strategy of a different variety: the separation of economics from communist 
ideology. Maoist dogma was out and pragmatism was in. Since then, for the most 
part, China has played a cautious game internationally, focusing on promoting 
policies that increase economic growth. Nonetheless, even if China did not 
actively export revolution, it did inspire a number of them, to include of course, 
the Cuban revolution. 
Fidel Castro, on the other hand, internationalized the foco revolutionary 
theory by continuing an insurgent strategy that placed Cuba as the foco within a 
global context. The motive for armed struggle became increasingly less local and 
instead directed against the entire imperialistic system led by the United States. 
By emphasizing the universality of revolutionary conditions, armed struggle 
became an appealing option to some countries integrated into the world capitalist 
system (Childs 1995). Castro could not just turn inward; he lacked the raw 
materials, subsistence, and economic resources to do so. Instead he would 
“export revolution” and confront the United States in order to obtain international 
support. He then skillfully refined the dual strategy. The external component 
focused on promoting his revolution, developing a strong following in Latin 
America, enhancing Cuba’s influence, and increasing Cuba’s value as an ally to 
the Soviet Union, in order to obtain and then continue its sponsorship. The 
internal component targeted the Cuban people and their continued support of the 
revolution through the buildup of nationalism. The dual strategy was to continue 
for another 50 years in Cuba. This chapter will examine how Castro refined and 
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executed this strategy, which builds on the experiences of the revolution and the 
philosophy of guerilla warfare.  
Over the close to five decades of Castro’s rule, Cuba transitioned to 
communism with the adoption of a strong Marxist-Leninist political agenda; 
developed cooperation and dependency with the Soviet Union; faced-off with the 
U.S. in the “Bay of Pigs” invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis; conducted 
military interventions overseas; lost sponsorship, with the fall of the Soviet Union; 
and endured a continued U.S. economic embargo. During this time, the island’s 
economy and the welfare of Cubans have stagnated. Today, problems continue, 
from inadequate agricultural production and restricted diets, to a crumbling 
infrastructure and failing public services. Through it all, Cubans have endured 
significant political and economic hardship. How can a society accept these 
terrible conditions without organizing and mobilizing against the regime? I 
suggest that the regime relies on three pillars to remain in power: repression, 
emigration, and nationalism. The first two pillars will be briefly discussed in this 
chapter, but the focus will be on the mechanisms that Castro utilizes to foster 
nationalism – the objective of the internal component of the dual strategy. The 
U.S. imposed economic embargo is one of those tools – and presently the most 
important – utilized by Castro to cultivate a strong nationalistic sentiment in the 
Cuban people against an external enemy: the United States.   
 The economic embargo actually serves the Castro brothers by focusing 
Cubans on self-determination, national sovereignty and the defense of the 
fatherland (Pérez 1988). The regime skillfully manipulates the built-in 
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contradiction of the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba with its dual-strategy. 
Internally, the embargo builds nationalism, while externally it promotes sympathy 
for the regime and criticisms towards the U.S. Thus, the economic pressures of 
the embargo are worth the political benefits that the Cuban government has 
gained. I argue that the Castro regime has sought to continue the economic 
embargo as a mechanism to promote nationalism and international support. 
Castro needs a conflict in order to create a climate of permanent confrontation 
that allows him to justify his absolute power and economic policies, under the 
pretense that he is defending the homeland. Without a conflict, there is no 
justification for the extreme hardship imposed on the Cuban people. The U.S. is 
the obvious target: a superpower that is only 90 miles away, who seeks the 
suffering of all Cubans through an “illegal” economic embargo – or as Castro 
prefers to call it: a “blockade.” The regime’s political calculation is that by 
emphasizing confrontation with America, through an insurgent strategy, the 
masses will continue to support the government. I will identify key openings in 
U.S. – Cuba relations that could have resulted in the lifting of the embargo, but 
Castro repeatedly made political moves that ended any prospects of closer 
relations.  
Therefore, I will examine the build-up of nationalism in Cuba that has 
culminated in a strategy that on one hand condemns the embargo, but on the 
other seeks to continue it as a mechanism for popular support through 
nationalism. I also seek to answer the question of what mechanisms are used by 
the Castro regime to foster nationalism. I will provide an account of how the 
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Cuban government utilized historical events to build nationalism, as well as some 
of the more traditional methods such as symbols, sports, and the media; then 
transition to a short discussion of the U.S. economic sanctions; and conclude 
with an analysis of Castro’s “dual-strategy.” Although Fidel Castro resigned as 
President in February 2008 – resulting in the election of his brother Raúl as 
president – Fidel is still Chairman of the Communist Party, and undoubtedly 
retains veto power over all strategic foreign policy, defense, and economic 
decisions. As a result, I will continue to refer to Fidel as the ultimate decision-
maker. This chapter focuses on the period following the 1959 revolution, but with 
particular emphasis on the period following the end of the Cold War.  
Nonetheless, in order to set the context for my analysis, it is important to explain 
what led to the continued confrontation between Cuba and America…The seeds 
were planted shortly after consolidation of the revolution. 
Background 
Following the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the strong nationalism promoted 
by Fidel Castro, gradually entered the post-revolutionary regime. The revolution, 
having succeeded in its own terms, enjoyed enormous popularity. Castro 
consolidated his power by eliminating past political institutions and to rule by 
decree; he delivered popular reform decrees that resulted in a significant 
redistribution of wealth. Castro then pushed further using the well-organized and 
established Cuban Communist Party to purge all dissent from the government 
and eliminate all opposition media. Gradually, anti-communism became 
synonymous with counter-revolution (Pérez 1988). The opposition to Castro took 
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new forms as exile groups organized and adopted techniques such as internal 
sabotage. But Castro’s support was strong as he integrated nationalism into the 
defense of the revolution. Relations with the United States continued to 
deteriorate - through the expropriation of U.S. business interests in Cuba - 
resulting in a continued economic embargo, which has in different forms, 
endured to the present day.  
By the end of 1959, Castro was firmly in control. He had essentially 
eliminated a powerless provisional government by systematically isolating and 
pushing aside any liberals or moderates that had been in government. He broke 
with all past political institutions he considered implicated in past misgovernment: 
the presidency, congress, the courts, the army and police, the press, political 
parties, and the church. The masses demanded deep radical changes, and their 
charismatic leader delivered as he ruled by decree with reforms that reduced 
rents and properties, increased wages and reduced rates of utilities, as well as 
agrarian reform – resulting in a significant redistribution of wealth (Pérez 1988; 
Prevost 2006). These early reforms won the revolutionary government immediate 
widespread popular support, which of course, was not unanimous. The U.S. saw 
its interests threatened and demanded compensation for property nationalized 
through agrarian reform. Liberals, property owners, and the middle class were 
increasingly suspicious of Castro’s intentions. The opposition and exile groups 
organized, but this played right into Fidel’s hand: now defense of the nation 
became indistinguishable from defense of the revolution (Pérez 1998). 
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Nationalism immediately became an important tool for Castro to continue the 
consolidation of his revolution. 
Of course, nationalism was integrated with the other two pillars. Castro 
controlled the means of violence which were used to purge all dissent. As the 
elimination of the U.S. presence continued, the classes economically dependent 
on and ideologically allied to the U.S., all but collapsed (Pérez 1998). 
Nevertheless, these well-educated and professional classes still represented a 
threat to the regime, which repression alone could not control, due to the 
numbers as well as political implications. Emigration was the solution and Castro 
used it for nationalistic purposes as well:  
            “Let the worms34 leave; we do not want them and we do not need them,”  
he is quoted as saying. The massive middle class emigration between 1959 and 
1962 eliminated the possibility of an internal challenge to the regime, but it also 
had negative consequences for all parties. The island was drained of its talented 
professionals, affecting development for years to come; the Cuban immigrants 
had placed their faith on the U.S, instead of challenging the regime from the 
inside. The U.S. had created another enemy for Cuba – the exile community.   
 Relations continued to deteriorate as Cuba sought trade and political 
relations with the communist bloc. Once alternative markets for sugar exports 
and an oil agreement with the Soviet Union had been secured, the U.S. lost its 
economic leverage on the island. Cuba continued expropriating North American 
properties. The U.S. responded with an economic embargo and a ban on most 
 
34 Worm – or gusano in Spanish – is a term popularly used in Cuba in reference to counter-
revolutionaries. 
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U.S. exports; Cuba then nationalized a broad range of private enterprises to 
include Cuban-owned interests. The North American attempt to use economic 
coercion to force Castro into moderation had failed. Confrontation with the U.S. 
further radicalized the revolution and facilitated the alignment with the Soviet 
Union (Prevost 2006). Once again, Castro played his cards masterfully. The 
socialist character of the revolution was now affirmed.  
Nationalism in the Castro Era 
“If the Americans do not like what is happening in Cuba, they can land the 
Marines and then there will be 200,000 gringos dead.” Fidel Castro, 1959 
The growth of nationalism is the process of integrating the masses into a 
common political form (Kohn 1944). To the Cuban regime, this meant imparting a 
common revolutionary identity to the population. Through the revolution, Castro 
developed the possibility of a new “imagined community35” that incorporated a 
sense of Cubanidad (Cubaness) based on the political and social ideals of the 
revolution. Nationalism is normally imposed from above by the so-called political 
“elites.” In the Cuban case study, this applies to Castro, his brother Raúl, the 
close circle of revolutionaries, and the upper echelons of the Communist party. 
According to Hobsbawm (1990), the reception to the imposition of nationalism 
could be universal or separated by class. In Cuba, it was accepted by the 
masses, long ignored by the previous governments, but not the upper and middle 
classes, most of which migrated to the United States. The political elites have 
 
35 The “imagined community” is a concept developed by Benedict Anderson (1990) to explain 
nationalism. Anderson argues that a nation is actually an “imagined” political community because, 
unlike an actual community, there is no face-to-face interaction between its members. People 
perceive themselves as part of a group (or nation) through the power of the media and the 
sharing of similar interests. 
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skillfully used historical events and mechanisms to “connect” with the masses 
regarding the revolutionary identity. In forging this “imagined community” the 
political elite combined the ideals of a classless society with a passionate anti-
U.S. rhetoric that would become essential to being Cuban and independent. 
Several events have shaped Cuba’s “revolutionary” identity. The regime has 
expertly manipulated and exploited these experiences to build nationalism. Next, 
I will discuss several examples of such events, as well as the mechanisms used 
to connect with the masses.   
Events 
The failed Bay of Pigs invasion by Cuban exiles – half-heartedly 
supported by the U.S. and organized by the Central Intelligence Agency- during 
April 1961 (Lynch 1999), proved to be a turning point for Cuba-U.S. relations, 
and one that Castro exploited for nationalistic and survival purposes. 
Nationalism, repression, and emigration were the tools employed. Nationalism: 
the major result of the American intervention was the consolidation of Castro’s 
power by creating a solid identification of the Cuban people with the common 
revolutionary identity imposed from above.  The forces under Castro had 
defeated two enemies: the U.S. and Cuban exiles - they could do no wrong. 
Repression: the government moved against anyone suspected of opposition to 
the regime; by the end of the month, an estimated 100,000 persons were 
imprisoned or otherwise detained; virtually no suspected opponent of the 
government remained free in Cuba after that time (Pérez 1988). Emigration: 
thereafter, planeload after planeload of Cubans that opposed the regime left the 
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island. Castro was confident. He then declared the “socialist” character of the 
Cuban revolution (Pérez 1988; Prevost 2006), and abolished the 1940 
constitution proclaiming “direct government by the people.” Additionally, Castro 
built on the anti-U.S. component of the revolutionary identity by seeking the 
protection and sponsorship of the Soviet Union. The survival of the revolution 
was all but guaranteed a year later, when the United States, as part of the 
negotiations to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba, agreed not to invade the 
island (Pérez 1988). Cubans could be proud of their “imagined community” that 
had defeated the mighty empire.     
The international interventions by Cuba in the Middle East and Africa not 
only played to the anti-U.S. component of Cuban nationalism, but increased 
Cuba’s prestige within the Third World, as well as the pride of Cubans with the 
performance of their armed forces. The small island of Cuba was having an 
impact internationally. Cuba’s success in Africa36 led directly to a prominent role 
for Castro in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), an organization of Third-World 
countries that grew in prestige during the 1970s. NAM strongly endorsed Cuba’s 
Africa policies, and in 1979, Castro was elected to the presidency of the 
organization. The presidency of NAM represented a new height of prestige for 
Castro and revolutionary Cuba (Prevost 2006). Although Castro lost political 
capital when he backed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he reversed the 
 
36 Following the War of Independence (1961-1975)  in Angola, the two main groups – the National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) became antagonists in the ensuing Civil War (1975-2002). In 1975, 
Cuba deployed 36,000 troops to Angola in support of the MPLA, and were able to prevent South 
African intervention into Angola to support UNITA. As a result, Cuba gained significant influence 
in the region (Prevost 2006).  
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situation during the Falklands/ Malvinas War in 1982. Parallel to the success in 
Africa and with NAM, Cuba also played an important role in Central America and 
the Caribbean in the early 1980s, as a supporter of the revolutionary 
governments that emerged in Grenada and Nicaragua. By the end of the decade, 
Cuba was extending its trade with most of Latin America and Castro was a 
prominent participant at regional political meetings (Prevost 2006). Ordinary 
Cubans felt significant pride regarding the importance of their leader and country 
in international affairs.     
The end of the Cold War and subsequent breakup of the USSR and the 
Soviet Bloc produced complete disarray and distress in Cuba. The cancellation of 
trade arrangements and commercial agreements, trade subsidies, and economic 
assistance, subjected Cuba to the full impact of international market forces. Cuba 
responded with the implementation of the “special period,” a framework to 
implement a series of austerity measures. Cuba plunged into a deep cycle of 
scarcity in which daily life was essentially a fight for survival in the pursuit of the 
most basic needs. The resulting depression reduced the gross domestic product 
(GDP) by 35 percent, led to closure of hundreds of factories, and left tens of 
thousands of Cubans unemployed; real wages declined by 80 percent between 
1989 and 1995 (Purcell and Rothkopf 2000). 
Cuba responded to the difficult times with pragmatic measures such as 
the pursuit of new markets, new trading partners, free farmer’s markets, 
legalization of self-employment, and the legalization of U.S. dollars. Development 
strategies encouraged foreign investment in all industries to include agriculture, 
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transportation, construction, mining, and textiles, but most importantly tourism – 
that could provide much needed foreign exchange (Purcell and Rothkopf 2000). 
Although conditions improved, the mass infusion of dollars into the economy 
caused some resentment among those Cubans that were unable to benefit from 
access to dollars, whether by remittances or participation in the tourism industry. 
Other side effects included internal “brain drain” to the tourism industry, rise in 
petty theft, prostitution, corruption and expansion of the underground economy 
(Pérez 2006; Prevost 2006). Castro later rolled-back some of these reforms and 
also conducted a new wave of repression and emigration to eliminate the dissent 
caused by the special period. Nevertheless, Castro still retained considerable 
moral authority and loyalty among vast numbers of Cubans. They had survived 
the extreme hardship of the special period and the tightening of the U.S. 
embargo…They could claim victory against the enemy.   
Ten years ago, the saga of Elián Gonzalez mobilized Cuba in a 
nationalistic fervor that had been somewhat dormant during the special period. 
Having survived the death of his mother in an ill-fated crossing of the Florida 
Straits, the unaccompanied five-year-old arrived in the United States in 
November 1999, and was immediately the subject of competing claims of 
custody between his cousins in Miami - with strong support of the exile 
community - and his father in Cuba (Pérez 2006). Castro himself took the lead in 
arguing the father’s case for custody in the international court of public opinion 
and seized the opportunity to mobilize the population in support of the boy’s 
return. He was successful in both counts. The highly publicized controversy was 
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resolved with a raid of federal agents to recover the boy from the custody of the 
Miami relatives and his eventual return to Cuba. The massive demonstrations in 
Cuba re-enforced Cuban nationalism. Once again, Castro had beaten the 
enemies of the revolution: the United States and the Cuban exile community.  
More recently, a series of tropical storms and hurricanes in 2008 provided 
a new platform for the Cuban government’s propaganda campaign. The 
destruction caused by the storms supplied ample material for television 
commercials and newscasts that emphasized the government’s role in protecting 
the people before and after the storms. Images of families being rescued by 
emergency workers from flooded streets with messages like “now is the time to 
show our unity,” played to the nationalistic sentiment of Cubans. In addition, the 
dual strategy was manifested in the rejection of humanitarian assistance offered 
to Cuba by Washington. The U.S. offered to provide Cuba with contributions of 
$5 and $6 million dollars to cover recovery expenses, but was turned down twice 
by the regime in Havana (www.MiamiHerald.com). This act of defiance – even if 
it means continued hardship – plays well with most Cubans. They, and other 
Latin Americans, see it as standing up to the U.S. and not accepting gifts from 
the enemy.  
Mechanisms 
According to Hobsbawm (1990), symbols are an important component in 
building nationalism. Communist Cuba has certainly incorporated this concept 
into the daily life of Cubans. Castro capitalizes on the symbolic legacy of national 
heroes of the past such as the 19th century Cuban patriot, José Martí, who not 
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only advocated for the unity of all Cubans regardless of race or ethnicity, but also 
warned of the dangers of U.S. hegemony in the Western hemisphere. Others 
include the heroes of the Cuban revolution, such as Castro himself and Ernesto 
Che Guevara, who represent the ideals of the revolution; sports figures who 
represent the success of the Cuban system; and of course, the display of the 
Cuban flag virtually everywhere, as well as the singing of the national anthem 
before any public activity – to include the workplace, community meetings, and 
sports events. But symbols, or nationalistic propaganda for that matter, are 
useless unless they can be disseminated to the masses.   
Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1991) describes the 
importance of the media in establishing links among individuals to develop a 
common bond and ideology. Billboards displaying the images of Castro, Martí, 
and Guevara are a common medium throughout Cuba and proclaim the success 
of the revolution: A Castro billboard states: “Vamos Bien” (we are doing well), or 
a silhouette of the revolutionary Ernesto Che Guevara with the slogan: Seguimos 
Tu Ejemplo (we follow your example). Of course, in a communist state the 
government controls all media, and the Cuban regime employs this mechanism 
very well in the dissemination of nationalistic and political ideology to the masses. 
The daily government newspaper, Granma, is full of nationalistic and 
revolutionary ideology reports and editorials. On a latter section of this chapter, I 
will provide a sample of Granma reports concerning the U.S. economic embargo. 
Sports provide another mechanism that serves to instill pride and 
nationalism in the Cuban people. The government spends considerable 
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resources in the development of a national sports program. The success of 
Cubans in international sports is undeniable. For example, in the 2008 Beijing 
Summer Olympic Games, Cuba finished in 12th place with 24 medals – highest of 
any Latin American nation and ahead of countries such as Brazil, Canada, and 
Spain. In fact in the all-time medal list, Cuba places 23 out of 126 nations (an 
additional 79 countries have never won any medals), well ahead of Brazil – the 
next Latin American country in number 33 (www.olympic.org). These figures are 
remarkable considering the size of Cuba, and the fact that the standings include 
the Winter Games, for which Cuba does not field a team. Success in sports 
allows the Cuban regime to claim superiority to other political systems in Latin 
America. Its impact on nationalism cannot be underestimated.  
Although there is no political debate in Cuba, the 1976 constitution 
established “Organs of People Power” (OPP) to provide an element of popular 
participation in policy implementation (Prevost 2006), and a forum for the 
common people to express their personal and community concerns through 
elected representatives. Additionally, the revolution did achieve success in the 
areas of education, nutrition, and health services – virtually eliminating illiteracy, 
malnutrition, and providing free health care for all citizens. The government cites 
the OPPs and gains in social services as proof of the success of the revolution 
and its ideals. In general, the people consider these gains noteworthy, 
particularly in relation to other Latin American countries.    
So far in this chapter, I have established the fact that Castro built on his 
revolutionary movement through repression, emigration, and intense nationalism. 
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He cleverly utilizes events and the media to connect with the masses. Cuban 
nationalism is anti-Yankee and tends to bolster a regime in confrontation with the 
United States (LeoGrande 1982). I have also attempted to answer the central 
question regarding mechanisms used by the Cuban government to foster 
nationalism. But the focus of this chapter is the U.S. economic embargo and 
Castro’s dual strategy – inspired by a guerilla warfare insurgent philosophy - in 
dealing with the sanctions for political benefits. 
U.S. Economic Sanctions  
The economic embargo - initially imposed by President Eisenhower in 
1960 - has held to this day, albeit in a variety of forms. The particulars of the 
different variations are well documented and beyond the scope of this chapter. 
However, there are two important points worth mentioning. First, America’s 
justifications for sanctions have been reactive to Castro’s political moves. During 
the 1960’s and 1970’s, U.S. strategy was to isolate communist Cuba 
economically to encourage internal discontent and weaken the regime from 
within.  
 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the embargo could no longer 
be justified by reference to the Soviet threat or Cuban international interventions, 
since the loss of Soviet support made it virtually impossible to “export revolution.”  
As a result, Washington began to define its Cuba policy in terms of democracy, 
human rights, and a market economy (Purcell 2001). The second point is that 
these policies, combined with the unwavering efforts of Castro, have had the 
opposite effect and serve to forge Cuban nationalism, as manifested in the 
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resolve and solidarity of Cubans to continue with the revolution. The overall 
winner has been the regime. Cubans must unite in defense of the nation against 
the “enemy,” that being the U.S. and Cuban exile community plotting against the 
island. Foreign governments and international organizations have expressed 
their opposition as well. Castro has made political gains internally and externally; 
his “Dual Strategy” has been consistently validated.     
Development of Cuba’s Dual Strategy on the U.S. Economic Sanctions 
           The attention that Cuba gets in U.S. politics has not subsided since the 
end of the Cold War. The discourse has probably only intensified. Castro made 
sure of this by attacking the embargo and creating incidents that highlight the 
“threat” to his regime (Purcell and Rothkopf 2000). This pattern has repeated 
itself for almost 5 decades. However, the unpleasant truth is that for the first 30 
years the leverage of the economic embargo was not as significant because the 
Cuban economy was subsidized by the Soviet bloc. Nonetheless, the Cuban 
regime would have benefited economically by investment and trade with its close 
neighbor, but the rising of hostile rhetoric assumed a dynamic of its own. During 
the 1960s, Washington continued with a policy of hostility that included not only 
the embargo, but the recruiting of allies to join in the isolation of Cuba. Outside 
the hemisphere these efforts met with little success, but among Latin American 
states only Mexico refused to abide by the Organization of American States 
(OAS). Cuba responded by increasing its efforts to export the revolution to its 
Latin American neighbors (LeoGrande 1982). Cuba’s leaders made a decision on 
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a policy of insurgent confrontation with the United States and dealing with the 
reality of the embargo. The stage was set for the future.  
In the early 1970s U.S. policy makers began to reassess relations with 
Cuba. The policy of hostility had failed to destabilize the island and Castro had 
continued to export revolution. Concurrently, the initiation of the policy of détente 
made Cuban communism less threatening and the embargo less rational 
(LeoGrande 1982). As Latin American states began to abandon the sanctions, 
Cuba did respond with moderation in its revolutionary adventures and pressure 
within the U.S. to normalize relations with Cuba increased. The Ford 
administration moved in that direction; it eased the economic embargo for 
subsidiaries of U.S. firms operating abroad, voted in 1975 to relax the OAS 
sanctions, and dropped its demand that Cuba sever its relations with the Soviet 
Union as a precondition for normalization (LeoGrande 1982). The denial of aid to 
third countries that permitted their ships to trade with Cuba was also revoked 
(Purcell 2003). Additionally, private discussions began on the full range of 
bilateral relations. However, the movement towards normalization ended when 
Cuba deployed 35, 000 troops (LeoGrande 1982; Prevost 2006) to Angola in 
support of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) resistance 
to a South African incursion (Prevost 2006). Besides threatening a military 
response to any further Cuban interventions abroad, the U.S. declared the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops a precondition for resuming the normalization 
process. Castro chose political benefits abroad over better relations with 
America; that is, the continued use of the embargo for propaganda and 
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nationalism over economic benefits for the Cuban people. The confrontational 
pattern continued. 
By the time President Carter assumed office in 1977, Cuban troops had 
begun withdrawing from Angola, and Washington sought to improve relations. A 
fishing agreement was negotiated and bilateral discussions on a wide range of 
issues resumed (LeoGrande 1982). A series of bilateral concessions followed: 
The U.S. halted reconnaissance over flights and lifted the ban on travel to Cuba. 
The Cubans responded by releasing over 4,000 political prisoners and starting a 
dialogue with the Cuban exile community regarding visits to Cuba and to allow 
reunification of families (LeoGrande 1982). These efforts culminated with the 
establishment of diplomatic interests sections in both capitals (Purcell 2003) – a 
move just short of diplomatic recognition. But Carter’s efforts to normalize 
relations collapsed in 1978 when Cuba sent 20,000 troops to Ethiopia in support 
of the communist military junta in a border conflict with Somalia. Carter felt that 
the Cuban leader had betrayed him (Purcell 2003). A succession of mini-crises 
that included the presence of Soviet fighter aircraft and combat units in Cuba, as 
well as the 1980 flotilla of Cuban refugees from Mariel,37 further deteriorated 
relations (LeoGrande 1982). Once again, an opportunity was lost as Castro 
selected continued confrontation over normalization of relations.  
 
37 The Mariel Boatlift (April- September 1980) was a mass exodus of Cubans following an 
economic turndown and the subsequent announcement by Castro that Cubans that wanted to 
leave could do so. Political implications resulted when it became known that a number of exiles 
included convicts from Cuban jails and patients from mental institutions. By the time the boatlift 
ended by mutual agreement, over 125,000 Cubans had migrated to Florida with the help of the 
exile community. 
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 President Ronald Reagan assumed a tough stance with Cuba as his 
administration promoted the tightening of the embargo and the re-isolation of 
Cuba within the hemisphere (Prevost 2006). Of course, Cuba continued with its 
confrontational policy with the U.S. as it assisted the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, 
pursued political influence in Grenada, and shipped arms to guerillas in El 
Salvador. Overall, Cuba had gained politically with its foreign interventions, anti-
U.S. policy, and the continuation of the U.S. embargo. This was especially true 
through Reagan’s tenure, as most of Latin America resented his aggressive 
foreign policy across the region. Externally, Cuba assumed a prominent role in 
non-aligned movement of Third-World Countries, and rallied Latin American 
countries on a nationalistic basis against the U.S. support of the British in the 
Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982, thus helping breakdown Cuba’s isolation in 
Latin America (Prevost 2006). Internally, Castro continued to use the embargo, 
and Cuba’s improved international relations, to strengthen the anti-Yankee 
Cuban nationalism, which of course tends to bolster a regime in confrontation 
with an external power (LeoGrande 1982).  
Up to this point, the argument could be made that although Castro can 
use the embargo for propaganda and nationalistic purposes, the political gains 
combined with Soviet subsidies more than offset the economic gains of lifting the 
embargo. Thus, it was an easy decision for the Cuban government to continue 
the pattern of confrontation. However, the status quo changed with the end of the 
Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. By 1993 Cuba had lost 75% of its 
import capacity, and the country’s economy had contracted by 50%. Outside the 
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context of war, no modern economy had been so devastated in the twentieth 
century (Prevost 2006). The resulting hardships on the Cuban people have 
already been discussed. The conditions were set for the Cuban regime to 
complement some of the pragmatic measures already undertaken to improve the 
economy – such as development of the tourism industry and small capitalistic 
projects – with efforts to improve economic relations with the U.S. But would 
Washington respond? It did not. President George H.W. Bush continued the hard 
line against Cuba by signing the Cuba Democracy Act – which gave the 
Executive Branch the option of selective lifting of sanctions to reward positive 
actions by Cuba (Purcell 2003; Roy 2000). However, the election of President 
Clinton offered a new beginning and an opening to better relations. 
U.S. policy makers had expected the revolutionary government to collapse 
in the absence of Soviet bloc support (Prevost 2006). But the regime survived 
and the U.S. sought to increase the pressure through the Helms-Burton (H-B) 
1996 Act. The Clinton administration opposed the legislation because of strong 
opposition from U.S. allies38 (Prevost 2006) and had even launched a series of 
“people to people” initiatives to try and build unofficial bridges to Cuban society 
(Roy 2000). Further, Secretary of State Warren Christopher issued statements 
regarding “U.S. calibrated responses” to Castro’s actions, an indication of U.S. 
willingness to move in the direction of gradually normalizing relations with Cuba 
 
38 The Helms-Burton Act strengthened the embargo by extending its application internationally to 
foreign companies trading with Cuba, and penalized foreign companies allegedly trafficking in 
property formerly owned by U.S. citizens but expropriated by Cuba after the 1959 revolution 
(www.state.gov). 
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(Suchliki 2003). Passage of the H-B act was not a done deal. On one side stood 
the agricultural, travel, and energy lobbies, as well as Cuban-American family 
associations, and cultural, religious, and humanitarian groups (Roy 2000); on the 
other, stood the powerful Cuban-American lobby and their 6-8% of the vote in the 
swing state of Florida. But once again, Castro forced the hand of Congress and 
the President.  
In early February, the Cuban government unleashed a wave of brutal 
repression against Concilio Cubano, an umbrella organization of dissident groups 
on the island, and arrested more than 100 of its members - thus reinforcing 
Castro’s opposition to any kind of political opening within the island (Suchlicki 
2003). Worse yet, on February 24, 1996, Cuban MIG-23 and MIG-29 fighter jets 
shot down two civilian Cessna airplanes from the Miami-based “Brothers to the 
Rescue” activist group. Granted, the group had been warned in the past about 
violating Cuban airspace while dropping leaflets on the island and spotting for 
rafters; and on this particular date at least one of three airplanes (specific reason 
why the third aircraft was not shot down is unknown) is known to have entered 
Cuban airspace. Nonetheless, this is hardly a reason for engaging unarmed 
aircraft with hostile fire. Other measures such as escorting the aircraft beyond 
national airspace or instructing them to land would have been appropriate. In a 
highly centralized regime like Cuba’s – and with likely international ramifications - 
the order to execute such an action had to come from the highest levels of the 
Cuban government. Undoubtedly, that would be the Castro brothers. The timing, 
in the middle of Congressional debate of the H-B Act, was hardly coincidental. 
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Castro made a conscientious decision to shoot down those aircraft knowing full 
well that it would lead to passage of the H-B legislation and tightening of the 
embargo. Thus, the incident shattered any near-term possibility of 
rapprochement between the United States and Cuba. As a result, President 
Clinton, who at first had been ambivalent, appeared compelled to sign the H-B 
bill into law on March 12, 1996 (Roy 2000).   
Internally, Castro capitalized with the incident and passage of the H-B Act. 
“National sovereignty” had been at stake and thus few Cubans sympathized with 
the Brothers to the Rescue pilots; and the tightening of the embargo was 
effective at stirring strong U.S. sentiments. For example, following passage of the 
H-B Act, Castro organized numerous island-wide demonstrations and protests 
(Katz 2005). These of course served to build nationalistic fervor and distract 
Cubans from the failures of their own regime. Externally, the aircraft incident 
brought some initial international condemnation, but this was outweighed by the 
H-B international implications. Despite the aircraft controversy, Cuba managed to 
rally other countries to its side serving to bolster Cuban nationalism and the 
government’s legitimacy in its “fight” with the U.S. Since 1994, the United Nations 
General Assembly has voted (by margins as large as 157 to 2) to support the 
embargo’s repeal. Moreover, powerful figures such as Pope John Paul II have 
criticized the “unjust and ethically unacceptable” U.S. embargo – helping Castro 
seize the moral high ground (Katz 2005; Roy 2000). During November 2007, the 
Summit of Leaders from Latin America, Spain, and Portugal called for the U.S. to 
end the economic embargo (Miami Herald 2007). More recently, at the 
 154
                                                
December 2008 Latin American Summit, leaders not only welcomed Raúl Castro 
to the summit meeting, but also condemned the U.S. embargo    
Further evidence of Castro’s dual strategy can be implied from quotes and 
reactions of Cuban officials to passage of the H-B Act. Carlos Lage, executive 
secretary of the Cuban Council of Ministers, argued that the H-B Act had a 
corresponding political benefit, it “has played a role in unifying the Cuban people, 
has unified the international community, [and] has increased our adrenaline flow” 
(Roy 2006). Moreover, he predicted that the law would not interfere with the 
economic recovery of Cuba – as forty-three nations had invested in 143 new 
ventures (Roy 2006). The H-B Act also helped the Cuban government when 
things did not go well. Cuban officials have made use of H-B to explain real or 
anticipated economic problems by stating that the law creates a “climate of 
uncertainty” for investors and it is the cause of any misery and hardship 
experienced by the Cuban people (Roy 2006). As explained earlier, the media is 
the primary mechanism for getting this message to the masses. The Granma 
website (www.granma.cu) – a reflection of the government’s newspaper – offered 
the following recent (April 2009) headlines in the front page of the international 
edition: 
? United Nations Vote Condemns Embargo of Superpower that Intends to 
Isolate Cuba 
 
? The Entire Planet Condemns the Blockade 
? Success of Cuban Team in ALBA39 Games and World Series of Platform 
Diving 
 
39 ALBA stands for the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, a regional organization created by 
Venezuela to promote alternatives to capitalism. 
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? Fidel talks about the Che [Guevara] Documentary 
? President of United Nations Human Rights Counsel Praises Cuba 
Further, the front page includes links to editorials by “comrade” Fidel, as 
well as links to his principal speeches. Thus, these headlines serve to fuel the 
national sentiment of Cubans against the enemy that – through the embargo – 
attempts to crush the nation; the sports headline – as discussed earlier – is used 
to instill pride in Cubans and their system; and the use of Che Guevara as a 
symbol of revolutionary values validates Hobsbawm’s (1990) thesis on the 
importance of symbols to build nationalism. Such use of media and propaganda 
to connect the elites, that do the “imagining,” with the masses, validates 
Anderson’s theory of “Imagined Communities.” 
Conclusion 
“The Revolution has not yet started.” Fidel Castro, 1999 
The Cuban revolution fused two of Latin America’s most genuine 
characteristics: a thirst for nationalism and the role of the caudillo (strong man) 
(Roy 2000). Fidel Castro and his close group of revolutionaries have successfully 
made the connection with the masses to create this “imagined community” 
through the media and other mechanisms. A proven technique for fostering 
nationalism is a conflict with an external foe. History is full of examples: the 
Japanese invasion actually united the Chinese communists and nationalists in a 
wave of nationalism during World War II; and the Argentines supported the 
military dictatorship in the invasion of the Falkland/ Malvinas islands in 1982, to 
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cite just two examples. Castro effectively utilizes the embargo to stir strong anti-
U.S. sentiments and effectively “maintain” an external enemy alive. While the 
United States hopes the sanctions will force change, or perhaps the collapse of 
the regime, the Cuban government blames the United States for the chronic 
economic problems within the island. 
This chapter has set out to prove the thesis that the Castro regime seeks 
to continue the U.S. imposed economic embargo as a mechanism to promote 
nationalism and international support. This dual strategy promotes the regime 
internally while concurrently it obtains international legitimacy. The central 
concept to prove my thesis is the wave of missed opportunities by Cuba that 
would have possibly led to the eventual termination of the embargo. Each time, 
Castro consistently chose continued confrontation. I suggest that this is not 
coincidence, but part of a systematic approach to continue the embargo. 
Granted, a case for the other side of the argument – that Castro truly wants an 
end to the embargo – can certainly be made. After all, Castro has spent 
significant resources lobbying U.S. interest groups and politicians. However, that 
is simply part of the strategy. The Cuban regime must “appear” to want to end 
the embargo – otherwise they would lose all credibility in the eyes of Cubans and 
the international community. Consequently, the dual strategy is conducted by the 
decision makers of the Cuban government – possibly only the Castro brothers – 
which is of course a feasible course of action in a dictatorship, particularly one as 
centralized as Cuba’s.    
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Over the last ten years, the U.S. has tried both partial engagement as well 
as an aggressive approach. In 1999, President Clinton announced an offer to 
increase communications with Cuba, combined with an offer of food and 
medicine (Roy 2000). Predictably, Castro chose resistance. Cuban Economy 
Minister José Rodríguez called the offer “crumbs.” Ricardo Alarcón, president of 
the Cuban National Assembly, went further calling the offer “subversive, 
meddlesome, and counterrevolutionary” (Roy 2006). The apparent 
disappearance of the enemy could not be allowed; the threat had to continue. 
More recently (October of 2007), President Bush gave his first stand-alone 
address on Cuba in four years (www.foxnews.com) challenging the dictatorship 
and encouraging dissidents to step up efforts on the island in pursuit of change. 
Bush proposed new initiatives to follow-through on his call: the creation of an 
international “freedom fund” to help Cuba’s potential rebuilding of the country; a 
U.S. licensing of private groups to provide Internet access to Cuban students; 
and an invitation to Cuban youth to join a scholarship program 
(www.foxnews.com). All this of course plays right into Castro’s hand.  While 
condemning the speech for all the usual “anti-imperialist” reasons, the Cuban 
authorities found it quite to their liking, and so embarrassingly out of touch, that 
they chose to broadcast and print it on the island media (Miami Herald 2007).40  
They were comfortable with broadcasting the speech because it strengthens their 
position. Castro had also pre-empted the speech by saying that Bush had a 
                                                 
40 Bush’s statement about Cuba’s “socialist paradise is a tropical gulag,” was deleted. 
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vision equivalent to a new “conquest of Cuba by force” and that he [Bush] “could 
spark World War III (www.foxnews.com).   
The recent election of U.S President Barack Obama has definitely 
changed the dynamic of U.S.-Cuba relations. Mr. Obama has declared the need 
for closer relations and has lifted remittances and travel restrictions to the island 
for exile families. In return, Raúl Castro declared that Cuba was willing to discuss 
“everything” with U.S counterparts to include human rights, freedom of the press 
and expression, and political prisoners. At the April 2009 Summit of the 
Americas, Obama responded by saying that Washington seeks a new beginning 
with Cuba, but also called for Cuba to release political prisoners and reduce 
taxes on remittances from the U.S. Unfortunately, Fidel immediately intervened, 
reducing expectations for improved bilateral relations, when he wrote an editorial 
in Granma stating that Obama “without a doubt misinterpreted Raúl’s 
declarations,”  suggesting that Obama had no right to dare suggest Cuba make 
even small concessions (www.MiamiHerald.com). It appears that once again an 
attempt for improved relations by a U.S. President has been derailed by Fidel. 
The embargo is a complex issue with many variables and actors: the 
powerful lobby of Cuban-American voters in the swing state of Florida, with its 27 
electoral votes; U.S. economic interests; increased isolation of U.S. foreign 
policy; human rights; and many others. Whether the sanctions are effective or not 
was not the subject of this chapter. It is evident that for 50 years the embargo 
has failed to bring down the Cuban communist regime; but there is also no 
guarantee that engagement would have led to any kind of political reform, or 
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change of existing internal policies that lie at the root of Cuba’s failed economy. It 
is also clear that many Cubans have not bought Castro’s rhetoric or imposed 
nationalism. They risk their lives crossing the Florida Straits in pursuit of freedom, 
and many in Cuba view the exiles as fortunate to have escaped and live in 
freedom, democracy and economic prosperity. But the Castro brothers still enjoy 
the support of the majority of Cubans on the island. Therefore, it is safe to say 
that prosecution of the “Dual Strategy” will continue for as long as the Castro 
brothers – and particularly Fidel – are making the strategic decisions.  
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Chapter Seven 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In this work, I have set out to prove that the following relationship was the 
formula for success in both the Chinese and Cuban revolutions:  
 
Guerilla Warfare => Grand Strategy => Nationalism 
                                 X1                                          X2                                 Y 
 
An initial requirement to apply this relationship of variables is the existence of 
several pre-conditions that can create a revolutionary setting and contribute to 
the success of failure of a particular insurgent movement. Factors such as 
geography, demography, land tenure, and socio-economic status interact with 
one another to increase revolutionary potential and shape a particular setting. 
Issues or friction in one or more of these pre-conditions worked in favor of the 
insurgents in China and Cuba, as both settings were ripe for revolution. Their 
development can be best explained through Jack Goldstone’s An Analytical 
Framework (1991), which frames revolutions by analyzing three overlapping 
processes of state breakdown, revolutionary contention of anti-government 
groups, and state rebuilding once the dominant group achieves power and 
attempts to consolidate the new regime. Accelerators such as military defeat, and 
economic crises serve to increase the revolutionary “fever’ described by Crane 
Brinton, in his work The Anatomy of Revolution (1938). Finally, as suggested by 
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Barrington Moore (1966) a catalyst normally ignites the revolutionary setting into 
an actual revolution. I have suggested throughout this thesis, that guerilla warfare 
was the catalyst for the Chinese and Cuban revolution. More importantly, 
however, guerilla warfare was the principal component of the revolutionary 
theories designed by Mao, and Castro’s chief lieutenant - Che Guevara.    
Mao refined the Marxist Theory of Revolution to fit the particular Chinese 
setting. Mao’s People’s War subsequently inspired Fidel Castro’s guerilla 
revolutionary campaign and Guevara’s Foco Theory. They both realized that the 
source of strength to defeat a superior army was the peasants, but their 
strategies were slightly different. Mao concluded that a peasant Red Army, 
thoroughly indoctrinated and with a nationalistic consciousness, was the key to 
the revolutionary struggle. People, not weapons would be the decisive factor. 
The Red Army was co-equal to the Communist Party as the vanguard of the 
revolution. On the other hand, for Castro and Guevara, the peasants provided 
sanctuary and the initial recruits of their guerilla band, but the focus was the 
support of the middle class. Castro’s intent was to energize and unite the majority 
of the population in a movement of liberation. Castro did not necessarily follow a 
dogmatic formula or ideology but relied mostly on a nationalistic platform. Castro 
and Guevara saw the guerilla band as the one and only vanguard of the 
revolution.  However, in both cases, the principal instrument in their respective 
strategies was indeed guerilla warfare.  
In these two case studies, guerilla warfare went beyond simply military 
tactics techniques, and procedures. It was the catalyst for mobilizing the peasant 
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masses, for political indoctrination, and the main ingredient in a grand strategy to 
mobilize the resources required for revolutionary victory. Guerilla warfare was the 
mechanism for political work from the bottom-up, which combined with top-down 
strategic organization, resulted in the buildup of nationalism – the objective of the 
grand strategy. The principal takeaway regarding guerilla warfare in these two 
case studies is that it is not simply a stand-alone form of violence in the pursuit of 
power, but that to achieve success when revolutionary conditions exist, guerilla 
warfare must shape the grand strategy that incorporates political, social, 
economic, and psychological variables, with an end state of maximum 
mobilization of resources. As per Charles Tilly’s Theory (1978), mobilization 
seeks control of manpower and materiel resources. A successful grand strategy 
then maximizes the resources available to the insurgents, while it minimizes 
those available to the government. Mao and Castro developed such a plan of 
action – a dual strategy - for mobilizing popular support resources.   
The Dual Strategy is a strategy of deception because it seeks wide 
popular support of groups or classes with divergent interests. Thus, in order to 
appeal to the different groups, the insurgent’s message is modified according to 
which group it is targeting at a particular time and place. The dual strategy 
contains two principal components: internal and external. In general terms, the 
internal strategy focused on securing the sympathy and support of the peasant 
base. By promising radical social and agrarian reform, having peasants comprise 
the bulk of the insurgent force, and basing guerilla operations from the 
countryside, the peasantry was assured that their interests were indeed the main 
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effort of the revolutionary struggle. The external strategy focused on securing the 
alliance of the majority of the upper and middle classes as well as the 
international community, in order to isolate the government. By stressing a liberal 
patriotic image, defending justice, and calling for unity and moderate reforms, the 
insurgents sought to widen their appeal to the majority of the population and 
classes of society.  
The conduct of a Dual Strategy carries certain risks. Overlaps do occur 
between the internal and external components that result in contradictions. For 
example, the promise of radical agrarian reform contradicts the protection of 
property rights for landowners. The solution is to subordinate one component to 
the other based on the elements of time, space, and participants.  Only a strong 
and charismatic leader can manage these elements and maintain credibility, 
particularly when violence is involved. Mao and Castro were successful because 
they skillfully administered these contradictions - and within a revolutionary 
setting - expertly incorporated several variables such as ideology, organization, 
and violence - to achieve the mobilization of resources that could challenge the 
actor in power. However, at its core, the dual strategy requires the mechanism of 
guerilla warfare to measure progress and provide credibility in the revolutionary 
struggle, and thus provide focus and direction in pursuit of nationalism – the 
principal objective for the dual strategy.  
In a revolutionary setting, the actor that is better organized to obtain 
access to resources has the best chance of achieving dominance. The appeal of 
nationalism cuts across all classes of society and strongly enables the 
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mobilization of resources by the revolutionaries.  In fact, an ideology that appeals 
to national identity is probably the most powerful symbolic means of mobilizing 
revolutionary support and offers the greatest flexibility in appealing to all the 
society’s classes (Greene 1999). Mao was able to achieve the proper mix of 
communism and nationalism.  Communist ideology provided Mao with a coherent 
and articulate system that resonated with peasants and facilitated their support 
for revolution (Greene 1999). But the dual strategy at times de-emphasized 
communist ideology and instead focused on nationalism in order to obtain broad 
mass support. The Japanese invaders facilitated the growth of nationalism as the 
communists were successful in fostering an image of conducting guerilla warfare 
in defense of the people. Castro relied exclusively on nationalism; in fact, when 
exactly did Castro turn Marxist is not clear; what is clear is that in Cuba 
communist ideology was either non-existent or relatively unimportant until after 
revolutionary victory (The Economist 2009). Mr. Castro relied on the long-
standing hostility of Cubans towards the strong economic and political influence 
of the Unites States, to build a nationalistic platform.  In sum, guerillas must 
appear as nationalists, otherwise they will not win the mass support required to 
challenge the actor in power 
Alexis de Tocqueville in The French Revolution and the Growth of the 
State (1848) stated that revolutions often strengthen the power of the state. The 
protracted popular war of the Chinese Revolution devastated the country. 
Nevertheless, the new communist government was able to transform China from 
a declining and dependent power into an assertive and independent great power 
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(Katz 2001). For a short period of time, Communist China did seek to spread its 
brand of revolution elsewhere in the developing world, but to fully assert itself, 
China had to become part of the world community. Although the Cultural 
Revolution brought a period of social and political chaos combined with economic 
disarray, China remained a power player as a permanent member of the United 
Nations Security Council and as a nuclear state. It also became a broker in the 
bipolar world of the Cold War as it shifted emphasis of relations between the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union, while maintaining an independent foreign policy.  
In 1978, China adopted a dual strategy of a different variety: the 
separation of economics from communist ideology, with the introduction of 
market reforms that focus on capitalism with a heavy mixture of government 
control. As a result, China has become one of the world’s fastest growing 
economies, and for the most part - except for flare-ups with Taiwan in 1995-96 
and with the U.S. in 2001 - China has played a cautious game internationally, 
focusing on promoting policies that increase economic growth and maintain the 
status quo (The Economist 2009). China’s importance in the world today is 
undeniable with the world’s second largest economy and the largest standing 
army. 
In Cuba, the revolution succeeded on the cheap without a long protracted 
struggle. It also became a stronger state – at least internationally. The revolution 
transformed what was essentially a U.S. colony into an independent state. The 
Cuban revolution inspired the “left” throughout the world and ignited revolutionary 
struggles across the region. Cuba actively pursued a policy of vigorously 
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exporting revolution through its support of international revolutionary solidarity, 
Third World nationalism, and by providing arms and funds to insurgents (Childs 
1995), as it sought to advance their interest and influence. Essentially, Fidel 
Castro internationalized the foco revolutionary theory by continuing an insurgent 
strategy that placed Cuba as the foco within a global context. Cuban-inspired 
insurgent movements succeeded in Nicaragua in the 1970s, but failed in 
Venezuela in the 1960s and Bolivia in 1967 (Weitz 1986). Although Mr. Castro 
did stop trying to overthrow Latin American governments more than two decades 
ago, shortly before his Soviet sponsor collapsed, Cuba’s influence is still relevant 
today. Its achievements in health, education, and social welfare provided a 
credible model for Hugo Chávez Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela, who in turn 
has influenced a socialist transformation in Bolivia, Ecuador, and a return of the 
Sandinistas in Nicaragua.   
Fidel Castro successfully refined the dual strategy to adapt to changing 
conditions. The external component focused on promoting his revolution, 
developing a strong following in Latin America, enhancing Cuba’s influence, and 
increasing Cuba’s value as an ally to the Soviet Union, in order to obtain and 
then continue its sponsorship. The internal component targeted the Cuban 
people and their continued support of the revolution through the buildup of 
nationalism. Mr. Castro consistently presented himself as a nationalist first and a 
communist second. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the dual strategy 
has continued with the U.S. economic embargo as the principal tool utilized by 
Castro to provide focus in its execution. In this work, I have argued that the 
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Castro regime has sought to continue the economic embargo as a mechanism to 
promote nationalism and international support. Castro needs a conflict in order to 
create a climate of permanent confrontation that allows him to justify his absolute 
power and economic policies, under the pretense that he is defending the 
homeland. Without a conflict, there is no justification for the extreme hardship 
imposed on the Cuban people.  
Castro has continued to validate this dual strategy with positive results: 
the regime has considerable international political and even economic support; 
and the regime has remained in power. Cuba now receives substantial aid from 
Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez oil money. In turn Mr. Chávez benefits from the 
services of Cuban doctors and political and security advice designed to keep Mr. 
Chávez in power. A handful of other radical socialists who have achieved office 
through elections such as Bolivia’s Evo Morales also seek inspiration in Mr. 
Castro. He is treated with respect by social democrats such as Brazil’s Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva. In many cases that is because he offered them friendship in 
the past, when they were persecuted by dictatorships that had American backing. 
This is of course ironic because Castro has oppressed Cubans as well. The 
same applies to Presidents Cristina Fernandez of Argentina and Michelle 
Bachelet of Chile, who have recently visited Cuba and expressed support. 
Additionally, Latin America is now united in wanting to end the diplomatic 
isolation and many would like the U.S. to lift its long-standing economic embargo 
against the island (Summit of the Americas – April 2009). Nonetheless, fifty years 
after the revolution, and the subsequent imposition of communism, the island is 
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once again close to bankruptcy (The Economist 2009). If success and failure are 
measured by the quality of life of ordinary Cubans, then undoubtedly, the 
revolution has failed; however, it has succeeded in the minds of the Castro 
brothers and Cubans who are proud of their “imagined community.”   
So what does the future hold for these two countries? There are many 
who predict that China will be the next challenger to the United States. But 
China’s military power is still far behind that of the U.S. particularly in the naval 
component. China has not been a naval power for centuries and building one to 
match that of the U.S. will take decades. The question is whether China can 
remain stable as it resolves the contradictions associated with a relatively free 
market economy and a communist political system, as it occurs when economic 
decisions are made for political reasons, resulting in corruption and inefficiency. 
Further, the relative prosperity of the coastal regions compared with the mostly 
poor interior can lead to friction and conflict. It is likely then that China will 
continue to seek, and maintain, the status quo for the short term; however, the 
current system appears unsustainable for the long term. Slow and measured 
political reform is possible, but also a figure like Mao might emerge once again to 
bring equality and social reform through a strong nationalistic and pro-communist 
rhetoric. In fact, China’s “leftists” are becoming more active as the global 
economy sputters (The Economist 2009).  It is then quite possible that the dual 
strategy will re-emerge once again in China. 
The prospect of reform of Cuba looked promising when in February 2008 
Fidel stepped down as president in favor of his brother Raúl, who is considered 
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more of a pragmatist than an ideologue. Further, the election of U.S. President 
Barack Obama, who promised closer relations with Cuba during his campaign, 
offered a unique opportunity for change. However, since then, Raúl declared, 
during the 50th anniversary of the revolution, that the: “U.S. enemy will never stop 
being aggressive, dominant, and treacherous;”41 this was followed by the rebuttal 
of Fidel regarding Mr. Obama’s statements at the Summit of the Americas in 
April; finally, the Castro brothers asserted their dictatorial authority by sacking 
some of the younger and reform-minded officials in a recent government 
shakeup. Thus, the likelihood of reform is low, as long as the Castro brothers and 
the old revolutionary guard that comprise the inner circle remain in power. 
However, the regime is unsustainable long term considering the island’s weak 
economy, lack of resources and infrastructure, and of course the advanced age 
of its leadership. Although the dual strategy will continue for the foreseeable 
future, regime change is imminent for Cuba…However, only the Cuban people 
should make that decision.   
 
 
 
 
 
41 As quoted on www.breitbart.com (1/2/2009) 
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